WorldCat Identities

Wheeler, David 1946-

Overview
Works: 98 works in 358 publications in 2 languages and 3,123 library holdings
Genres: Case studies 
Roles: Author, Editor, Honoree
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by David Wheeler
Human resource policies, economic growth, and demographic change in developing countries by David Wheeler( Book )

13 editions published in 1984 in English and held by 380 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Automation and world competition : new technologies, industrial location, and trade by Ashoka Mody( Book )

14 editions published in 1990 in English and Undetermined and held by 289 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The stakeholder corporation : a blueprint for maximizing stakeholder value by David Wheeler( Book )

15 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 262 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Examines the business case for good corporate citizenship and gives a workable management system for auditing and transforming stakeholder relationships. Provides numerous case studies of successful businesses, which demonstrate that stakeholder inclusion is both practical and good for business
Human resource development and economic growth in developing countries : a simultaneous model by David Wheeler( Book )

14 editions published between 1980 and 1985 in English and held by 124 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Informal regulation of industrial pollution in developing countries : evidence from Indonesia by Sheoli Pargal( Book )

9 editions published between 1995 and 1999 in English and Undetermined and held by 73 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

February 1995 The pollution intensity of emissions is much higher for plants located in poorer, less-educated communities than in richer, better educated ones. This difference appears to be too large to reflect preferences alone. Differential ability to pressure polluting firms may also be important. Pargal and Wheeler test a model of supply-demand relations in an implicit market for environmental services when formal regulation is absent. They use plant-level data from Indonesia for 1989 - 90, before the advent of nationwide environmental regulation. Treating pollution as a derived demand for environmental services, their model relates emissions of biological oxygen demand to the price (expected cost) of pollution; to prices of other inputs (labor, energy, materials); and to enterprise characteristics that may affect pollution demand, including scale, vintage, ownership, and efficiency. The price of pollution is determined by the intersection of plant-level demand and a local environmental supply function, enforced by community pressure or informal regulation. Environmental supply is affected by community income, education, the size of the exposed population, the local economic importance of the plant, and its visibility as a polluter. Their results are strongly consistent with the existence of an informal pollution equilibrium. Pollution intensity declines with increases in plant size, efficiency, and local materials prices. Older plants and publicly owned facilities are more pollution-intensive; multinational ownership has no independent effect. The results also suggest that the price of pollution is higher when plants are particularly visible and is far lower in poorer, less-educated communities. Thus, the intensity of pollution is far higher in such communities. While it would be premature to generalize from these results, they suggest that the model of optimal pollution control in environmental economics is more relevant for developing countries than many have believed. Community-factory interactions seem to reflect environmental supply-demand considerations even when formal regulation does not exist. In addition, the apparent power of informal regulation implies that cost-effective formal systems should be designed to complement, not supplant, community control. In particular: * Local communities should not be forced to rely so heavily on visibility when judging environmental performance. Formal regulation should include publication of audited emissions reports from factories. * Environmental injustice may be real and important. Many poor, uneducated communities may need extra support from national regulators. * However, appropriate regulation should strike the right balance between equity and efficiency. Uniform national standards go too far because they eliminate all the natural and legitimate regional diversity that is also reflected in informal arrangements. This paper -- a product of the Environment, Infrastructure, and Agriculture Division, Policy Research Department -- is part of a larger effort in the department to understand variations in pollution across firms. The authors may be contacted at spargal@worldbank.org or dwheeler1@worldbank.org
Why paper mills clean up determinants of pollution abatement in four Asian countries by Raymond S Hartman( )

12 editions published in 1997 in English and Undetermined and held by 72 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

