Polinsky, A. Mitchell
Most widely held works by A. Mitchell Polinsky
An introduction to law and economics by A. Mitchell Polinsky ( Book )
23 editions published between 1983 and 2011 in 5 languages and held by 576 libraries worldwide
Handbook of law and economics ( Book )
17 editions published between 2004 and 2007 in English and Dutch and held by 259 libraries worldwide
Law can be viewed as a body of rules and legal sanctions that channel behavior in socially desirable directions - for example, by encouraging individuals to take proper precautions to prevent accidents or by discouraging competitors from colluding to raise prices. The incentives created by the legal system are thus a natural subject of study by economists. Moreover, given the importance of law to the welfare of societies, the economic analysis of law merits prominent treatment as a subdiscipline of economics. This two volume Handbook is intended to foster the study of the legal system by econo
The economic theory of public enforcement of law by A. Mitchell Polinsky ( Book )
10 editions published between 1998 and 1999 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 88 libraries worldwide
Corruption and optimal law enforcement by A. Mitchell Polinsky ( Book )
9 editions published between 1999 and 2000 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 88 libraries worldwide
On the disutility and discounting of imprisonment and the theory of deterrence by A. Mitchell Polinsky ( Book )
7 editions published between 1997 and 1998 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 81 libraries worldwide
Should liability be based on the harm to the victim or the gain to the injurer by A. Mitchell Polinsky ( Book )
7 editions published in 1993 in English and held by 67 libraries worldwide
The theory of public enforcement of law by A. Mitchell Polinsky ( Book )
7 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 66 libraries worldwide
"This chapter of the forthcoming Handbook of Law and Economics surveys the theory of the public enforcement of law--the use of governmental agents (regulators, inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. The theoretical core of our analysis addresses the following basic questions: Should the form of the sanction imposed on a liable party be a fine, an imprisonment term, or a combination of the two? Should the rule of liability be strict or fault-based? If violators are caught only with a probability, how should the level of the sanction be adjusted? How much of society's resources should be devoted to apprehending violators? We then examine a variety of extensions of the central theory, including: activity level; errors; the costs of imposing fines; general enforcement; marginal deterrence; the principal-agent relationship; settlements; self-reporting; repeat offenders; imperfect knowledge about the probability and magnitude of sanctions; corruption; incapacitation; costly observation of wealth; social norms; and the fairness of sanctions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
The optimal use of fines and imprisonment when wealth is unobservable by A. Mitchell Polinsky ( Book )
3 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 64 libraries worldwide
"This article studies the optimal use of fines and imprisonment when an offender's level of wealth is private information that cannot be observed by the enforcement authority. In a model in which there are two levels of wealth, I derive the optimal mix of sanctions, including the imprisonment sentence imposed on offenders who do not pay the fine -- referred to as the "alternative" imprisonment sentence. Among other things, I demonstrate that if imprisonment sanctions are used, the optimal alternative imprisonment sentence is sufficiently high that high-wealth individuals prefer to pay a fine exceeding the wealth level of low-wealth individuals and bear a lower (possibly no) imprisonment sentence rather than to pretend to be low-wealth individuals. I also show that if the optimal enforcement system would rely exclusively on fines when wealth is observable, the inability to observe wealth is detrimental because higher fines then could not be levied on higher-wealth individuals. In this case, it may be desirable when wealth is unobservable to impose an imprisonment sentence on offenders who do not pay the fine -- who will be low-wealth offenders -- in order to induce high-wealth offenders to pay the fine. However, if the optimal enforcement system would employ both fines and imprisonment sentences when wealth is observable, the inability to observe wealth is not detrimental. In this case, the same sanctions would be chosen if wealth is unobservable and these sanctions lead high-wealth individuals to pay more than low-wealth individuals"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe by A. Mitchell Polinsky ( Book )
3 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 63 libraries worldwide
"This article studies optimal fines when an offender's wealth is private information that can be obtained by the enforcement authority only after a costly audit. I derive the optimal fine for the underlying offense, the optimal fine for misrepresenting one's wealth level, and the optimal audit probability. I demonstrate that the optimal fine for misrepresenting wealth equals the fine for the offense divided by the audit probability, and therefore generally exceeds the fine for the offense. The optimal audit probability is positive, increases as the cost of an audit declines, and equals unity if the cost is sufficiently low. If the optimal audit probability is less than unity, there are some individuals who are capable of paying the fine for the offense who misrepresent their wealth levels. I also show that the optimal fine for the offense results in underdeterrence due to the cost of auditing wealth levels"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Social science research network presents Legal scholarship network ( )
in English and held by 63 libraries worldwide
Site offers a searchable database of published papers with abstracts and full bibliographic descriptions relating to research in various area of law.
