WorldCat Identities
Fri Mar 21 17:04:12 2014 UTClccn-n821353250.59Crashes and panics : the lessons from history /0.740.96The highest price ever : the great NYSE seat sale of 1928-29 and capacity constraints /111226426n 82135325831519Nelson White, Eugene, 1952-White, Eugène 1952-White, Eugene N.White, Eugene N., 1952-White, Eugene Nelsonlccn-n82274662Bordo, Michael D.edtlccn-n83212494Goldin, Claudia Daleedtnc-national bureau of economic researchNational Bureau of Economic Researchlccn-n80038177Salomon Brothers Center for the Study of Financial Institutionslccn-n79139286National Bureau of Economic Researchlccn-n79128010New York Stock Exchangeviaf-291765389Rappoport, Peterlccn-no94015055Simard, Dominiquelccn-n82146922Mishkin, Frederic S.lccn-n90670741Ó Gráda, CormacWhite, Eugene Nelson1952-HistoryConference proceedingsCase studiesUnited StatesDepressionsEconomic historyEconomic policyBanks and bankingBanking lawBusiness cyclesStocks--PricesFranceFinancial crisesMonetary policyNapoleonic Wars (1800-1815)New York Stock ExchangeEconomic forecastingEconomicsDeposit insurance--Econometric modelsBank capital--Econometric modelsBank failuresReparations for historical injusticesCaliforniaBank loansBank of A. LevyDeflation (Finance)Deposit insuranceInterest ratesRailroadsInternational financeStock Market Crash (1929)FinanceGerman Occupation of France (1940-1945)Finance, PublicGreat BritainFinancial crises--Econometric modelsDividends--Econometric modelsBourse de ParisNational income--AccountingManagementSavings banksTaxationBusiness195219741975197819791980198319841985199019911992199319941995199619971998199920012002200420052006200720092010201120132014307652208338.542HB3717 1929ocn468332202ocn801042209ocn807835254ocn807579471ocn311459324ocn824092907ocn455909980ocn861014527ocn80395799274114ocn037331665book19970.63Bordo, Michael DThe defining moment : the Great Depression and the American economy in the twentieth centuryThe Defining Moment poses the question directly: to what extent, if any, was the Depression a watershed period in the history of the American economy? This volume organizes twelve scholars' responses into four categories: fiscal and monetary policies, the economic expansion of government, the innovation and extension of social programs, and the changing international economy. The central focus across the chapters is the well-known alterations to national government during the 1930s. The Defining Moment attempts to evaluate the significance of the past half-century to the American economy, while not omitting reference to the 1930s+-+34301517756367ocn008906602book19830.70White, Eugene NelsonThe regulation and reform of the American banking system, 1900-1929History40111ocn021077665book19900.59Salomon Brothers Center for the Study of Financial InstitutionsCrashes and panics : the lessons from historyHistoryConference proceedingsIncludes index. Papers of a conference held at the Salomon Brothers Center for Study of Financial Institutions at New York University's Stern School of Business in Oct., 19881138ocn034284210book19960.79Stock market crashes and speculative maniasHistory8410ocn037288507book19970.88White, Eugene NelsonThe legacy of deposit insurance : the growth, spread, and cost of insuring financial intermediariesWithout the Great Depression, the United States would not have adopted deposit insurance. While the New Deal's anti-competitive barriers have largely collapsed become" deeply rooted. This paper examines how market and political competition for deposits raised the level of coverage and spread insurance to all depository institutions. A comparison of the cost of federal insurance with a counterfactual of an insurance-free system shows that federal insurance ultimately imposed a" higher cost but achieved political acceptance because of the distribution of the burden769ocn041989070book19990.93White, Eugene NelsonCalifornia banking in the nineteenth century : the art and method of the Bank of A. LevyHistoryAn 1890s loan book of the Bank A. Levy permits a detailed examination of the lending operations of a private bank in California during the National Banking Era (1864-1914). This period has been intensively analyzed at the macroeconomic level, but there are few microeconomic studies of banks. This unregulated bank was well integrated into national money markets and lent to a broad cross section of the community. Although the bank appeared to adhere to the real bills doctrine, it provided medium term uncollateralized financing to business. The bank priced risk carefully, offering rates equal to the lowest in the country to its best customers while charging extraordinarily high rates to borrowers deemed risky. In the absence of modern accounting, close scrutiny of borrowers' businesses and personal lives overcame the asymmetry of information between borrower and lender, enabling the bank to fulfill a special intermediary role7611ocn049829788book20020.92Ó Gráda, CormacWho panics during panics? : evidence from a nineteenth century savings bankHistoryUsing records of the bank accounts of individual depositors, this paper provides a detailed microeconomic analysis of two nineteenth century banking panics. The panics of 1854 and 1857 were not characterized by an immediate mass panic of depositors and had important time dimensions. We examine depositor behavior using a hazard model. Contagion was the key factor in 1854 but it was not strong enough to create more than a local panic. In contrast, the panic of 1857 began with runs by businessmen and banking sophisticates followed by less informed depositors. Uninformed contagion may have been present, but the evidence suggests that this panic was driven by informational shocks in the face of asymmetric information about the true condition of bank portfolios7210ocn050172893book20020.93Mishkin, Frederic