January 1997 Clean production is not uncommon even in very poor countries such as Bangladesh. Even when there is no formal regulation of pollution, large, efficient, domestically owned plants operating near relatively affluent communities have demonstrated excellent environmental performance. The same cannot be said for manufacturing facilities near poor communities. Formal regulation of industrial pollution control standards has been hampered in some developing countries by the absence of a clear regulatory framework, by limited institutional capacity, and by limited information on emissions. For many manufacturing facilities in developing economies, the government-imposed price of pollution is zero. Yet Hartman, Huq, and Wheeler find strong evidence that despite weak or nonexistent formal regulation and enforcement of environmental standards, many plants in South and Southeast Asia are clean. Of course, many plants are also among the world's worst polluters. To account for the extreme variation among plants, the authors review evidence from a survey of pollution abatement by 26 pulp and paper plants in four countries: Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Thailand. They find that the level of pollution abatement is significantly affected by three factors. Abatement is: * Positively associated with scale and competitiveness. * Negatively associated with public ownership. * Unaffected by foreign links (in ownership or financing). A clear source of interplant differences is the level of community pressure, or informal regulation. Some communities successfully pressure plants to abate pollution even if they have little or no support from formal regulation. High local income is a powerful predictor of effective informal regulation. The authors also find that policy matters. Privatization, to the extent that it increases plant efficiency, can significantly improve environmental performance. As private ownership, competitiveness, and per capital incomes rise, communities may be in a better position to exert strong local pressure on polluting facilities to clean up production. The government may need to intervene to prevent environmental injustice in communities whose citizens are mostly poor, poorly educated, or members of marginalized minority groups (and hence less capable of applying local pressure on firms and less likely to be knowledgeable about pollution). To compensate, national regulators may want to consider strategies for improving participation in pollution control in those communities, and for targeting regulation to the problems of poor communities. This paper - a product of the Environment, Infrastructure, and Agriculture Division, Policy Research Department - is part of a departmental study funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget, Enterprise Ownership and Pollution (RPO 677-44)
Bending the rules discretionary pollution control in China by Susmita Dasgupta( )

12 editions published in 1997 in English and Undetermined and held by 72 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In China, environmental regulators play by the rules, but often bend them in ways that reflect important environmental and social concerns. Regulators give little or no slack to heavy dischargers. Old factories pay more, state-owned factories pay higher rates, and big employers get a discount. Industry compliance with pollution regulations is far from universal, even in North America. In developing countries, compliance rates are often quite low, particularly where budgets for regulation are low or inspectors are corrupt. And strictness of enforcement varies. Regulators are reluctant to impose stiff penalties on financially strapped plants that are major employers, and in many developing countries state-owned plants are treated more leniently than their private-sector counterparts. But research on determinants of compliance and enforcement is rare, even in industrial societies. Dasgupta, Huq, and Wheeler use new plant-level data for China to analyze variations in both compliance and enforcement, with a focus on regulation of water pollution. They look at the mechanics of official regulation, the economics of compliance, and regulatory discretion. They find: Cost-sensitive plants will try to adjust emissions to the point where the marginal levy equals the marginal cost of abatement. In practice, local regulators have considerable discretion in judging both compliance and appropriate penalties for noncompliance. China's regulators play by the rules, but often bend them. Underreporting and underassessment are common in China. But variable regulation is systematic, not random, and seems to reflect important environmental and social concerns. Old factories pay more, state-owned factories pay higher rates, and big employers get a discount. And regulators give little or no slack to heavy dischargers. This paper - a product of the Environment, Infrastructure, and Agriculture Division, Policy Research Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to understand the economics of industrial pollution control in developing countries. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project The Economics of Industrial Pollution Control in Developing Countries (RPO 680-20)
Endogenous Enforcement and Effectiveness of China's Pollution Levy System by Hua O Wang( )

11 editions published between 1999 and 2000 in English and Undetermined and held by 68 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

May 2000 - How well air and water pollution regulation is implemented depends very much on both the level of economic development and actual environmental quality. Pollution pricing is closer to the dictates of environmental economics than China's formal regulatory statutes would suggest - and there is considerable scope for using economic instruments to reduce China's industrial pollution problems. Wang and Wheeler investigate two aspects of China's pollution levy system, which was first implemented about 20 years ago. First, they analyze what determines differences in enforcement of the pollution levy in various urban areas. They find that collection of the otherwise uniform pollution levy is sensitive to differences in economic development and environmental quality. Air and water pollution levies are higher in areas that are heavily polluted. Second, they analyze the impact of pollution charges on industry's environmental performance, in terms of the pollution intensity of process production and the degree of end-of-pipe abatement for both water pollution and air pollution. Econometric analysis shows that plants respond strongly to the levy by either abating air pollution in the production process or providing end-of-pipe treatment for water pollution. This paper - a product of Infrastructure and Environment, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study environmental regulation in developing countries. The authors may be contacted at hwang1@worldbank.org or dwheeler1@worldbank.org
Controlling industrial pollution a new paradigm by Shakeb Afsah( )

