WorldCat Identities

Fodor, Jerry A.

Overview
Works: 114 works in 386 publications in 10 languages and 16,483 library holdings
Roles: Editor, Collaborator, Interviewee
Classifications: bd418.3, 128.2
Publication Timeline
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Publications about Jerry A Fodor Publications about Jerry A Fodor
Publications by Jerry A Fodor Publications by Jerry A Fodor
Most widely held works about Jerry A Fodor
 
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Most widely held works by Jerry A Fodor
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16 editions published between and 2000 in English and German and held by 1,301 libraries worldwide
Doing philosophy, according to Jerry Fodor, is like piloting: The trick is to find an object of known position and locate yourself with respect to it. In this book, Fodor contrasts his views about the mind with those of a number of well-known philosophers and cognitive scientists, including John McDowell, Christopher Peacocke, Paul Churchland, Daniel Dennett, Paul Smolensky, and Richard Dawkins. Fodor constructs a version of the representational theory of mind that blends intentional realism, computational reductionism, nativism, and semantic atomism.
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14 editions published between and 1994 in English and held by 1,025 libraries worldwide
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20 editions published between and 1993 in English and held by 1,002 libraries worldwide
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8 editions published between and 2011 in English and held by 975 libraries worldwide
This book dares to challenge natural selection--not in the name of religion but in the name of good science. Most scientists are so terrified of religious attacks on the theory of evolution that it is never examined critically. There are significant scientific and philosophical problems with the theory of natural selection. Darwin claimed the factors that determine the course of evolution are very largely environmental. Empirical results in biology are increasingly calling this thesis into question. The authors show that Darwinism is committed to inferring, from the premise that a kind of creature with a certain trait was selected, the conclusion that that kind of creature was selected for having that trait. Though such inferences are fallacious, they are nevertheless unavoidable within the Darwinist framework. Ultimately, Jerry Fodor and Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini level a devastating critique against Darwinist orthodoxy and suggest new ways of thinking about evolution.--From publisher description.
by ( Book )
18 editions published between and 1997 in English and Spanish and held by 907 libraries worldwide
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35 editions published between and 2008 in English and Undetermined and held by 870 libraries worldwide
Four accounts of mental structure; A functional taxonomy of cognitive mechanisms; Input systems as modules; Central systems; Caveats and conclusions.
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26 editions published between and 1984 in 3 languages and held by 857 libraries worldwide
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8 editions published in in English and held by 815 libraries worldwide
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19 editions published between and 1986 in English and held by 794 libraries worldwide
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8 editions published between and 2002 in English and Spanish and held by 777 libraries worldwide
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11 editions published between and 2001 in English and held by 733 libraries worldwide
"In this engaging book, Jerry Fodor argues against the widely held view that mental processes are largely computations, that the architecture of cognition is massively modular, and that the explanation of our innate mental structure is basically Darwinian. Although Fodor has praised the computational theory of mind as the best theory of cognition that we have got, he considers it to be only a fragment of the truth. In fact, he claims, cognitive scientists do not really know much yet about how the mind works (the book's title refers to Steve Pinker's How the Mind Works)." "Fodor's primary aim is to explore the relationship among nativism, computational and modular theories of mind, and evolutionary psychology. Along the way, he explains how Chomsky's version of nativism differs from that of the widely received New Synthesis approach. He concludes that although we have no grounds to suppose that most of the mind is modular, we have no idea how nonmodular cognition could work. Thus, according to Fodor, cognitive science has hardly gotten started."--BOOK JACKET.
by ( Book )
11 editions published between and 2004 in English and Undetermined and held by 555 libraries worldwide
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14 editions published between and 2004 in English and held by 542 libraries worldwide
Renowned philosopher Fodor presents an original theory of the basic constituents of thought in this first volume of the Oxford Cognitive Science Series. He argues for an atomistic theory of concepts and demolishes rival theories.
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11 editions published between and 2005 in English and held by 422 libraries worldwide
"Hume? Yes, David Hume, that's who Jerry Fodor looks to for help in advancing our understanding of the mind. Fodor claims his Treatise of Human Nature as the foundational document of cognitive science: it launched the project of constructing an empirical psychology on the basis of a representational theory of mind. Going back to this work after more than 250 years we find that Hume is remarkably perceptive about the components and structure that a theory of mind requires. Careful study of the Treatise helps us to see what's amiss with much twentieth-century philosophy of mind, and to get on the right track." "Hume says in the Treatise that his main project is to construct a theory of human nature and, in particular, a theory of the mind. Hume Variations examines his account of cognition and how it is grounded in his 'theory of ideas'. Fodor discusses such key topics as the distinction between 'simple' and 'complex' ideas, the thesis that an idea is some kind of picture, and the roles that 'association' and 'imagination' play in cognitive processes. He argues that the theory of ideas, as Hume develops it, is both historically and ideologically continuous with the representational theory of mind as it is now widely endorsed by cognitive scientists. This view of Hume is explicitly opposed to recent discussions by critics who hold that the theory of ideas is the Achilles heel of his philosophy and that he would surely have abandoned it if only he had read Wittgenstein carefully." "You don't have to know much about Hume to enjoy this inventively argued, provocative, and stimulating defence of the representational theory of mind - which is looking increasingly hard to resist."--Jacket.
by ( Book )
14 editions published between and 2010 in English and held by 386 libraries worldwide
This latest book on the language of thought hypothesis, offers a more cogent presentation and a fuller explication of Fodor's distinctive account of the mind, with various intriguing new features. The central role of compositionality in the representational theory of mind is revealed: most of what we know about concepts follows from the compositionality of thoughts. Fodor shows the necessity of a referentialist account of the content of intentional states, and of an atomistic account of the individuation of concepts. Not least among the new developments is Fodor's identification and persecution of pragmatism as the leading source of error in the study of the mind today--Publisher description.
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3 editions published in in English and held by 225 libraries worldwide
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4 editions published between and 2002 in 3 languages and held by 108 libraries worldwide
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11 editions published between and 1987 in English and held by 81 libraries worldwide
 
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In critical condition polemical essays on cognitive science and the philosophy of mind
Alternative Names
Fodor, J. A.
Fodor, J. A. 1935-
Fodor, J. A. (Jerry A.)
Fodor, J. A. (Jerry Alan), 1935-
Fodor, Jerry.
Fodor, Jerry 1935-
Fodor, Jerry Alan 1935-
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