WorldCat Identities

Roth, Alvin E. 1951-

Overview
Works: 106 works in 357 publications in 2 languages and 3,966 library holdings
Genres: Conference proceedings 
Roles: Editor, Contributor
Classifications: HB144, 330.0724
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about  Alvin E Roth Publications about Alvin E Roth
Publications by  Alvin E Roth Publications by Alvin E Roth
Most widely held works by Alvin E Roth
The handbook of experimental economics by John H Kagel ( Book )
12 editions published between 1995 and 1997 in English and held by 688 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
"This book, which comprises eight chapters, presents a comprehensive critical survey of the results and methods of laboratory experiments in economics. The first chapter provides an introduction to experimental economics as a whole, while the remaining chapters provide surveys by leading practitioners in areas of economics that have seen a concentration of experiments: public goods, coordination problems, bargaining, industrial organization, asset markets, auctions, and individual decision making." "The work aims both to help specialists set an agenda for future research and to provide nonspecialists with a critical review of work completed to date. Its focus is on elucidating the role of experimental studies as a progressive research tool so that, whenever possible, the emphasis is on looking at a series of experiments that build on one another. The contributors to the volume - Colin Camerer, Charles A. Holt, John H. Kagel, John O. Ledyard, Jack Ochs, Alvin E. Roth, and Shyam Sunder - adopt a particular methodological point of view: the way to learn how to design and conduct experiments is to consider how good experiments grow organically out of the issues and hypotheses they are designed to investigate."--BOOK JACKET
Game-theoretic models of bargaining by Alvin E Roth ( Book )
22 editions published between 1985 and 2005 in English and held by 460 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Laboratory experimentation in economics : six points of view by Alvin E Roth ( Book )
16 editions published between 1987 and 2005 in English and Undetermined and held by 446 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Two-sided matching : a study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis by Alvin E Roth ( Book )
26 editions published between 1990 and 2003 in English and Undetermined and held by 441 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The Shapley value : essays in honor of Lloyd S. Shapley by Alvin E Roth ( Book )
19 editions published between 1988 and 2008 in English and held by 362 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This volume makes accessible the large body of work that has grown out of Shapley's seminal 1953 paper
Axiomatic models of bargaining by Alvin E Roth ( Book )
15 editions published in 1979 in 3 languages and held by 272 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The redesign of the matching market for American physicians : some engineering aspects of economic design by Alvin E Roth ( Book )
14 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 96 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
We report on the design of the new clearinghouse adopted by the National Resident Matching Program, which annually fills approximately 20,000 jobs for new physicians in the United States. Because that market exhibits many complementarities between applicants and between positions, the theory of simple matching markets does not apply directly. However, computational experiments reveal that the theory provides a good approximation, and furthermore the set of stable matchings, and the opportunities for strategic manipulation, are surprisingly small. A new kind of core convergence' result is presented to explain this; the fact that each applicant can interview for only a small fraction of available positions is important. We also describe in detail engineering aspects of the design process
The handbook of market design by Nir Vulkan ( Book )
8 editions published between 2013 and 2014 in English and held by 85 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This handbook brings together the latest research on applied market design. It surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as law clerks and judges or patients and kidney donors
Last minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctions : theory and evidence from a natural experiment on the Internet by Alvin E Roth ( Book )
9 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 77 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
There is a great deal of late bidding on internet second price auctions. We show that this need not result from either common value properties of the objects being sold, or irrational behavior: late bidding can occur at equilibrium even in private value auctions. The reason is that very late bids have a positive probability of not being successfully submitted, and this opens a way for bidders to implicitly collude, and avoid bidding wars, in auctions such as those run by eBay, which have a fixed end time. A natural experiment is available because the auctions on Amazon, while operating under otherwise similar rules, do not have a fixed end time, but continue if necessary past the scheduled end time until ten minutes have passed without a bid. The strategic differences in the auction rules are reflected in the auction data by significantly more late bidding on eBay than on Amazon. Futhermore, more experienced bidders on eBay submit late bids more often than do less experienced bidders, while the effect of experience on Amazon goes in the opposite direction. On eBay, there is also more late bidding for antiques than for computers. We also find scale independence in the distribution over time of bidders' last bids, of a form strikingly similar to the deadline effect' noted in bargaining: last bids are distributed according to a power law. The evidence suggests that multiple causes contribute to late bidding, with strategic issues related to the rules about ending the auction playing an important role
Kidney exchange by Alvin E Roth ( Book )
7 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 77 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
"Most transplanted kidneys are from cadavers, but there are also substantial numbers of transplants from live donors. Recently, there have started to be kidney exchanges involving two donor-patient pairs such that each donor cannot give a kidney to the intended recipient because of immunological incompatibility, but each patient can receive a kidney from the other donor. Exchanges are also made in which a donor-patient pair makes a donation to someone on the queue for a cadaver kidney, in return for the patient in the pair receiving the highest priority for a compatible cadaver kidney when one becomes available. We explore how such exchanges can be arranged efficiently and incentive compatibly. The problem resembles some of the housing' problems studied in the mechanism design literature for indivisible goods, with the novel feature that while live donor kidneys can be assigned simultaneously, the cadaver kidneys must be transplanted immediately upon becoming available. In addition to studying the theoretical properties of the design we propose for a kidney exchange, we present simulation results suggesting that the welfare gains would be substantial, both in increased number of feasible live donation transplants, and in improved match quality of transplanted kidneys"--NBER website