10 editions published in 1996 in English and Undetermined and held by 68 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Conventional discussions of pollution regulation in developing countries have been too shallow - devoting inordinate attention to the choice of instrument while ignoring the preconditions for applying any instrument effectively. They have also been too narrow - focusing only on the interaction of state and factory, and ignoring the role of the market and the community. Afsah, Laplante, and Wheeler call for a revised model for the regulation of industrial pollution. They think the traditional emphasis on appropriate instruments, while ultimately correct, is premature, because agencies in most developing countries have too many problems with information and transaction costs to implement any instruments comprehensively. Once regulators have better information, more integrated information systems, more capacity for setting priorities, and a stronger public mandate, it will not be difficult for them to manage pollution more cost-effectively. Overhasty introduction of market-based instruments will not work and will probably discredit those potentially powerful regulatory tools. The new model of regulation should relegate regulators to their proper place in the scheme of things. Factories' environmental performance is shaped by the interaction of agents with different incentives. The state should play a role in regulating pollution externalities, but the role of the community and market must also be recognized. In the authors' view, appropriate regulation in developing countries should incorporate five key features: * Information intensity. Regulators need reliable data, integrated information systems, and the ability to set priorities that reflect relative costs and benefits. Markets and communities need timely, accurate, public information to assess factories' environmental performance. * Orchestration, not dictation. Potentially high-leverage programs to add to the mix include community environmental education, public disclosure of factory performance ratings, and technical training programs for environmental personnel in polluting factories. * Community control. This should be a current reality, not a goal of future programs. Strengthening central regulatory agencies should not empower them to impose uniform standards on heterogeneous communities under the guise of efficiency. Local variations in regulation are legitimate. * Structured learning. Agencies should initiate pilot projects and build larger programs as lessons from the pilot projects are absorbed. * Adaptive instruments. Newly industrializing economies can experience rapid changes in ambient quality across air- and watersheds. Regulation should focus on adaptation to these rapid changes. Regulators should be empowered to counter environmental degradation by tightening existing regulations, but the system should also minimize disruption for investors. Adjustment rules should be transparent and linked to publicly available data on quality and emissions. This paper - a product of the Environment, Infrastructure, and Agriculture Division, Policy Research Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to develop more cost-effective approaches to regulation of externalities. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under research project The Economics of Industrial Pollution Control in Developing Countries (RPO 680-20). David Wheeler may be contacted at dwheeler1@worldbank.org
Road Network Upgrading And Overland Trade Expansion In Sub-Saharan Africa by Piet Buys( )

12 editions published between 2006 and 2012 in English and Undetermined and held by 67 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Recent research suggests that isolation from regional and international markets has contributed significantly to poverty in many Sub-Saharan African countries. Numerous empirical studies identify poor transport infrastructure and border restrictions as significant deterrents to trade expansion. In response, the African Development Bank has proposed an integrated network of functional roads for the subcontinent. Drawing on new econometric results, the authors quantify the trade-expansion potential and costs of such a network. They use spatial network analysis techniques to identify a network of primary roads connecting all Sub-Saharan capitals and other cities with populations over 500,000. The authors estimate current overland trade flows in the network using econometrically-estimated gravity model parameters, road transport quality indicators, actual road distances, and estimates of economic scale for cities in the network. Then they simulate the effect of feasible continental upgrading by setting network transport quality at a level that is functional, but less highly developed than existing roads in countries like South Africa and Botswana. The authors assess the costs of upgrading with econometric evidence from a large World Bank database of road project costs in Africa. Using a standard approach to forecast error estimation, they derive a range of potential benefits and costs. Their baseline results indicate that continental network upgrading would expand overland trade by about
Industrial pollution in economic development Kuznets revisted by Hemamala Hettige( )

9 editions published in 1998 in English and Undetermined and held by 66 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

January 1998 Industrial water pollution stabilizes with economic development, but there is no evidence that it declines. Using new international data, Hettige, Mani, and Wheeler test for an inverse U-shaped, or Kuznets, relationship between industrial water pollution and economic development. They measure the effect of income growth on three proximate determinants of pollution: the share of manufacturing in total output, the sectoral composition of manufacturing, and the intensity (per unit of output) of industrial pollution at the end of pipe. They find that the manufacturing share of output follows a Kuznets-type trajectory, but the other two determinants do not. Sectoral composition gets cleaner through middle-income status and then stabilizes. At the end of pipe, pollution intensity declines strongly with income. The authors attribute this partly to stricter regulation as income increases and partly to pollution-labor complementarity in production. When they combine the three relationships, they do not find a Kuznets relationship. Instead, total industrial water pollution rises rapidly through middle-income status and remains roughly constant thereafter. To explore the implications of their findings, the authors simulate recent trends in industrial water pollution for industrial economies in the OECD, the newly industrialized countries, Asian developing countries, and ex-COMECON economies. They find roughly stable emissions in the OECD and ex-COMECON economies, moderate increases in the newly industrialized countries, and rapidly growing pollution in the Asian developing countries. Their estimates for the 1980s suggest that Asian developing countries displaced the OECD economies as the greatest generators of industrial water pollution. Generally, however, the negative feedback from economic development to pollution intensity was sufficient to hold total world pollution growth to about 15 percent over the 12-year sample period. This paper-a product of the Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the economics of industrial pollution control in developing countries. The study was funded by the Research Support Budget under the research project The Economics of Industrial Pollution Control in Developing Countries (RPO 680-20)
Is environmentally-friendly agriculture less profitable for farmers? evidence on integrated pest management in bangladesh by Susmita Dasgupta( )

