WorldCat Identities

Rosen, Sherwin 1938-2001

Overview
Works: 90 works in 314 publications in 2 languages and 4,164 library holdings
Genres: Conference proceedings 
Roles: Editor, Honoree, Dedicatee
Classifications: HD4813, 331
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about  Sherwin Rosen Publications about Sherwin Rosen
Publications by  Sherwin Rosen Publications by Sherwin Rosen
posthumous Publications by Sherwin Rosen, published posthumously.
Most widely held works about Sherwin Rosen
 
Most widely held works by Sherwin Rosen
Studies in labor markets by Sherwin Rosen ( )
16 editions published between 1970 and 2007 in English and Undetermined and held by 1,677 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The papers in this volume present an excellent sampling of the best of current research in labor economics, combining the most sophisticated theory and econometric methods with high-quality data on a variety of problems. Originally presented at a Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic Research conference on labor markets in 1978, and not published elsewhere, the thirteen papers treat four interrelated themes: labor mobility, job turnover, and life-cycle dynamics; the analysis of unemployment compensation and employment policy; labor market discrimination; and labor market informat
Markets and diversity by Sherwin Rosen ( Book )
11 editions published between 2002 and 2004 in English and held by 525 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
"A staunch neoclassical economist, Sherwin Rosen drew inspiration from Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, particularly his theory of compensating wage differentials, which Rosen felt was central to all economic problems involving product differentiation and spatial considerations. The main theme of his collection is how markets handle diversity, including the determination of value in the presence of diversity, the allocation of idiosyncratic buyers to specialized sellers, and the effects of heterogeneity and sorting on inequality."--BOOK JACKET
A disequilibrium model of demand for factors of production by M. Ishaq Nadiri ( Book )
12 editions published between 1973 and 1974 in 3 languages and held by 490 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Organizations and institutions : sociological and economic approaches to the analysis of social structure ( Book )
6 editions published between 1988 and 1989 in English and Undetermined and held by 160 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Implicit contract theory by Sherwin Rosen ( Book )
8 editions published in 1994 in English and held by 156 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Public employment, taxes and the welfare state in Sweden by Sherwin Rosen ( Book )
18 editions published between 1995 and 1997 in English and held by 91 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Abstract: All employment growth in Sweden since the early 1960's is attributable to labor market entry of women, working in local public sector jobs that implement the Welfare State. Sweden has 'monetized' or 'nationalized' the family. Women are paid at public expense to provide household services for other families. Subsidizing purchased household services encourages labor force participation of women through substitution of market- for self-provided services. It also reduces the marginal cost prices of household goods and encourages substitution of household goods for material goods. A kind of social cross-hauling occurs: when subsidies are increased and taxes raised to finance them, production of material goods declines and production of household goods increases. Women enter the market and work more in each other's households and less in the material goods sector. Efficiency distortions of current child policies in Sweden may be as large as half of total expenditures on childcare. The current 90% subsidies to public childcare probably involve large deadweight losses. A one percent decline in the rate of subsidy accompanied by balanced budget tax decreases would reduce the deadweight losses of tax distortions by one percent, at current policy levels
Theories of the distribution of labor earnings by Derek A Neal ( Book )
11 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 90 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Several empirical regularities motivate most theories of the distribution of labor earnings. Earnings distributions tend to be skewed to the right and display a long right tail. The are leptokurtic(positive fourth cumulant) and have a fat tail. Mean earnings always exceed median earnings and the top percentiles of earners account for a disproportionate share of total earnings. Mean earnings also differ greatly across groups defined by occupation, education, experience, and other observed traits. With respect to the evolution of the distribution of earnings for a given cohort, initial earnings dispersion is smaller than the dispersion observed in prime working years. We explore several classes of models that address these stylized facts. Stochastic theories begin with distributional assumptions about worker endowments and then examine the stochastic structures that might generate observed features of the aggregate distribution of earnings. Selection models describe how workers allocate their skills to tasks. Because workers choose their best option from a menu of careers, these allocation decisions generate earnings distributions which tend to be skewed. Sorting models provide dynamic versions of selection models and illustrate how gradual earning about endowments leads to sorting patterns that amplify dispersiion and generate a skewed distribution of earnings within a cohort of experienced workers. Human capital theory demonstrates that earnings dispersion is a prerequisite for significant skill investments. Without earnings dispersion, workers would not willingly mak
Labor markets in professional sports by Sherwin Rosen ( Book )
