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Thu Oct 16 18:04:16 2014 UTClccn-n840751060.53Social experimentation0.670.95An ordered probit analysis of transaction stock prices /93289944Jerry_A._Hausmann 840751061132180Hausman, J. 1946-Hausman, J. A.Hausman, J. A. 1946-Hausman, JerryHausman, Jerry 1946-lccn-n79139286National Bureau of Economic Researchlccn-n81071329Wise, David A.edtlccn-n88053822Bradley, Stephen P.1941-edtlccn-n50005328Nolan, Richard L.edtlccn-n87148047Baltagi, Badi H.(Badi Hani)edtlccn-n86016175Newey, Whitney, halWhite, Hallccn-n78083381American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Researchlccn-no2004093196Leibtag, Ephraimlccn-n83053993Griliches, Zvi1930-1999Hausman, Jerry A.Conference proceedingsUnited StatesEvaluation research (Social action programs)Negative income tax--EvaluationElectric utilities--Rates--Time-of-use pricing--EvaluationHousing subsidies--EvaluationMedical policy--EvaluationInformation technologyCompetition, InternationalInternational business enterprises--ManagementTelecommunication--DeregulationCompetitionTelecommunicationContingent valuationEconometricsConsumer price indexesWal-Mart (Firm)United States.--Bureau of Labor StatisticsConsumer price indexes--Econometric modelsRetail tradeEconomics--Statistical methodsIncome taxTaxation--Economic aspectsLabor supply--Mathematical modelsTax Reform Act of 1986 (United States)Income tax--Mathematical modelsSeasonal variations (Economics)Time-series analysisCivil service--PensionsSocial securityCivil service--RetirementHousing subsidiesNegative income taxMedical policyElectric utilitiesTelecommunication--Economic aspectsTelecommunication--Technological innovationsIncome tax--Law and legislationStock exchanges--Econometric modelsTaxation--Law and legislationCompetition--Econometric modelsProbitsSocial sciencesManagementValueEconomics19461972197319741975197619771978197919801981198219831984198519861987198819891990199119921993199419951996199719981999200120022003200420052006200720082010201120124916147414361.6072H62ocn299448210ocn312355912ocn613753238ocn772510307ocn827900995ocn300034221ocn802550428ocn856721020ocn455659224ocn256394569ocn826594800ocn823292725ocn463720222146916ocn212773573file19850.53Hausman, Jerry ASocial experimentationConference proceedingsSince 1970 the United States government has spent over half a billion dollars on social experiments intended to assess the effect of potential tax policies, health insurance plans, housing subsidies, and other programs. Was it worth it? Was anything learned from these experiments that could not have been learned by other, and cheaper, means? Could the experiments have been better designed or analyzed? These are some of the questions addressed by the contributors to this volume, the result of a conference on social experimentation sponsored in 1981 by the National Bureau of Economic Research. T+-+259468177532475810ocn027014051book19930.56Globalization, technology, and competition : the fusion of computers and telecommunications in the 1990s+-+238893023539219ocn028218534book19930.82Hausman, Jerry AContingent valuation : a critical assessmentConference proceedingsThe papers in this volume present a quite critical assessment of contingent valuation (CV). CV is a survey method that attempts to estimate individual values for economic goods by asking people hypothetical questions about their willingness to pay for such goods. In economics, CV has previously been studied almost solely by economists specializing in environmental economics. This book, however, reports research which is mainly from economists with specialities in economic theory, econometrics, and public finance, rather than from the more narrowly focused research of environmental economists3537ocn070765482file19980.70Hausman, Jerry ATaxation by telecommunications regulation the economics of the e-rate3426ocn019064044book19890.79Future competition in telecommunications2937ocn824794980file20120.56Baltagi, Badi HEssays in honor of Jerry HausmanA title that aims to annually publish original scholarly econometrics papers on designated topics with the intention of expanding the use of developed and emerging econometric techniques by disseminating ideas on the theory and practice of econometrics throughout the empirical economic, business and social science literature9511ocn042425398book19990.88Hausman, Jerry AEfficiency effects on the U.S. economy from wireless taxationAbstract: This paper measures for the first time the economic efficiency effects of the taxation of wireless services, which are taxed by federal, state, and local governments at relatively high rates in the range of 14%-25%. The paper concludes such taxes are a much greater drain on the economy than their direct costs. The taxes identified in this paper cost the economy $2.56 billion more than the $4.79 billion they raise in tax revenues. These taxes are raised from wireless consumers and thereby suppress demand for service, imposing an efficiency loss on the economy of $0.53 for every $1 currently raised in taxes. Prospective taxes will impose an efficiency loss of $0.72-$1.14 per additional dollar of tax revenue raised9411ocn038189197book19970.88Hausman, Jerry ATaxation by telecommunications