10 editions published between 2004 and 2013 in English and Undetermined and held by 66 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Concerns about the sustainability of conventional agriculture have prompted widespread introduction of integrated pest management (IPM), an ecologically-based approach to control of harmful insects and weeds. IPM is intended to reduce ecological and health damage from chemical pesticides by using natural parasites and predators to control pest populations. Since chemical pesticides are expensive for poor farmers, IPM offers the prospect of lower production costs and higher profitability. However, adoption of IPM may reduce profitability if it also lowers overall productivity, or induces more intensive use of other production factors. On the other hand, IPM may actually promote more productive farming by encouraging more skillful use of available resources. Data scarcity has hindered a full accounting of IPM's impact on profitability, health, and local ecosystems. Using new survey data, Dasgupta, Meisner and Wheeler attempt such an accounting for rice farmers in Bangladesh. They compare outcomes for farming with IPM and conventional techniques, using input-use accounting, conventional production functions, and frontier production estimation. All of their results suggest that the productivity of IPM rice farming is not significantly different from the productivity of conventional farming. Since IPM reduces pesticide costs with no countervailing loss in production, it appears to be more profitable than conventional rice farming. The interview results also suggest substantial health and ecological benefits. However, externality problems make it difficult for farmers to adopt IPM individually. Without collective adoption, neighbors' continued reliance on chemicals to kill pests will also kill helpful parasites and predators, as well as exposing IPM farmers and local ecosystems to chemical spillovers from adjoining fields. Successful IPM adoption may therefore depend on institutional support for collective action. This pa
Structural adjustment and forest resources the impact of World Bank operations by Kiran D Pandey( )

10 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 65 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Structural adjustment has not promoted domestic deforestation, but it has increased net imports of wood products, implying some displacement of pressure onto other countries' forest resources. Devaluations have significantly increased the exploitation of forest resources
Racing to the bottom? foreign investment and air pollution in developing countries by David Wheeler( )

11 editions published between 1997 and 2001 in English and Undetermined and held by 65 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

January 2001 Critics of free trade have raised the specter of a "race to the bottom," in which environmental standards collapse because polluters threaten to relocate to "pollution havens" in the developing world. The flaw in the race-to-the-bottom model is that its basic assumptions misrepresent the political economy of pollution control in developing countries. Critics of free trade have raised the specter of a "race to the bottom," in which environmental standards collapse because polluters threaten to relocate to "pollution havens" in the developing world. Proponents of this view advocate high, globally uniform standards enforced by punitive trade measures that neutralize the cost advantage of would-be pollution havens. To test the race-to-the-bottom model, Wheeler analyzes recent air quality trends in the United States and in Brazil, China, and Mexico, the three largest recipients of foreign investment in the developing world. The evidence clearly contradicts the model's central prediction. The most dangerous form of air pollution--suspended particulate matter--has actually declined in major cities in all four countries during the era of globalization. Citing recent research, Wheeler argues that the race-to-the-bottom model is flawed because its basic assumptions misrepresent the political economy of pollution control in developing countries. He proposes a more realistic model, in which low-income societies serve their own long-run interests by reducing pollution. He concludes with recommendations for international assistance measures that can improve environmental quality without counterproductive enforcement of uniform standards and trade sanctions. This paper--a product of Infrastructure and Environment, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to study the economics of pollution control in developing countries. Please contact David Wheeler, room MC2-529, telephone 202-473-3401, fax 202-522-3230, email address dwheeler1@worldbank.org
Pricing industrial pollution in China : an econometric analysis of the levy system by Hua Wang( Book )

12 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 40 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