12 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 84 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Abstract: Many interesting elements of supply and demand are starkly observable in professional athletics. Understanding institutional arrangements, competitive balance and labor-management relations requires a basic understanding of sports labor markets and the struggle for control of those markets between interest groups. In this paper we treat historical and contemporary labor issues in North America and Europe, from reserve rules and free agency, high levels of player pay and work stoppages, to the distribution of playing talents across teams. We discuss the relationship between personal productivity and pay; relative versus absolute demand; competitive and cooperative interactions across firms (teams); factor substitutions; player mobility and the Coase theorem. We briefly consider how property rights affect supply, athletic talent, arms races and restrictions on competition. The problem of (excess) incentives to compete leading to externalities and inefficiencies are noted throughout the paper. Restrictive agreements such as reverse-order drafts, payroll caps and revenue sharing may constrain these forces, but they also redistribute rents from players to owners. All of these schemes, in one way or another, punish success. The European approach -- promotion of better-performing teams and relegation of those with the poorest records -- punishes failure. It remains an interesting economic question as to which system is better
Manufactured inequality by Sherwin Rosen ( Book )
12 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 83 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Abstract: Many discrete life choices--where to live, what kind of job to hold, and consumption lifestyle--are stratified by income. Stratification and sorting often manifest state-dependent preferences in which the marginal utility of income (consumption) depends on the outcome of prior choices. For example, one can choose to live a quiet life in the country, where money buys few things, or can choose a more active and exciting lifestyle in a large city, where money has greater value because all kinds of goods are available to buy. The natural market equilibrium stratification is for rich people to live in the city, where their money has more value, and for poor people to live in the country, where money is less productive. But before location is chosen, the a priori von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function over both choices can take the Friedman-Savage form, providing pareto efficient social demands for inequality. If there is not enough inequality to produce the socially optimum stratification to begin with, inequality is socially manufactured. People voluntarily participate in gambles and lotteries in which the winners are rich and live in the exciting places and the losers are poor and choose the quiet life. There is a inequality
The new economics of teachers and education by Fredrick Flyer ( Book )
12 editions published in 1994 in English and held by 83 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Abstract: Rapidly growing costs of elementary and secondary education are studied in the context of the rising value of women's time. The three-fold increase in direct costs of education per student in the past three decades was caused by increasing demand and utilization of teacher and staff inputs, attributable to growing market opportunities of women and changes in the structure of families. Substitution of purchased teacher and staff inputs for own household time in the total production of children's education and maturation is a predictable economic response to these forces. On the supply side, the 'flexibility option,' that female teachers who take temporary leaves to raise children do not suffer subsequent wage loss upon reentry, is shown to be an important attraction of the teaching profession to women. Other college educated women suffer reentry wage losses of 10 percent per year of leave. The estimated value of flexibility in teaching is 5 percent of life-cycle earnings and will fall as labor force interruptions of women for child-rearing become less frequent. Both supply and demand considerations suggest that the direct costs of education per student will continue to increase in the future, independent of political and other organization reforms of schools
Conflicts and common interests in committees by Hao Li ( Book )
11 editions published between 1999 and 2001 in English and held by 80 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Abstract: Committees improve decisions by pooling independent information of members, but promote manipulation, obfuscation, and exaggeration of private evidence when members have conflicting preferences. We study how self-interest mediates these conflicting forces. When members' preferences differ, no person ever submits a report that allows perfect inference of his private information. Instead, equilibrium strategies are many-to-one mappings that transform continuous data into ordered ranks: voting procedures are the equilibrium methods of achieving a consensus in committees. Voting necessarily coarsens the transmission of information among members, but is necessary to control conflicts of interest. The degree of coarseness of the equilibrium voting procedure is determined by the extent of conflicting preferences. Though self-interests necessarily reduce the efficient use of information in committees, real information sharing occurs nonetheless. Committees make better decisions on behalf of the average' (Pareto weighted) member than would any individual on the basis of own information. Committees are viable, though imperfect ways of making decisions when information is dispersed among members
Unraveling in assignment markets by Hao Li ( Book )