Unraveling reduces the scope of an entry level labor market : gastroenterology with and without a centralized match by Muriel Niederle ( Book )
9 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 72 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
From 1986 through 1997 the entry-level market for American gastroenterologists was organized by a centralized clearinghouse. Before, and since, it has been conducted via a decentralized market in which appointment dates have unraveled to well over a year before the start of employment. The career paths of gastroenterologists therefore offer a unique opportunity to examine the difference between the market when appointments are decentralized and early, versus when they are made later via a centralized clearinghouse. (Most centralized clearinghouses remain in use once established, and so there is no way to separate changes due to the clearinghouse from other changes that may have taken place over time.) We find that, both before and after the years in which the centralized clearinghouse was used, gastroenterologists are less mobile, and more likely to be employed at the same hospital in which they were internal medicine residents, than when the clearinghouse was in use. This suggests that the clearinghouse serves not only to coordinate the timing of appointments, but that it also increases the scope of the market, compared to decentralized markets with early appointments and exploding offers. This has implications for theories of market failure due to unraveling over time
Pairwise kidney exchange by Alvin E Roth ( Book )
7 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 68 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
"In connection with an earlier paper on the exchange of live donor kidneys (Roth, Sonmez, and Ünver 2004) the authors entered into discussions with New England transplant surgeons and their colleagues in the transplant community, aimed at implementing a Kidney Exchange program. In the course of those discussions it became clear that a likely first step will be to implement pairwise exchanges, between just two patient-donor pairs, as these are logistically simpler than exchanges involving more than two pairs. Furthermore, the experience of these surgeons suggests to them that patient and surgeon preferences over kidneys should be 0-1, i.e. that patients and surgeons should be indifferent among kidneys from healthy donors whose kidneys are compatible with the patient. This is because, in the United States, transplants of compatible live kidneys have about equal graft survival probabilities, regardless of the closeness of tissue types between patient and donor (unless there is a rare perfect match). In the present paper we show that, although the pairwise constraint eliminates some potential exchanges, there is a wide class of constrained-efficient mechanisms that are strategy-proof when patient-donor pairs and surgeons have 0-1 preferences. This class of mechanisms includes deterministic mechanisms that would accommodate the kinds of priority setting that organ banks currently use for the allocation of cadaver organs, as well as stochastic mechanisms that allow considerations of distributive justice to be addressed"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
The collapse of a medical labor clearinghouse (and why such failures are rare) by C. Nicholas McKinney ( Book )
8 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 67 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The collapse of the clearinghouse for the entry-level gastroenterology labor market offers a unique opportunity to study how stable clearinghouses succeed and fail. To explore the reasons for the failure of the clearinghouse (and why failures of this kind of clearinghouse have been so rare), we conduct an experimental investigation of demand shocks of the kind that occurred in the gastroenterology market. We find that a reduction in demand for positions leads to the collapse of the match only when it is detectable by firms before being detected by workers (as in the unexpected shock that took place in 1996, which could be seen by firms in their reduced applicant pools). Simple demand and supply imbalances do not seem to interfere with the operation of the centralized match. Our results suggest an affirmative answer to the question posed by market participants about whether the clearinghouse could be successfully restarted, and that this would relieve some of the distress now reported in that market, by allowing it to operate later, at a more uniform time, and with more national scope
Market culture : how norms governing exploding offers affect market performance by Muriel Niederle ( Book )
6 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 67 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
"Many markets have organizations that influence or try to establish norms concerning when offers can be made, accepted and rejected. Examining a dozen previously studied markets suggests that markets in which transactions are made far in advance are markets in which it is acceptable for firms to make exploding offers, and unacceptable for workers to renege on commitments they make, however early. But this evidence is only suggestive, because the markets differ in many ways other than norms concerning offers. Laboratory experiments allow us to isolate the effects of exploding offers and binding acceptances. In a simple environment, in which uncertainty about applicants' quality is resolved over time, we find inefficient early contracting when firms can make exploding offers and applicants' acceptances are binding. Relaxing either of these two conditions causes matching to take place later, when more information about applicants' qualities is available, and consequently results in higher efficiency and fewer blocking pairs. This suggests that elements of market culture may play an important role in influencing market performance"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Efficient kidney exchange : coincidence of wants in a structured market by Alvin E Roth ( Book )
6 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 59 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