An analysis of provincial water pollution control shows that China's pollution levy system has been working much better than is commonly believed. Wang and Wheeler analyze China's experience with the water pollution levy, an emissions charge system that covers hundreds of thousands of factories. The levy experience has not been studied systematically, but anecdotal critiques have suggested that the system is arbitrarily administered and ineffective in controlling pollution. Critics view the levy as a local financing mechanism, but ineffective as a regulatory instrument. Enforcement is thought to vary widely, so that factories in different regions face different penalties for polluting. And it is widely believed that the levy provides little incentive to control pollution because official rates are below marginal abatement costs. Wang and Wheeler test the conventional critique of the levy system using solid new province level data for 1987-93. Their results suggest that the water pollution levy system is neither arbitrary nor ineffective. Across provinces and over time, variations in the effective levy rate are well explained by proxies for local valuation of environmental damage and community capacity to enforce local norms. During 1987-93, rapid development in many provinces led to sharp increases in the effective rate. Their results also suggest that the emissions intensity of Chinese industy was highly responsive to those increases, because marginal abatement costs were often lower than levy rates. And from 1987 to 1993, provincial pollution intensities fell at a median rate of 50 percent, and total discharges at a median rate of 22 percent. The results suggest several lessons for regulators in developing countries: * Local enforcement of national standards will determine the effective price of pollution in each area. Such regional heterogeneity is natural and legitimate. * The locally enforced price of pollution rises with industrial development. * Early in the regulatory process, industrial emissions intensity is highly responsive to changes in the price of pollution, mainly because marginal costs are often quite low in low to medium abatement ranges. In China, provincial adjustments of effective levy rates and other regulatory instruments have been sufficient to induce sharp declines in emissions intensity and reductions in total emissions from registered factories during a period of rapid industrial growth. This paper -- a product of the Environment, Infrastructure, and Agriculture Division, Policy Research Department -- is part of a larger effort in the department to identify appropriate policies for environmental regulation in developing countries. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under research project The Economics of Industrial Pollution Control in Developing Countries (RPO 680-20)
Surviving success : policy reform and the future of industrial pollution in China by Susmita Dasgupta( Book )

9 editions published between 1997 and 1998 in English and held by 38 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

November 1997 Lax regulation of industrial pollution is causing thousands of premature deaths and serious health problems in China. Pollution abatement would cost little; inaction amounts to valuing a Chinese worker's life below US$500, a tragically low figure by any standard. China's recent industrial growth, a remarkable success story, has been clouded by hundreds of thousands of premature deaths and incidents of serious respiratory illness caused by exposure to industrial air pollution. Seriously contaminated by industrial discharges, many of China's waterways are largely unfit for direct human use. This damage could be substantially reduced at modest cost. Industrial reform combined with stricter environmental regulation has reduced organic water pollution in many areas and has curbed the growth of air pollution. But much higher levels of emissions controls (of particulates and sulfur dioxide) are warranted in China's polluted cities. For the cost-benefit analysis that led to this conclusion, the authors developed three scenarios projecting pollution damage under varying assumptions about future policies. Their findings: * Even if regulation is not tightened further, continued economic reform should have a powerful effect on pollution intensity. Organic water pollution will stabilize in many areas and actually decline in some. Air pollution will continue growing in most areas but at a much slower pace than industrial output. * The cost of inaction would be high: Most of China's waterways will remain heavily polluted, and many thousands of people will die or suffer serious respiratory damage. * Continuing current trends in tightened regulation for water pollution will lead to sharp improvements; adopting an economically feasible policy of much stricter regulation will restore the health of many waterways. The stakes are even higher for air pollution because regulatory enforcement has weakened in many areas in the past five years. Reversing that trend will save many lives at extremely modest cost. China's National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) has recommended a tenfold increase in the air pollution levy; adopting NEPA's very conservative recommendation would produce a major turnaround in most cities. For representative Chinese cities, a fiftyfold increase in the levy is probably warranted economically. To be cost-effective, heavy sources of particulate and sulfur dioxide emissions should be targeted for abatement. Reducing emissions from large private plants is so cheap that only significant abatement makes sense-at least 70 percent abatement of sulfur dioxide particulates and even greater abatement of particulates in large urban industrial facilities. This paper-a product of the Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to identify appropriate policies for environmental regulation in developing countries. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project The Economics of Industrial Pollution Control in Developing Countries (RPO 680-20). Susmita Dasgupta may be contacted at sdasgupta@worldbank.org
Citizen complaints as environmental indicators : evidence from China by Susmita Dasgupta( Book )