A model of optimal fines for repeat offenders by A. Mitchell Polinsky ( Book )
5 editions published between 1989 and 1993 in English and held by 62 libraries worldwide
A damage-revelation rationale for coupon remedies by A. Mitchell Polinsky ( Book )
4 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 60 libraries worldwide
This article studies optimal remedies in a setting in which damages vary among plaintiffs and are difficult to determine. We show that giving plaintiffs a choice between cash and coupons to purchase units of the defendant's product at a discount -- a "coupon-cash remedy" -- is superior to cash alone. The optimal coupon-cash remedy offers a cash amount that is less than the value of the coupons to plaintiffs who suffer relatively high harm. Such a remedy induces these plaintiffs to choose coupons, and plaintiffs who suffer relatively low harm to choose cash. Sorting plaintiffs in this way leads to better deterrence because the costs borne by defendants (the cash payments and the cost of providing coupons) more closely approximate the harms that they have caused.
Optimal cleanup and liability after environmentally harmful discharges by A. Mitchell Polinsky ( Book )
8 editions published in 1992 in English and held by 59 libraries worldwide
Enforcement costs and the optimal magnitude and probability of fines by A. Mitchell Polinsky ( Book )
9 editions published between 1990 and 1993 in English and Undetermined and held by 59 libraries worldwide
Decoupling liability : optimal incentives for care and litigation by A. Mitchell Polinsky ( Book )
5 editions published between 1991 and 1993 in English and held by 59 libraries worldwide
Remedies for price overcharges : the deadweight loss of coupons and discounts by A. Mitchell Polinsky ( Book )
5 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and held by 56 libraries worldwide
Mandatory versus voluntary disclosure of product risks by A. Mitchell Polinsky ( Book )
6 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 55 libraries worldwide
We analyze a model in which firms are able to acquire information about product risks and may or may not be required to disclose this information. We initially study the effect of disclosure rules assuming that firms are not liable for the harm caused by their products. Although mandatory disclosure obviously is superior to voluntary disclosure given the information about product risks that firms possess -- since such information has value to consumers -- voluntary disclosure induces firms to acquire more information about product risks because they can keep silent if the information is unfavorable. The latter effect could lead to higher social welfare under voluntary disclosure. The same results hold if firms are liable for harm under the negligence standard of liability. Under strict liability, however, firms are indifferent about revealing information concerning product risk, and mandatory and voluntary disclosure rules are equivalent.
A note on optimal fines when wealth varies among individuals by A. Mitchell Polinsky ( Book )
5 editions published between 1989 and 1991 in English and held by 54 libraries worldwide
Optimal liability when the injurer's information about the victim's loss is imperfect by A. Mitchell Polinsky ( Book )
5 editions published between 1986 and 1988 in English and held by 49 libraries worldwide
A note on optimal public enforcement with settlements and litigation costs by A. Mitchell Polinsky ( Book )
4 editions published in 1986 in English and held by 47 libraries worldwide
Actions and defenses Actions and defenses--Mathematical models Antitrust law Antitrust law--Economic aspects Compromise (Law)--Mathematical models Consumer protection Consumers--Attitudes Contracts Costs (Law) Costs (Law)--Mathematical models Coupons (Retail trade) Crime prevention Crime prevention--Mathematical models Criminal justice, Administration of Damages Databases Economics Exemplary damages Fines (Penalties) Fines (Penalties)--Economic aspects Fines (Penalties)--Mathematical models Imprisonment Law Law and economics Law--Economic aspects Law enforcement Law enforcement--Economic aspects Liability (Law) Liability (Law)--Economic aspects Liability (Law)--Mathematical models Liability for hazardous substances pollution damages--Econometric models Negligence Prices--Mathematical models Pricing Product recall Product safety Products liability Products liability--Economic aspects Punishment in crime deterrence Punishment in crime deterrence--Economic aspects Punishment in crime deterrence--Mathematical models Rebates Recidivists Risk--Mathematical models Strict liability Tax administration and procedure Taxation United States Wealth Wealth--Mathematical models
Mitchell-Polinsky, A. 1948-
Polinsky, A. M. 1948-
Polinsky, A. Mitchell 1948-
Polinsky, Alan Mitchel 1948- Falsche Namensform in Vorlage
Polinsky, Alan Mitchell.
Polinsky, Mitchell 1948-
No Linguistic content (3)