WorldCat Identities

MacLeod, W. Bentley (William Bentley) 1954-

Works: 121 works in 452 publications in 2 languages and 1,633 library holdings
Roles: Author, Editor
Classifications: HB1, 330
Publication Timeline
Most widely held works by W. Bentley MacLeod
Supply side hysterisis [i.e. hysteresis] : the case of the Canadian unemployment insurance system by Thomas Lemieux( Book )

15 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 123 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper presents results from a 1971 natural experiment carried out by the Canadian government on the unemployment insurance system. At that time, they dramatically increased the generosity of the system. We find that the propensity to collect UI increases with a first time exposure to the system. Hence as more individuals experience unemployment their lifetime use of the system increases. This supply side hysterisis effect may explain why unemployment has steadily increased over the 1972 - 1992 period, even though the generosity of unemployment insurance did not
Institutions and contract enforcement by Armin Falk( )

18 editions published between 2008 and 2011 in English and Undetermined and held by 96 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions -- dismissal barriers, and bonus pay -- affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and market efficiency, by interfering with firms' use of firing threat as an incentive device. Dismissal barriers also distort the dynamics of worker effort levels over time, cause firms to rely more on the spot market for labor, and create a distribution of relationship lengths in the market that is more extreme, with more very short and more very long relationships. The introduction of a bonus pay option dramatically changes the market outcome. Firms are observed to substitute bonus pay for threat of firing as an incentive device, almost entirely offsetting the negative incentive and efficiency effects of dismissal barriers. Nevertheless, contract enforcement behavior remains fundamentally changed, because the option to pay bonuses causes firms to rely less on long-term relationships. Our results show that market outcomes are the result of a complex interplay between contract enforcement policies and the institutions in which they are embedded
Cut to the bone? : hospital takeovers and nurse employment contracts by Janet M Currie( Book )

11 editions published between 2002 and 2004 in English and held by 88 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper uses data from the 1990s to examine changes in the wages, employment, and effort of nurses in California hospitals following takeovers by large chains. The market for nurses has been described as a classic monopsony, so that one might expect increases in firm market power to be associated with declines in wages. However, we show that if one extends the monopsony model to consider effort, or if we apply a basic contracting model to the data, then we would expect to see effects on effort rather than on wages. This prediction is bourne out by the data nurses see few declines in wages following takeovers, but see increases in the number of patients per nurse, our measure of effort. We also find that these changes are similar in the largest for-profit and non-profit chains, suggesting that market forces are more more important than institutional form
Great expectations : law, employment contracts, and labor market performance by W. Bentley MacLeod( )

10 editions published in 2010 in English and German and held by 80 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper reviews the literature on employment and labor law. It is observed that all jurisdictions in the world have extensive employment and labor law, even though many economists recommend a reduction in legal restrictions. The review of the law illustrates that it has evolved in response to problems of market and contract incompleteness, that often leads to inefficient allocations ex post. In contrast, due to data limitations, the economic analysis of legal rules tends to focus upon ex post inefficiencies. The review concludes that in order to understand the structure of current legal rules, and the appropriate way to modify them there needs to be more empirical research that explicitly incorporates transactions costs
First do no harm? : tort reform and birth outcomes by Janet M Currie( )

10 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 77 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"We examine the impact of tort reforms using U.S. birth records for 1989-2001. We make four contributions: First, we develop a model that analyzes the incentives created by specific tort reforms. Second, we assemble new data on tort reform. Third, we examine a range of outcomes. Finally, we allow for differential effects by demographic/risk group. We find that reforms of the "deep pockets rule" reduce complications of labor and C-sections, while caps on noneconomic damages increase them. Our results demonstrate there are important interactions between incentives created by tort law and other incentives facing physicians"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Contracts between legal persons by Lewis Kornhauser( )

9 editions published in 2010 in English and German and held by 74 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Abstract: Contract law and the economics of contract have, for the most part, developed independently of each other. In this essay, we briefly review the notion of a contract from the perspective of lawyer, and then use this framework to organize the economics literature on contract. The review thus provides an overview of the literature for economists who are interested in exploring the economic implications of contract law. The title, Contracts between Legal Persons, limits the review to that part of contract law that is generic to any legal person. A legal person is any individual, firm or government agency with the right to enter into binding agreements. Our goal is to discuss the role of the law in enforcing these agreements under the hypothesis that the legal persons have well defined goals and objectives
Performance pay and wage inequality by Thomas Lemieux( )

