WorldCat Identities

Sibert, Anne C.

Overview
Works: 53 works in 256 publications in 1 language and 1,667 library holdings
Roles: Honoree
Classifications: HB1, 330.072
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about  Anne C Sibert Publications about Anne C Sibert
Publications by  Anne C Sibert Publications by Anne C Sibert
Most widely held works by Anne C Sibert
Capital accumulation and foreign investment taxation by Anne C Sibert ( )
5 editions published in 1983 in English and held by 218 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The risk premium in the market for forward foreign exchange by Anne C Sibert ( )
3 editions published in 1982 in English and held by 185 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles by Kenneth S Rogoff ( )
13 editions published between 1985 and 1997 in English and held by 168 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
There is an extensive empirical literature on political business cycles, but its theoretical foundations are grounded in pre-rational expectations macroeconomic theory. Here we show that electoral cycles in taxes, government spending and money growth can be modeled as an equilibrium signaling process. The cycleis driven by temporary information asymmetries which can arise if, for example, the government has more current information on its performance in providing for national defense. Incumbents cheat least when their private informationis either extremely favorable or extremely unfavorable. An exogenous increase in the incumbent partyts popularity does not necessarily imply a damped policy cycle
An analysis of the welfare implications of alternative exchange rate regimes an intertemporal model with an application by World Bank ( )
4 editions published in 1986 in English and held by 129 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The macroeconomic implications of labor contracting with asymmetric information by Matthew B Canzoneri ( )
1 edition published in 1984 in English and held by 120 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Transition issues for the European monetary union by Willem H Buiter ( Book )
20 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 120 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Abstract: If Stage Three of EMU starts on January 1, 1999, transition issues remain on two time scales. Until July 1, 2002, national currencies and the euro co-exist as legal tender. We argue that intra-EMU currency risk exists in principle during that period, but that no EMU member can be forced out through speculative attacks. Cohabitation of Ins and Outs has an open-ended time scale. We discuss the effect of EMU on incentives for both Ins and Outs to undertake structural reform and the coordination problems associated with the distribution of seigniorage revenue and the Stability and Growth Pact
Deflationary bubbles by Willem H Buiter ( Book )
21 editions published between 2004 and 2006 in English and held by 105 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
"We analyse deflationary bubbles in a model where money is the only financial asset. We show that such bubbles are consistent with the household's transversality condition if and only if the nominal money stock is falling. Our results are in sharp contrast to those in several prominent contributions to the literature, where deflationary bubbles are ruled out by appealing to a non-standard transversality condition, originally due to Brock. This condition, which we dub the GABOR condition, states that the consumer must be indifferent between reducing his money holdings by one unit and leaving them unchanged and enjoying the discounted present value of the marginal utility of that unit of money forever. We show that the GABOR condition is not part of the necessary and sufficient conditions for household optimality nor is it sufficient to rule out deflationary bubbles. Moreover, it rules out Friedman's optimal quantity of money equilibrium and, when the nominal money stock is falling, it rules out deflationary bubbles that are consistent with household optimality. We also consider economies with real and nominal government debt and small open economies where private agents can lend to and borrow from abroad. In these cases, deflationary bubbles may be possible, even when the nominal money stock is rising. Their existence is shown to depend on the rules governing the issuance of government debt"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Cross-border tax externalities : are budget deficits too small? by Willem H Buiter ( Book )
15 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and held by 98 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
"In a dynamic optimising model with costly tax collection, a tax cut by one nation creates positive externalities for the rest of the world if initial public debt stocks are positive. By reducing tax collection costs, current tax cuts boost the resources available for current private consumption, lowering the global interest rate. This pecuniary externality benefits other countries because it reduces the tax collection costs for foreign governments of current and future debt service. In the non-cooperative equilibrium, nationalistic governments do not allow for the effect of lower domestic taxes on debt service costs abroad. Taxes are too high and government budget deficits too low compared to the global cooperative equilibrium. Even in the cooperative equilibrium complete tax smoothing is not optimal: current taxes will be lower than future taxes"--NBER website
Monetary policy committees : individual and collective reputations by Anne C Sibert ( Book )