SU.S. stock market crashes and their aftermath : implications for monetary policyThis paper examines fifteen historical episodes of stock market crashes and their aftermath in the United States over the last one hundred years. Our basic conclusion from studying these episodes is that financial instability is the key problem facing monetary policy makers and not stock market crashes, even if they reflect the possible bursting of a bubble. With a focus on financial stability rather than the stock market, the response of central banks to stock market fluctuations is more likely to be optimal and maintain support for the independence of the central bank719ocn050408515book20020.93Klug, AdamHow could everyone have been so wrong? : forecasting the Great Depression with the railroadsHistoryContemporary observers viewed the recession that began in the summer of 1929 as nothing extraordinary. Recent analyses have shown that the subsequent large deflation was econometrically forecastable, implying that a driving force in the depression was the high expected real interest rates faced by business. Using a neglected data set of forecasts by railroad shippers, we find that business was surprised by the magnitude of the great depression. We show that an ARIMA or Holt-Winters model of railroad shipments would have produced much smaller forecast errors than those indicated by the surveys. The depth and duration of the depression was beyond the experience of business, which appears to have believed that recovery would happen quickly as in previous recessions. This failure to anticipate the collapse of the economy suggests roles for both high real rates of interest and a debt deflation in the propagation of the depression707ocn029931882book19940.92Rappoport, PeterThe New York stock market in the 1920s and 1930s : did stock prices move together too much?HistoryIn this paper, we re-examine the stock market of the 1920s and 1930s for evidence of a bubble, a 'fad' or 'herding' behavior by studying individual stock returns. One story often advanced for the boom of 1928 and 1929 is that it was driven by the entry into the market of largely uninformed investors, who followed the fortunes of and invested in 'favorite' stocks. The recent theoretical literature on how 'noise traders' perturb financial markets is consistent with this description. The result of this behavior would be a tendency for the favorite stocks' prices to move together more than would be predicted by their shared fundamentals. Our results suggest that there was excess comovement in returns even before the boom began, but comovement increased significantly during the boom and was a signal characteristic of the tumultuous market of the early 1930s. These results are thus consistent with the possibility that a fad or crowd psychology played a role in the rise of the market, its crash and subsequent volatility698ocn043189712book19990.94White, Eugene NelsonMaking the French pay : the costs and consequences of the Napoleonic reparationsCase studies624ocn029943074book19940.90Bordo, Michael DFrance and the Bretton Woods international monetary system, 1960 to 1968HistoryWe reinterpret the commonly held view in the U.S. that France, by following a policy from 1965 to 1968 of deliberately converting their dollar holdings into gold helped perpetuate the collapse of the Bretton Woods International Monetary System. We argue that French international monetary policy under Charles de Gaulle was consistent with strategies developed in the interwar period and the French Plan of 1943. France used proposals to return to an orthodox gold standard as well as conversions of its dollar reserves into gold as tactical threats to induce the United States to initiate the reform of the international monetary system towards a more symmetrical and cooperative gold-exchange standard regime595ocn033953960book19950.93White, Eugene NelsonDeposit insurance517ocn022979195book19900.95Bordo, Michael DBritish and French finance during the Napoleonic WarsHistoryThe Napoleonic Wars offer an experiment unique in the history of wartime finance. While Britain was forced off the gold standard and endured a sustained inflation, France remained on a bimetallic standard for the war's duration. For wars of comparable length and intensity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Napoleonic war finance stands out. This apparent paradox may be explained by drawing upon the literatures on tax smoothing, time consistency, and credibility in macroeconomics. We argue that these contrasting war finance regimes were the consequence of each nation's credibility as a debtor. Given its long record of fiscal probity, coupled with its open budgetary process in Parliament, Great Britain could continue to borrow a substantial fraction of its war expenditures at what were relatively low interest rates. British tax rates did not vary much over most of the eighteenth century as peacetime surpluses offset wartime deficits to payoff the accumulated war debts. In addition, because of its longstanding record of maintaining specie convertibility, Britain had access to the inflation tax although in practice it was not a major source of wartime finance. France, on the other hand, had squandered her reputation in the last decade of the ancient regime and the Revolution. Her dependency on taxation did not reflect any superior fiscal virtues but rather the opposite. Borrowing would have been exceedingly costly and the public very skeptical of the Empire's fidelity. Moreover, the recent experience of assignat hyperinflation ruled out the inflation tax as a source of revenue. Inherited credibility resolves this paradoxical pairing of fiscal regimes497ocn066257090file20060.92Occhino, FilippoHow occupied France financed its own