regulationAbstract: Telecommunications regulation in the U.S. is replete with a system of subsidies and taxes. Because of budgetary spending limits, Congress is unable to increase general taxes to pay for social programs and thus funds these programs from taxes on specific sectors of the economy. In this paper I consider the Congressional legislation which established a program so that all public schools and libraries in the U.S. will receive subsidized service to the Internet. The cost of the program is estimated to be $2.25 billion per year. Congress passed legislation that directed all users of interstate telephone service to pay for the program. Using analytical methods from public finance, I calculate the efficiency cost to the economy of the higher taxation of interstate telephone services to fund the Internet access discounts. I estimate the cost to the economy of raising the $2.25 billion per year to be at least $2.36 billion (in addition to the $2.25 billion of tax revenue), or the efficiency loss to the economy for every $1 raised to pay for the Internet access discounts is an additional $1.05 to $1.25 beyond the money raised for the Internet discounts. This cost to the economy is extremely high compared to other taxes used by the Federal government to raise revenues. I discuss an alternative method by which the FCC could have raised the revenue for the Internet discounts which would have a near zero cost to the economy9218ocn031949626book19940.90Hausman, Jerry AValuation of new goods under perfect and imperfect competitionThe Consumer Price Index (CPI) attempts to answer the question of how much more (or less) income does a consumer require to be as well off in period 1 as in period 0 given changes in prices, changes in the quality of goods, and the introduction of new goods (or the disappearance of existing goods). In this paper I explain the theory of cost-of-living indices and demonstrate how new goods should be included using the classical theory of Hicks and Rothbarth. The correct price to use for the good in the pre-intro- duction period is a virtual' price which sets demand to zero. Estimation of this virtual price requires estimation of a demand function which in turn provides the expenditure function which allows exact calucation of the cost of living index. The data requirements and need to specify and estimate a demand function for a new brand among many existing brands requires extensive data and some new econometric methods which may have proven obstacles to the inclusion of new goods in the CPI up to this point. As an example I use the introduction of a new cereal brand by General Mills in 1989-Apple Cinnamon Cheerios. I find the virtual price is about 2 times the actual price of Apple Cinnamon Cheerios and that increase in consumer surplus is substantial. Based on some simplifying approximations, I find that CPI may be overstated for cereal by about 25% because of its neglect of the effect of new brands. When I take imperfect competition into account I find that the increase in consumer welfare is only 85% as high with perfect competition so CPI for cereal would still be 20% too high8212ocn036814619book19970.90Hausman, Jerry ACellular telephone, new products and the CPIAbstract: Cellular telephone is an example of a new product that has significantly affected how Americans live. Since their introduction in 1983, cellular telephone adoption has grown at 25-35% per year such that at year end 1996 about 42 million cellular telephones are in use in the U.S. However, cellular telephone has not been included in the construction of the CPI, and the CPI will not include cellular telephone until 1998 or 1999. This neglect of new goods leads to an upward bias in the CPI. The analysis of the paper demonstrates that the gains in consumer welfare from a new product such as cellular telephone can be substantial. The paper also gives an approximation result which the BLS could use to calculate gains in consumer welfare from new products for use in the CPI. The BLS telecommunications CPI estimates that since 1988, telecommunications prices have increased by 8.5% or an increase of 1.02% per year. This estimate ignores cellular service. A corrected telecommunication services COLI that includes cellular service decreased from 1.0 in 1988 to 0.903 in 1996 for a decrease of 1.28% per year. Thus, the bias in the BLS telecommunications services CPI equals approximately 2.3 percentage points per year. The neglect of new products in the CPI can lead to significant biases+-+4946243755728ocn056507997book20040.93Hausman, Jerry ACPI bias from supercenters : does the BLS know that Wal-Mart exists?"Hausman (2003) discusses four sources of bias in the present calculation of the CPI. A pure price' index based approach of surveying prices as done by the BLS cannot succeed in solving the problems of bias. We discuss economic and econometric approaches to measuring the first order bias effects from outlet substitution bias. We demonstrate the use of scanner data that permits implementation of techniques that allow the problem to be solved. In contrast, the current BLS procedure does not treat correctly outlet substitution bias and acts as if Wal-Mart does not exist. Yet, Wal-Mart offers