WorldCat Identities

Polinsky, A. Mitchell

Overview
Works: 96 works in 528 publications in 7 languages and 3,703 library holdings
Genres: Abstracts 
Roles: Author, Editor, Contributor, Thesis advisor, Creator
Classifications: K487.E3, 349.73
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by A. Mitchell Polinsky
An introduction to law and economics by A. Mitchell Polinsky( Book )

58 editions published between 1983 and 2011 in 8 languages and held by 1,043 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Completely updated and revised for its Third Edition, An Introduction to Law and Economics focuses on a set of core topics including property, contracts, torts, and criminal law. The text imparts a good basic knowledge of economic principles and issues pertaining to the law. Avoiding specialized jargon and math, Polinsky shows students how to think like an economist and understand legal issues from an economic perspective
Handbook of law and economics by A. Mitchell Polinsky( Book )

33 editions published between 2004 and 2009 in English and held by 311 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Law can be viewed as a body of rules and legal sanctions that channel behavior in socially desirable directions for example, by encouraging individuals to take proper precautions to prevent accidents or by discouraging competitors from colluding to raise prices. This title offers a survey of the state of the field
The economic theory of public enforcement of law by A. Mitchell Polinsky( Book )

38 editions published between 1997 and 2005 in English and held by 127 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This chapter of the forthcoming Handbook of Law and Economics surveys the theory of the public enforcement of law - the use of governmental agents (regulators, inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. The theoretical core of our analysis addresses the following basic questions: Should the form of the sanction imposed on a liable party be a fine, an imprisonment term, or a combination of the two? Should the rule of liability be strict or fault-based? If violators are caught only with a probability, how should the level of the sanction be adjusted? How much of society's resources should be devoted to apprehending violators? We then examine a variety of extensions of the central theory, including: activity level; errors; the costs of imposing fines; general enforcement; marginal deterrence; the principal-agent relationship; settlements; self-reporting; repeat offenders; imperfect knowledge about the probability and magnitude of sanctions; corruption; incapacitation; costly observation of wealth; social norms; and the fairness of sanctions
On the disutility and discounting of imprisonment and the theory of deterrence by A. Mitchell Polinsky( Book )

17 editions published between 1997 and 1998 in English and held by 70 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This article studies the implications for the theory of deterrence of (a) the manner in" which individuals' disutility from imprisonment varies with the length of the imprisonment" term; and (b) discounting of the future disutility and future public costs of imprisonment. Two" questions are addressed: Is deterrence enhanced more by increasing the length of imprisonment" terms or instead by raising the likelihood of imposing imprisonment? What is the optimal" combination of the severity and probability of imprisonment sanctions?"
Should liability be based on the harm to the victim or the gain to the injurer? by A. Mitchell Polinsky( Book )

14 editions published in 1993 in English and held by 60 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Should the level of liability imposed on an injurer be based on the harm he caused or instead on the gain he obtained from engaging in the harmful act? The main point of this article is that there is a strong reason to favor liability based on harm rather than gain when account is taken of the possibility of legal error. Notably, even a small underestimate of gain can lead an injurer to commit a harmful act when the harm greatly exceeds his gain, causing a large social loss. In contrast, a comparable error in the estimate of harm will not lead an injurer to engage in the harmful act when the harm significantly exceeds his gain. The general superiority of harm-based liability is shown to hold under the rules of negligence and strict liability and regardless of whether potential injurers know the error that will be made
Social Science Research Network : SSRN( )

in English and held by 56 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Site offers a searchable database of published papers with abstracts and full bibliographic descriptions relating to research in various area of law
Optimal cleanup and liability after environmentally harmful discharges by A. Mitchell Polinsky( Book )

14 editions published in 1992 in English and held by 54 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This article studies how liability for environmentally harmful discharges affects the incentives of firms to engage in cleanup and invest in precautions, as well as the incentives of consumers to purchase the goods whose production leads to discharges. Our main conclusion is that making firms responsible for cleanup and strictly liable for any remaining harm will lead to the socially optimal outcome. We also show that under the negligence approach -- whereby a firm is liable for damages only if it fails to take appropriate precautions or to engage in proper cleanup -- the outcome will not be optimal: too much of the good will be purchased
Optimal awards and penalties when the probabilty of prevailing varies among plaintiffs by A. Mitchell Polinsky( Book )

12 editions published in 1993 in English and Undetermined and held by 48 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This article derives the optimal award to a winning plaintiff and the optimal penalty on a losing plaintiff when the probability of prevailing varies among plaintiffs. Optimality is defined in terms of achieving a specified degree of deterrence of potential injurers with the lowest litigation cost. Our main result is that the optimal penalty on a losing plaintiff is positive, in contrast to common practice in the United States. By penalizing losing plaintiffs and raising the award to winning plaintiffs (relative to what it would be if losing plaintiffs were not penalized), it is possible to discourage relatively low-probability-of-prevailing plaintiffs from suing without discouraging relatively high-probability plaintiffs, and thereby to achieve the desired degee of deterrence with lower litigation costs. This result is developed first in a model in which all suits are assumed to go to trial and then in a model in which settlements are possible
A model of optimal fines for repeat offenders by A. Mitchell Polinsky( Book )