9 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 36 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

China's experience shows the problem of relying on citizen complaints for guidance in addressing pollution problems when monitoring resources are scarce. Visible pollutants get too much attention and communities with low levels of literacy get too little. China's environmental regulators respond to more than 100,000 citizen complaints a year. The complaints process undoubtedly provides useful information and helps encourage community participation in environmental policy. But it also directs a big share of inspection resources to areas where people tend to complain. After analyzing provincial data for 1987-93, Dasgupta and Wheeler find the subsequent allocation of resources biased, in terms of social welfare. The incidence of complaints reflects potential abatement benefits and the intensity of exposure to highly visible pollutants. However, citizen complaints seem not to be affected by harmful pollutants that are less visible. And basic education seems to have a strong independent effect on propensity to complain. Relying on complaints alone would lead to inappropriately low allocation of inspection resources to less-educated, relatively silent regions. Citizens' incomplete information creates the biggest problem for regulators who rely on complaints for guidance. To compensate for this problem, say Dasgupta and Wheeler, agencies should invest in public environmental education targeted especially to communities with less schooling. They might also explore targeted outreach programs, since poorly educated people may also be more timid about complaining. More important, Dasgupta and Wheeler recommend giving priority to technical risk assessments in determining resource allocation. Over time, citizen complaints should decline if regulators establish strategic priorities and pursue them systematically, while maintaining close contact with the communities affected. This paper - a product of the Environment, Infrastructure, and Agriculture Division, Policy Research Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to understand the economics of industrial pollution control in developing countries. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under research project The Economics of Industrial Pollution Control in Developing Countries (RPO 680-20)
What improves environmental performance? : evidence from Mexican industry by Susmita Dasgupta( Book )

8 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 34 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Strengthened enforcement raises the price of pollution and provides an incentive to reduce it. A cost-effective complement to stricter enforcement is effective environmental management and training programs within plants. Using new survey evidence, Dasgupta, Hettige, and Wheeler analyze the effects of regulation, plant-level management policies, and plant and firm characteristics on environmental performance in Mexican factories. They focus especially on management policies: the degree of effort to improve environmental performance and the type of management strategy adopted. They index effort with two variables: adoption of ISO 14000-type procedures for pollution management and use of plant personnel for environmental inspection and control. Proxies for strategic orientation are two indices of mainstreaming: assigning environmental respon-sibilities to general managers instead of specialized environmental managers, and providing environmental training for all plant employees, not just specialists. Detailed survey data let them test the performance impact of such factors as ownership, scale, sector, trade and other business relationships, local regulatory enforcement, local community pressure, management education and experience, and workers' general education. Their findings: Process is important. Plants that institute ISO 14000-type internal management procedures show superior environmental performance. Mainstreaming works. Environmental training for all plant personnel is more effective than developing a cadre of environmental specialists, and assigning environmental tasks to general managers is more effective than using special environmental managers. Regulatory pressure works. Plants that have experienced regulatory inspections and enforcement are significantly cleaner than those that have not. Public scrutiny promotes stronger environmental policies. Publicly traded Mexican firms are significantly cleaner than privately held firms. Size matters. Large plants in multiplant firms are much more likely to adopt policies that improve environmental performance. OECD influences do not matter. It is generally assumed that plants linked to OECD economies show superior environmental performance, but they find no evidence that OECD links-including multinational ownership, trade, management training, or management experience-affect environmental performance. New technology is not significantly cleaner. They find no evidence that plants with newer equipment perform better environmentally (once other factors are accounted for). Education promotes clean production. Plants with more highly educated workers show significantly better environmental management efforts and performance. This paper-a product of the Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the determinants of environmental performance in developing countries. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project The Economics of Industrial Pollution Control in Developing Countries (RPO 680-20)
Policy reform, economic growth, and the digital divide : an econometric analysis by Susmita Dasgupta( Book )

10 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 32 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The digital divide reflects a gap in telecom access, not lower propensity to use the internet in poor countries. Promoting access for poor households will help, but pro-competitive policy holds the key to rapid progress in narrowing the divide
Étude comparative des pratiques du Royaume-Uni et du Canada en rapport avec la transparence des régimes de retraite by David Wheeler( )

3 editions published in 2004 in French and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

 
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The stakeholder corporation : a blueprint for maximizing stakeholder value
Alternative Names
Wheeler, D. 1946-

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English (199)

French (3)

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