10 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 72 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"We document that an increasing fraction of jobs in the U.S. labor market explicitly pay workers for their performance using bonuses, commissions, or piece-rates. We find that compensation in performance-pay jobs is more closely tied to both observed (by the econometrician) and unobserved productive characteristics of workers. Moreover, the growing incidence of performance-pay can explain 24 percent of the growth in the variance of male wages between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, and accounts for nearly all of the top-end growth in wage dispersion(above the 80th percentile)."
Contracting in the shadow of the law by Surajeet Chakravarty( )

9 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 64 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Economic models of contract typically assume that courts enforce obligations on the basis of verifiable events. As a matter of law, this is not the case. This leaves open the question of optimal contract design given the available remedies that are enforced by a court of law. This paper shows that standard form construction contracts can be viewed as an optimal solution to this problem. It is shown that a central feature of construction contracts is the inclusion of governance covenants that shape the scope of authority, and regulate the ex post bargaining power of parties. Our model also provides a unified framework for the study of the legal remedies of mistake, impossibility and the doctrine limiting damages for unforeseen events developed in the case of Hadley vs. Baxendale
Accidental death and the rule of joint and several liability by Daniel Carvell( )

8 editions published between 2009 and 2010 in English and held by 63 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Reforms to the Joint and Several Liability rule (JSL) are one of the most common tort reforms and have been implemented by most US states. JSL allows plaintiffs to claim full recovery from one of the defendants, even if that defendant is only partially responsible for the tort. We develop a theoretical model that shows that the efficiency of the JSL rule depends critically on both whether the care taken by potential tortfeasors is observed, and on how the actions of the potential tortfeasors interact to cause the harm. We then provide evidence that reforms of the JSL rule have been accompanied by reductions in the accidental death rate in the U.S. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the reform of JSL causes potential tortfeasors to take more care
Anti-lemons : school reputation and educational quality by W. Bentley MacLeod( )

8 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 62 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Friedman (1962) argued that a free market in which schools compete based upon their reputation would lead to an efficient supply of educational services. This paper explores this issue by building a tractable model in which rational individuals go to school and accumulate skill valued in a perfectly competitive labor market. To this it adds one ingredient: school reputation in the spirit of Holmstrom (1982). The first result is that if schools cannot select students based upon their ability, then a free market is indeed efficient and encourages entry by high productivity schools. However, if schools are allowed to select on ability, then competition leads to stratification by parental income, increased transmission of income inequality, and reduced student effort---in some cases lowering the accumulation of skill. The model accounts for several (sometimes puzzling) findings in the educational literature, and implies that national standardized testing can play a key role in enhancing learning
State dependence and unemployment insurance by Thomas Lemieux( Book )

5 editions published in 1995 in English and held by 50 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Intrinsic Motivation in Public Service Theory and Evidence from State Supreme Courts by Elliott Ash( )

6 editions published in 2014 in English and held by 41 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the intrinsic preferences of state appellate court judges. We construct a panel data set using published decisions from state supreme court cases merged with institutional and biographical information on all (1,700) state supreme court judges for the 50 states of the United States from 1947 to 1994. We exploit variation in the employment conditions of judges over this period of time to measure the effect of these changes on a number of measures of judicial performance. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that judges are intrinsically motivated to provide high-quality decisions, and that at the margin they prefer quality over quantity. When judges face less time pressure, they write more well-researched opinions that are cited more often by later judges. When judges are up for election then performance falls, consistent with the hypothesis that election politics is time-consuming. These effects are strongest when judges have more discretion to select their case portfolio, consistent with psychological theories that posit a negative effect of contingency on motivation (e.g. Deci, 1971). Finally, the intrinsic preference for quality appears to be higher among judges selected by non-partisan elections than among those selected by partisan elections
The big sort college reputation and labor market outcomes by W. Bentley MacLeod( )