9 editions published between 1989 and 1993 in English and held by 44 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper analyzes optimal fines in a model in which individuals can commit up to two offenses. The fine for the second offense is allowed to differ from the fine for the first offense. There are four natural cases in the model, defined by assumptions about the gains to individuals from committing the offense. In the case fully analyzed it may be optimal to punish repeat offenders more severely than first-time offenders. In another case, it may be optimal to impose less severe penalties on repeat offenders. And in the two remaining cases, the optimal penalty does not change
Remedies for price overcharges : the deadweight loss of coupons and discounts by A. Mitchell Polinsky( Book )

15 editions published between 2003 and 2006 in English and held by 42 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This article evaluates two different remedies for consumers who have been injured by a price overcharge on the sale of a good. Under a coupon remedy, injured consumers are awarded coupons that can be used for a limited period of time to purchase the good at a price below that which prevails after the overcharge has been eliminated, that is, below the competitive price. Under a discount remedy, any consumer, without proof of injury, may purchase the good for a limited period of time at a price that is set below the competitive price. Both remedies generally cause consumers to buy an excessive amount of the good during the remedy period. Under the coupon remedy only a subset of consumers are affected in this way (those holding a relatively high number of coupons), while under the discount remedy all consumers are affected. We show nonetheless that the resulting deadweight loss could be lower under the discount remedy. We also consider how the deadweight loss changes when the length of the remedy period is increased by extending the expiration date for the use of coupons or by employing a lower discount for a longer period of time. The deadweight loss may or may not decline under the coupon remedy, though it does decline under the discount remedy. In neither case, however, does it go to zero in the limit
Decoupling liability : optimal incentives for care and litigation by A. Mitchell Polinsky( Book )

9 editions published between 1991 and 1993 in English and held by 40 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

A "decoupled" liability system is one in which the award to the plaintiff differs from the payment by the defendant. The optimal system of decoupling makes the defendant's payment as high as possible. Such a policy allows the award to the plaintiff to be lowered, thereby reducing the plaintiff's incentive to sue -- and hence litigation costs -- without sacrificing the defendant's incentive to exercise care. The optimal award to the plaintiff may be less than or greater than the optimal payment by the defendant. The possibility of an out-of-court settlement does not qualitatively affect these results. If the settlement can be monitored, it may be desirable to decouple it as well
A damage-revelation rationale for coupon remedies by A. Mitchell Polinsky( Book )

11 editions published between 2005 and 2006 in English and held by 39 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This article studies optimal remedies in a setting in which damages vary among plaintiffs and are difficult to determine. We show that giving plaintiffs a choice between cash and coupons to purchase units of the defendant's product at a discount -- a "coupon-cash remedy" -- is superior to cash alone. The optimal coupon-cash remedy offers a cash amount that is less than the value of the coupons to plaintiffs who suffer relatively high harm. Such a remedy induces these plaintiffs to choose coupons, and plaintiffs who suffer relatively low harm to choose cash. Sorting plaintiffs in this way leads to better deterrence because the costs borne by defendants (the cash payments and the cost of providing coupons) more closely approximate the harms that they have caused
A note on optimal fines when wealth varies among individuals by A. Mitchell Polinsky( Book )

9 editions published between 1989 and 1991 in English and Undetermined and held by 36 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Abstract: equal the entire wealth of individuals. Such a fine allows the probability
The welfare implications of costly litigation in the theory of liability by A. Mitchell Polinsky( Book )

12 editions published between 1986 and 1988 in English and held by 30 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

One of the principal results in the economic theory of liability is that, assuming litigation is costless, the rule of strict liability with compensatory damages leads the injurer to choose the socially appropriate level of care. This paper reexamines this result when litigation is costly. It is shown that strict liability with compensatory damages generally leads to a socially inappropriate level of care and to excessive litigation costs. Social welfare can be increased by adjusting compensatory damages upward or downward, with the desired direction depending on the effect of changes in the level of liability on the injurer's decision to take care and on the victim's decision to bring suit
Mandatory versus voluntary disclosure of product risks by A. Mitchell Polinsky( Book )

12 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 30 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We analyze a model in which firms are able to acquire information about product risks and may or may not be required to disclose this information. We initially study the effect of disclosure rules assuming that firms are not liable for the harm caused by their products. Although mandatory disclosure obviously is superior to voluntary disclosure given the information about product risks that firms possess -- since such information has value to consumers -- voluntary disclosure induces firms to acquire more information about product risks because they can keep silent if the information is unfavorable. The latter effect could lead to higher social welfare under voluntary disclosure. The same results hold if firms are liable for harm under the negligence standard of liability. Under strict liability, however, firms are indifferent about revealing information concerning product risk, and mandatory and voluntary disclosure rules are equivalent
 
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An introduction to law and economics
Alternative Names
Mitchell-Polinsky, A. 1948-

Polinsky, A. M. 1948-

Polinsky, A. Mitchell 1948-

Polinsky, Alan Mitchel 1948-

Polinsky, Alan Mitchell.

Polinsky, Mitchell 1948-

ポリンスキー, A. M

Languages
Covers
Handbook of law and economics