identical food items at an average price about 15%-25% lower than traditional supermarkets. The BLS links out' Wal-Mart's lower prices. We find that a more appropriate approach to the analysis is to let the choice to shop at Wal-Mart be considered as a new good' to consumers when Wal-Mart enters a geographic market. This approach leads to a continuously updated expenditure weighted average price calculation. We find a significant difference between our approach and the BLS approach. Our estimates are that the BLS CPI-U food at home inflation is too high by about 0.32 to 0.42 percentage points, which leads to an upward bias in the estimated inflation rate of about 15% per year"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site719ocn051071043book20020.93Hausman, Jerry ASources of bias and solutions to bias in the CPIAbstract: Four sources of bias in the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) have been identified. The most discussed is substitution bias, which creates a second order bias in the CPI. Three other changes besides prices changes create first order effects on a correctly measured cost of living index (COLI). (1) Introduction of new goods creates a first order effect of new good bias' (2) Quality changes in existing goods will lead to quality' bias, which has first order effects (3) Shifts in shopping patterns to lower priced stores can create first order outlet bias'. I explain in this paper that a pure price' based approach of surveying prices to estimate a COLI cannot succeed in solving the 3 problems of first order bias. Neither the BLS nor the recent report C. Schultze and C. Mackie, eds., At What Price (AWP, 2002), recognizes that to solve these problems, which have been long known, both quantity and price data are necessary. I discuss economic and econometric approaches to measuring the first order bias effects as well as the availability of scanner data that would permit implementation of the techniques. Lastly, I review recent research that demonstrates that these sources of bias are large in relation to measured inflation in the CPI588ocn062413018file20050.92Hausman, Jerry AConsumer benefits from increased competition in shopping outlets measuring the effect of Wal-Mart"Consumers often benefit from increased competition in differentiated product settings. In this paper we consider consumer benefits from increased competition in a differentiated product setting: the spread of non-traditional retail outlets. In this paper we estimate consumer benefits from supercenter entry and expansion into markets for food. We estimate a discrete choice model for household shopping choice of supercenters and traditional outlets for food. We have panel data for households so we can follow their shopping patterns over time and allow for a fixed effect in their shopping behavior. We find the benefits to be substantial, both in terms of food expenditure and in terms of overall consumer expenditure. Low income households benefit the most"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site5413ocn025023625book19910.95Hausman, Jerry AAn ordered probit analysis of transaction stock pricesWe estimate the conditional distribution of trade-to-trade price changes using ordered probit, a statistical model for discrete random variables. Such an approach takes into account the fact that transaction price changes occur in discrete increments, typically eighths of a dollar, and occur at irregularly spaced time intervals. Unlike existing continuous-time/discrete-state models of discrete transaction prices, ordered probit can capture the effects of other economic variables on price changes, such as volume, past price changes, and the time between trades. Using 1988 transactions data for over 100 randomly chosen U.S. stocks, we estimate the ordered probit model via maximum likelihood and use the parameter estimates to measure several transaction-related quantities, such as the price impact of trades of a given size, the tendency towards price reversals from one transaction to the next, and the empirical significance of price discreteness515ocn301039009book19930.66Benzoni, LaurentInnovation, déréglementation et concurrence dans les télécommunications4410ocn015289873book19860.94Hausman, Jerry AHousehold behavior and the Tax Reform Act of 1986This paper evaluates the effects of the 1986 Tax Reform Act on household labor supply and savings. It describes the tax bill's effects on incentives to work and to save, and uses recent econometric estimates of labor supply and savings elasticities to describe the reform's impact on household behavior. Two factors lead us to conclude that the new law will have small aggregate effects. First, most households experience only small changes in their marginal tax rates. Forty-one percent of the taxpaying population will face marginal tax rates as high, or higher, under the new law as under the previous tax code. Only eleven percent of taxpayers receive marginal tax rate reductions of ten percentage points or more. Second, plausible estimates of both the labor supply and savings elasticities suggest that even for those households that receive rate reductions, behavioral changes will be small. Our analysis suggests that the tax