11 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 78 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Abstract: We present a two-period model of the assignment market with uncertainty in the first period regarding productive characteristics of participants. This model is used to understand incentives toward early contracts or unraveling in labor markets for entry-level professionals. We study two contractual situations, one where firms are bound by ex post unsuccessful early contracts, and the other where they can buy out of unsuccessful early contracts. The economic benefit of unraveling is to provide insurance in the absence of complete markets, but it can come at the cost of inefficient assignments. Without reentry, unraveling need not occur. It is more likely, the smaller the applicant pool or the proportion of more promising applicants in the pool, and the greater the degree of heterogeneity in the pool. A ban on early contracts always hurts firms and benefits less promising applicants, but the welfare effects on more promising applicants depends on how the gains from early contracts are shared. With buyouts, inefficiencies in assignments are eliminated, and unraveling always occurs between firms and the more promising applicants. The efficiency gains of buyouts can be distributed unevenly and sometimes firms benefit from a ban on buyouts
Cattle cycles by Sherwin Rosen ( Book )
12 editions published in 1993 in English and held by 62 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Abstract: U.S. beef cattle stocks are among the most periodic time-series in economics. A theory of cattle cycles is constructed, based upon rational breeding stock inventory decisions in the presence of gestation and maturation delays between production and consumption. The low fertility rates of cows and substantial lags between fertility and consumption decisions cause the demographic structure of the herd to respond cyclically to exogenous shocks in demand for beef and in production costs. Known biotechnology of cattle demographics imply sharp numerical benchmarks for the dynamic system that describes the evolution of cattle stock and beef consumption. These compare very closely to structural econometric time-series estimates over the 1875-1990 period and prove that systematic cattle cycles have a wholly rational explanation
Contracts and the market for executives by Sherwin Rosen ( Book )
10 editions published between 1990 and 1992 in English and held by 53 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The paper reviews empirical findings on executive compensation in light of marginal productivity and contract theories. The executive labor market performs three functions. First, control must be distributed and assigned among executives. The most talented executives are efficiently assigned to control positions in the largest firms when talent and the marginal product of control are complements. These gains or rents are partially captured in larger earnings. In fact, the elasticity of top executive pay lies within a tight band around .25 among industries, time periods, and countries where it has been estimated. Second, executive contracts must provide incentives for managers to act in the interests of shareholders. Potential loss of reputation, bonding and takeovers probably substitute for direct monetary incentives in this task. Nevertheless, the elasticity of top executive pay with respect to accounting rates of return lie near 1.0. The elasticity with respect to stock market returns is much smaller, though precisely estimated, near 0.1. Differences of opinion remain on whether the market provides enough incentives to align interests between ownership and control. Third, the market must identify new talent and reassign control over careers from older to younger generations. Competition among executives for top positions and the diminishing incentive effect of future rewards with age implies that compensation should increasingly tilt rewards to current performance over the course of a career. Available evidence supports this prediction
Transaction costs and internal labor markets by Sherwin Rosen ( Book )
7 editions published in 1987 in English and held by 41 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The concept of transactions costs used by Coase in "The Nature of the Firm" is applied to the internal labor market of an organization. Under joint production it is shown that the number of transaction-specific prices necessary to decentralize labor allocations rises geometrically with the size of the work force. Complexity of calculation and costs of implementation constrains the possibilities for internal decentralization through a price mechanism and substitutes a more authoritarian system of allocation instead. These same issues of complexity and implementation costs limit the usefulness of agency theory as a conceptual framework for this problem. The analysis suggests that an internal labor market must be viewed in a more comprehensive framework of a personnel management system
A time-series model of housing investment in the U.S. by Sherwin Rosen ( Book )
5 editions published in 1986 in English and held by 36 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
A decentralized market theory of investment based on rising supply price is formulated and explained. Asset prices embody all available information in a competitive market and serve as "sufficient statistics" for future market conditions. Construction is determined myopically by marginal cost pricing: rising supply price constrains aggregate investment. Market dynamics imply that anticipated pulses in demand and interest rates lead to "bubbles" in prices, rentals and construction, because it pays to "build ahead of demand" in the presence of rising supply price. This model, similar to q-theory, assumes that long and short run elasticities of supply are identical. Short-run supply is less elastic than long-run supply when internal adjustment costs are superimposed on rising supply price. Then the current construction decision is no longer myopic and current price (or current q) is no longer sufficient for investment. Instead, builders must anticipate the future path of asset prices for current construction decisions. This enriched model is estimated under the hypothesis of rational expectations. The short-run elasticity is found to be 1.0 inquarterly data. The long-run elasticity is 3.0. The long-run is achieved within one year, indicating substantial built-in flexibility in the industry to accomodate great volatility in housing construction. Elastic supply helps account for the large fluctuations in output and employment observed in this industry. The data also show that prices alone do not clear the market. Other nonprice dimensions, including expected time-to-sale and overall transactions volume play independent roles which remain to be explained