exploitation in World War IIHistoryThe occupation payments made by France to Nazi Germany between 1940 and 1944 represent one of the largest recorded international transfers and contributed significantly to financing the overall German war effort. Using a neoclassical growth model that incorporates essential features of the occupied economy and the postwar stabilization, we assess the welfare costs of French policies that funded payments to Germany. Occupation payments required a 16 percent reduction of consumption for twenty years, with the draft of labor to Germany and wage and price controls adding substantially to this burden. Vichy's postwar debt overhang would have demanded large budget surpluses; but inflation, which erupted after Liberation, reduced the debt well below its steady state level and redistributed the adjustment costs. The Marshall Plan played only a minor direct role, and international credits helped to substantially lower the nation's burden487ocn066257380file20060.92White, Eugene NelsonBubbles and busts the 1990s in the mirror of the 1920sHistoryThis paper surveys the twentieth century booms and crashes in the American stock market, focusing on a comparison of the two most similar events in the 1920s and 1990s. In both booms, claims were made that they were the consequence a "new economy" or"irrational exuberance." Neither boom can be readily explained by fundamentals, represented by expected dividend growth or changes in the equity premium. The difficulty of identifying the fundamentals implies that central banks would not be successful in preventing pre-emptive policies, although they still would have a critical role to play in preventing crashes from disrupting the payments system or sparking an intermediation crisis475ocn075383814com20060.92White, Eugene NelsonAnticipating the stock market crash of 1929 the view from the floor of the stock exchangeHistoryIn the months prior to the stock market crash of 1929, the price of a seat on the New York Stock Exchange was abnormally low. Rising stock prices and volume should have driven up seat prices during the boom of 1929; instead there were negative cumulative abnormal returns to seats of approximately 20 percent in the months just before the crash. At the same time, trading nearly ceased in the thin markets for seats on the regional exchanges. Brokers appear thus to have anticipated the October 1929 crash, although investors in the market apparently did not recognize this information455ocn085451600file20070.88White, Eugene NelsonThe crash of 1882, counterparty risk, and the bailout of the Paris BourseHistoryThe rapid growth of derivative markets has raised concerns about counterparty risk. It has been argued that their mutual guarantee funds provide an adequate safety net. While this mutualization of risk protects clients and brokers from idiosyncratic shocks, it is generally assumed that it also offers protection against systemic shocks, largely based on the observation that no twentieth century exchange has been forced to shut down. However, an important exception occurred in 1882 when the crash of the French stock market nearly forced the closure of the Paris Bourse. This exchange's structure was very similar to today's futures markets, with a dominant forward market leading the Bourse to adopt a common fund to guarantee transactions. Using new archival data, this paper shows how the crash overwhelmed the Bourse's common fund. Only an emergency loan from the Bank of France, intermediated by the largest banks, prevented a closure of the Bourse445ocn023295404book19910.93Rappoport, PeterWas there a bubble in the 1929 stock market?Standard tests find that no bubbles are present in the stock price data for the last one hundred years. In contrast., historical accounts, focusing on briefer periods, point to the stock market of 1928-1929 as a classic example of a bubble. While previous studies have restricted their attention to the joint behavior of stock prices and dividends over the course of a century, this paper uses the behavior of the premia demanded on loans collateralized by the purchase of stocks to evaluate the claim that the boom and crash of 1929 represented a bubble. We develop a model that permits us to extract an estimate of the path of the bubble and its probability of bursting in any period and demonstrate that the premium behaves as would be expected in the presence of a bubble in stock prices. We also find that our estimate of the bubble's path has explanatory power when added to the standard cointegrating regressions of stock prices and dividends, in spite of the fact that our stock price and dividend series are cointegrated364ocn062145513book20050.96Davis, Lance EdwinThe highest price ever : the great NYSE seat sale of 1928-29 and capacity constraintsHistory"A surge in orders during the stock market boom of the late 1920s collided against the constraint created by the fixed number of brokers on the New York Stock Exchange. Estimates of the determinants of individual stock bid-ask spreads from panel data reveal that spreads jumped when volume spiked, confirming contemporary observers complaints that there were insufficient counterparties. When the position of the NYSE as the dominant exchange became threatened, the management of the exchange proposed a 25 percent increase in the number of seats in February 1929 by issuing a quarter-seat dividend to all members. While such a "stock split" would be expected to leave the aggregate value of the NYSE unchanged, an event study reveals that its value rose in anticipation of increased efficiency. These expectations were justified as bid-ask spreads became less sensitive to peak volume days after the increase in seats"--NBER website+-+3430151775+-+3430151775Fri Mar 21 15:12:31 EDT 2014batch26504