reform will increase labor supply by about one percent, and slightly reduce private savings366ocn769440792file20110.93Hausman, Jerry AHeteroskedasticity-robust inference in finite samplesSince the advent of heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, several papers have proposed adjustments to the original White formulation. We replicate earlier findings that each of these adjusted estimators performs quite poorly in finite samples. We propose a class of alternative heteroskedasticity-robust tests of linear hypotheses based on an Edgeworth expansions of the test statistic distribution. Our preferred test outperforms existing methods in both size and power for low, moderate, and severe levels of heteroskedasticity326ocn756573386file19840.95Hausman, Jerry AFamily Labor Supply With TaxesOver the period 1960 - 1983 the proportion of federal tax revenue raised by taxation of labor supply has risen from 57-77 percent. In this paper, we specify and estimate a model of family labor supply which treats both federal and state taxation. Husbands and wives labor supply are treated jointly rather than in aseparate manner as in previous research. A method to calculate the virtual wage for nonworking spouses is used within a utility maximizing framework to treat correctly the joint family labor supply decision. Joint family efforts are found to be important. The efficiency cost (deadweight loss) of labor taxation is estimated to be 29.6% of tax revenue raised. The effect of the new 10% deduction to ease the marriage tax for working spouses leads to a prediction of 3.8% increase in wives labor supply and a .9% decrease in husbands labor supply.Overall taxes paid are predicted to decrease by 3.4%315ocn756573537file19830.95Hausman, Jerry ASeasonal Adjustment with Measurement Error PresentSeasonal adjustment procedures attempt to estimate the sample realizations of an unobservable economic time series in the presence of both seasonal factors and irregular factors. In this paper we consider a factor which has not been considered explicitly in previous treatments of seasonal adjustment: measurement error. Because of the sample design used in the CPS, measurement error will not be a white noise process, but instead it will be characterized by serial correlation of a known form. We first consider what effect the serially correlated measurement error has on estimation of the non-seasonal component in seasonal adjustment models. We also consider the effect of measurement error on the widely used seasonal adjustment process X11. X11 which is the seasonal adjust procedure used by the BLS will implicitly reduce the effect of measurement error because of the averaging process used. However, this treatment will not be optimal in general. We therefore specify a seasonal adjustment model which takes explicit account of the measurement error. For examples on the unemployment rate, we find that X11 does almost as well as the optimal filter on some series but its efficiency is less than 10% for the teenage unemployment series. We also find that optimal treatment of the measurement error which accounts for the serial correlation can reduce the overall mean square error of the seasonally adjusted series below the variance of the measurement error which is often used as the benchmark for the sampling procedure307ocn008833310file19810.92Burtless, Gary T"Double dipping" : the combined effects of social security and civil service pensions on employee retirement"We consider the retirement behavior of civilian employees of the United States government. Unlike previous studies, this investigation is based upon a data set containing fairly complete and accurate information about the Social Security and employer-provided pensions for which employees are (or ultimately will be) eligible. These data permit us to specify the financial aspects of individual retirement decisions with a reasonable degree of precision. A large fraction of civil service pensioners is eligible to receive Social Security benefits because a part of their working careers was spent in Social-Security-covered employment. The prevalence of double pension coverage among government employees has raised serious equity questions about the treatment of civil servants by Social Security, and these questions have led to various suggestions for pension reform. Partly, the reform proposals have been put forward due to the perceived unfairness of "double dipping" which arises from the double pension coverage of government employees. Our analysis finds: (1) Both the amount of a Federal pension entitlement and the expected wait until the pension commences affect the timing of retirement from the Federal service. (2) The rate of anticipated wage growth significantly affects individual decisions to remain in Federal employment. (3) Workers who are eligible to ultimately receive Social Security in some cases show a different pattern of retirement than do workers not vested in Social Security. However, our analysis does not reveal any massive shift of Federal workers into Social-Security-covered employment in order to benefit from the "tilt" in the Social Security formula"--NBER website+-+2388930235+-+2388930235Thu Oct 16 15:18:57 EDT 2014batch32912