Unemployment and Insurance by Sherwin Rosen ( )
8 editions published between 1982 and 1983 in English and held by 33 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This paper elaborates equilibrium properties of contract labor markets when cost barriers limit labor mobility in response to demand and productivity shifts. Unemployment is sustained because the marginal value of labor is not equated across all firms; however the equilibrium contract optimally allocates a worker's time between market and nonmarket uses, given transactions cost-mobility constraints. Contracts provide full unemployment insurance for risks that are diversifiable by pooling among firms. Nondiversifiable (macro) risks are only partially shifted, largely through self-insurance (contingency saving). Increasing diversifiable risk has social value, similar to the value of an option. Increasing nondiversifiable risk has negative value because it reduces lifetime consumption. The main empirical implication of contract theory is shown to be closely related to the permanent income hypothesis and establishes linkages between labor activities and consumption behavior. It is atheory of consumption rigidity rather than wage rigidity. Another empirical implication is that unemployment incidence is proportional to comparative advantage in normarket production. Layoffs are ordered by workers' relative productivity in nonmarket compared with market sectors. The theory is used to analyze some features of the U.S. employment system. Its empirical support is briefly reviewed
Pension Inequality by Edward P Lazear ( )
6 editions published in 1984 in English and Undetermined and held by 31 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Pensions may contribute to male/female or black/white inequality to the extent that white males are more likely to receive pensions than are other groups. Conditional on receiving pensions, the value of pension benefits varies because white males have the highest level of expected tenure atretirement. By using a combination of the Current Population Survey and the 1980 Banker's Trust Corpprate Pension Plan Study, we find that the existence of pension plans contributes to black/white inequality but leaves male/female inequality unchanged among whites. Even though females are less likely tor eceive pensions than males, those females who do receive pensions enjoy generous ones. Among blacks, pensions exacerbate sex differences because black women are only about 75% as likely to receive pensions as black males
Implicit Contracts a Survey by Sherwin Rosen ( )
6 editions published in 1985 in English and Undetermined and held by 30 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
7mplicit contracts resolve the distribution of uncertainty and utilization of specific human capital between risk averse workers and less risk averse firms. Incomplete contracts are required to yield involuntary layoffs in contract markets: otherwise, contracts are efficient and pareto optimal by construction. There is a close relation between contract theory and neoclassical labor market theory. Contracts smooth consumption, but increase the volatility of labor supply and labor utilization to demand disturbances, because contractural insurance eliminates the income effects of socially diversifiable risks. This result is similar to the intertemporal substitution hypothesis. However, the price mechanism in a contract is substantially different. Contracts embody a nonlinear two-part pricing scheme. The lump sum part allocates the income-consumption consequences of risks and the marginal pricing part allocates production and labor utilization. This implicit pricing mechanism is in all respects "flexible, " though the observed average hourly wage combines both parts and may give the outward appearanceof rigidity. Furthermore, the observed average wage rate in a contract does not reflect marginal conditions necessary for structural econometric estimation. Indivisibilities appear necessary to account for the split between work-sharing and layoffs. Contracts with private information are also considered in the nonlinear pricing context
Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments by Sherwin Rosen ( )
6 editions published in 1985 in English and held by 29 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The role of rewards for maintaining performance incentives in multistage, sequential games of survival is studied. The sequential structure is a statistical design-of-experiments for selecting and ranking contestants. It promotes survival of the fittest and saves sampling costs by early elimination of weaker contenders. Analysis begins with the case where competitors' talents are common knowledge and is extended to cases where talents are unknown. It is shown that extra weight must be placed on top ranking prizes to maintain performance incentives of survivors at all stages of the game. The extra weight at the top induces competitors to aspire to higher goals independent of past achievements. In career games workers have many rungs in the hierarchical ladder to aspire to in the early stages of their careers, and this plays an important role in maintaining their enthusiasm for continuing. But the further one has climbed, the fewer the rungs left to attain. If top prizes are not large enough, those who have succeeded in attaining higher ranks rest on their laurels and slack off in their attempts to climb higher. Elevating the top prizes makes the ladder appear longer for higher ranking contestants, and in the limit makes it appear of unbounded length: no matter how far one has climbed, it looks as if there is always the same length to go. Concentrating prize money on the top ranks eliminates the no-tomorrow aspects of competition in the final stages
 
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Alternative Names
Rosen, S.
Rosen, S. 1938-2001
Rosen, S. (Sherwin), 1938-2001
Rosen, Sherwin 1938-
Languages
English (196)
French (1)
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