"Patients needing kidney transplants may have willing donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other such pairs. The situation facing such pairs resembles models of the "double coincidence of wants," and relatively few exchanges have been consummated by decentralized means. As the population of available patient-donor pairs grows, the frequency with which exchanges can be arranged will depend in part on how exchanges are organized. We study the potential frequency of exchanges as a function of the number of patient-donor pairs, and the size of the largest feasible exchange. Developing infrastructure to identify and perform 3-way as well as 2-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants, and will help the most vulnerable patients. Larger than 3-way exchanges have much smaller impact. Larger populations of patient-donor pairs increase the percentage of patients of all kinds who can find exchanges"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Repugnance as a constraint on markets by Alvin E Roth ( Book )
5 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 53 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
"This essay examines how repugnance sometimes constrains what transactions and markets we see. When my colleagues and I have helped design markets and allocation procedures, we have often found that distaste for certain kinds of transactions is a real constraint, every bit as real as the constraints imposed by technology or by the requirements of incentives and efficiency. I'll first consider a range of examples, from slavery and indentured servitude (which once were not as repugnant as they now are) to lending money for interest (which used to be widely repugnant and is now not), and from bans on eating horse meat in California to bans on dwarf tossing in France. An example of special interest will be the widespread laws against the buying and selling of organs for transplantation. The historical record suggests that while repugnance can change over time, change can be quite slow"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
The effects of a centralized clearinghouse on job placement, wages, and hiring practices by Muriel Niederle ( )
5 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 47 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
New gastroenterologists participated in a labor market clearinghouse (a "match") from 1986 through the late 1990's, after which the match was abandoned. This provides an opportunity to study the effects of a match, by observing the differences in the outcomes and organization of the market when a match was operating, and when it was not. After the GI match ended, programs hired fellows earlier each year, eventually almost a year earlier than when the match was operating. It became customary for GI program directors to make very short offers, rarely exceeding two weeks and often much shorter. Consequently many potential fellows had to accept positions before they finished their planned interviews, and most programs experienced cancellations of interviews they had scheduled. Furthermore, without a match, many programs hired more local fellows, and fewer from other hospitals and cities than they did during the match. Wages, however, seem not to have been affected. To restart the match, we proposed a policy, subsequently adopted by the gastroenterology professional organizations, that even if applicants had accepted offers prior to the match, they could subsequently decline those offers and participate in the match. This made it safe for programs to delay hiring until the match, confident that programs that did not participate would not be able to "capture" the most desirable candidates beforehand. Consequently it appears that most programs waited for the match in an orderly way in 2006, when the GI match was reinstated. The market for gastroenterologists provides a case study of market failures, the way a centralized clearinghouse can fix them, and the effects on market outcomes. In the conclusion we discuss aspects of the experience of the gastroenterology labor market that seem to generalize fairly widely
What have we learned from market design? by Alvin E Roth ( Book )
6 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 47 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This essay discusses some things we have learned about markets, in the process of designing marketplaces to fix market failures. To work well, marketplaces have to provide thickness, i.e. they need to attract a large enough proportion of the potential participants in the market; they have to overcome the congestion that thickness can bring, by making it possible to consider enough alternative transactions to arrive at good ones; and they need to make it safe and sufficiently simple to participate in the market, as opposed to transacting outside of the market, or having to engage in costly and risky strategic behavior. I'll draw on recent examples of market design ranging from labor markets for doctors and new economists, to kidney exchange, and school choice in New York City and Boston
Deferred acceptance algorithms history, theory, practice, and open questions by Alvin E Roth ( )
5 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 46 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and, indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance algorithms are at the basis of a number of labor market clearinghouses around the world, and have recently been implemented in school choice systems in Boston and New York City. In addition, the study of markets that have failed in ways that can be fixed with centralized mechanisms has led to a deeper understanding of some of the tasks a marketplace needs to accomplish to perform well. In particular, marketplaces work well when they provide thickness to the market, help it deal with the congestion that thickness can bring, and make it safe for participants to act effectively on their preferences. Centralized clearinghouses organized around the deferred acceptance algorithm can have these properties, and this has sometimes allowed failed markets to be reorganized
Unraveling results from comparable demand and supply an experimental investigation by Muriel Niederle ( )
9 editions published between 2009 and 2010 in English and held by 43 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms are willing to make early offers and workers are willing to accept them. We present a model and experiment in which workers' quality becomes known only in the late part of the market. However, in equilibrium, matching can occur (inefficiently) early only when there is comparable demand and supply: a surplus of applicants, but a shortage of high quality applicants
 
moreShow More Titles
fewerShow Fewer Titles
Audience Level
0
Audience Level
1
  Kids General Special  
Audience level: 0.78 (from 0.63 for The handbo ... to 0.93 for Last minut ...)
Alternative Names
Rot, Ėlvin 1951-
Roth, Al 1951-
Roth, Alvin E.
Roth, Alvin Eliot 1951-
Languages
English (208)
German (3)
Covers