11 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 46 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Government finance in a model of currency substitution by Anne C Sibert ( Book )
11 editions published in 1993 in English and held by 43 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Our model is a variant of the cash-in-advance model. Goods must be purchased in the seller's currency, but currency may be traded before shopping at a cost. This cost is a measure of substitutability. The model is applied to seignorage taxation. We show that optimal money growth is positive and increasing in substitutability if and only if first- and second-period consumption are gross substitutes. If government act independently, money growth is suboptimally low if currencies are suficiently substitutable and too high otherwise
UDROP, a small contribution to the new international financial architecture by Willem H Buiter ( Book )
10 editions published between 1998 and 1999 in English and held by 41 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Monetary regimes and labour market reform by Anne C Sibert ( Book )
13 editions published between 1997 and 1998 in English and held by 36 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Monetary union, entry conditions and economic reform by Gülçin Özkan ( Book )
15 editions published between 1997 and 2000 in English and held by 34 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Monetary integration and economic convergence by Anne C Sibert ( Book )
10 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 32 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Monetary policy with uncertain central bank preferences by Anne C Sibert ( Book )
8 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 26 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Credibility and flexibility with monetary policy committees by Ilian Mihov ( Book )
6 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 22 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Strategic capital taxation in large, open economies with mobile capital by Jiming Ha ( Book )
7 editions published between 1992 and 1996 in English and held by 22 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Central banking by committee by Anne C Sibert ( Book )
8 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 19 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
There is a small, but growing, economics literature on the importance and effects of having monetary policy made by a committee, rather than by an individual. Complimenting this is an older and larger body of literature on groups in the other social sciences, particular in social psychology. This paper provides a review of some of this work, focusing on two important features of committees: the effect of their size on performance and whether or not they are more moderate than the members who make them up. Individual members of a committee acquire idiosyncratic information which the committee uses to make a decision. A result of the famous Condorcet Jury Theorem is that larger committees have more resources, in the form of more information, and are thus better than smaller ones. This result depends on individuals being willing to work as hard at gathering information when they are members of a committee as they would be willing to work if they were acting alone. The economics literature suggests that this may not hold; that individual members may have an incentive to shirk. This phenomenon of a member withholding effort is called social loading in the social psychology literature. Studies stretching over 125 years document its existence and suggest that it becomes more important as committee size increases and that it disappears when individual members contributions can be identified and evaluated. The Condorcet Jury Theorem also depends on the committee being able to aggregate members information and on members being willing to truthfully reveal their information. An excessively formal meeting structure may cause the former to fail to hold; committee members with different objectives may cause the latter not to be true. As a result of shirking and coordination problems, smaller committees may be better than larger ones and the optimal size for a committee is an empirical issue. Committees pool members information and views, thus it seems that monetary policy made by a committee should be more moderate than monetary policy made by a single individual. However, several hundred studies demonstrate that belonging to a committee polarizes its members and, hence, committees may be more extreme than individuals. A particularly harmful form of group polarization occurs when committee members striving for consensus causes them to stop paying suffcient attention to alternative courses of action. In this case the committee may make terrible decisions that none of its members would have made on their own. The results of the literature on committee size and committee polarization suggest that the ideal monetary policy committee may not have many more than five members. It should have a well defined objective and it should publish the votes of its members
Can unconventional preferences explain risk premia in the foreign exchange markets? by Anne C Sibert ( Book )
4 editions published in 1992 in English and held by 18 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Banker compensation and confirmation bias by Hamid Sabourian ( Book )
8 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 18 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
 
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Audience level: 0.81 (from 0.47 for Monetary u ... to 0.93 for Government ...)
Alternative Names
Sibert, A.
Sibert, Anne
Sibert, Anne C.
Languages
English (193)