5 editions published in 2015 in English and held by 40 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Spence (1973) noted that individuals' choice of educational quantity -- measured by years of schooling -- may stem partially from a desire to signal their ability to the labor market. This paper asks if individuals' choice of educational quality -- measured by college reputation -- may likewise signal their ability. We use data on the admission scores of all Colombian college graduates to define a measure of reputation that gives clear predictions in a signaling framework. We find that college reputation, unlike years of schooling, is correlated with graduates' earnings growth. We also show that Colombia's staggered rollout of a new signal of skill -- a college exit exam -- reduced the earnings return to reputation and increased the return to individual admission scores. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that a college's reputation provides information about the ability of its student body and about its value added, broadly understood
Physician practice style and patient health outcomes : the case of heart attacks by Janet M Currie( )

5 editions published in 2015 in English and held by 40 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

When a patient arrives at the Emergency Room with acute myocardial infarction (AMI), doctors must quickly decide whether the patient should be treated with clot-busting drugs, or with invasive surgery. Using Florida data on all such patients from 1992-2011, we decompose physician practice style into two components: The physician's probability of conducting invasive surgery on the average patient, and the responsiveness of the physician's choice of procedure to the patient's condition. We show that practice style is persistent over time and that physicians whose responsiveness deviates significantly from the norm in teaching hospitals have significantly worse patient outcomes, including a 7% higher probability of death in hospitals among the patients who are least appropriate for the procedure. Our results suggest that a reallocation of invasive procedures from less appropriate to more appropriate patients could improve patient outcomes without increasing costs. Developing protocols to identify more and less appropriate patients could be a first step towards realizing this improvement
Diagnosis and unnecessary procedure use : evidence from C-section by Janet M Currie( )

5 editions published in 2013 in English and held by 38 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Taking the model to data on C-sections, the most common surgical procedure performed in the U.S., we show that improving diagnostic skills from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the observed distribution would reduce C-section rates by 11.7% among the low risk, and increase them by 4.6% among the high risk. Since there are many more low risk than high risk women, improving diagnosis would reduce overall C-section rates. Moreover, such an improvement in diagnostic skill would improve health outcomes for both high risk and low risk women, while improvements in surgical skill have the greatest impact on high risk women. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that efforts to improve diagnosis through methods such as checklists, computer assisted diagnosis, and collaborative decision making may improve patient outcomes -- National Bureau of Economic Research web site
The performance of elected officials evidence from state supreme courts by Elliott Ash( )

4 editions published in 2016 in English and held by 36 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper provides evidence on the effect of electoral institutions on the performance of public officials. Using panel data on state supreme courts between 1947 and 1994, we measure the effects of changes in judicial electoral processes on judge work quality - as measured by citations by later judges. Judges selected by non-partisan elections write higher-quality opinions than judges selected by partisan elections. Judges selected by technocratic merit commissions write higher-quality opinions than either partisan-elected judges or non-partisan-elected judges. Election-year politics reduces judicial performance in both partisan and non-partisan election systems. Giving stronger tenure to non-partisan-selected judges improves performance, while giving stronger tenure to partisan-selected judges has no effect. These results are consistent with the view that technocratic merit commissions have better information about the quality of candidates than voters, and that political bias can reduce the quality of elected officials
Viewpoint the human capital approach to inference by W. Bentley MacLeod( )

4 editions published in 2016 in English and held by 36 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The purpose of this essay is to discuss the "human capital" approach to inference. Observed decisions by experts can be used to organize data on their decisions using simple machine learning techniques. The fact that the human capital of these experts is heterogeneous implies that errors in decision making are inevitable, which in turn allows us to identify the conditional average treatment effect for a wider class of situations than would be possible with randomized control trials. This point is illustrated with some data from medical decision making in the context of treating depression, heart disease, and adverse childbirth events
Labour turnover and the natural rate of unemployment : efficiency wage vs frictional unemployment by W. Bentley MacLeod( Book )

18 editions published between 1987 and 1993 in English and held by 34 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Optimal contracting with subjective evaluation the effects of timing, malfeasance and guile by W. Bentley MacLeod( )

4 editions published in 2016 in English and held by 32 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We introduce a general Principal-Agent model with subjective evaluation and malfeasance characterized by two-sided asymmetric information on performance that allows for an arbitrary information structure. Two generic contract forms are studied. An authority contract has the Principal reveal his information before the Agent responds with her information. Under such a contract, the Agent's compensation varies only with the Principal's information, while her information is used to punish untruthful behavior by the Principal. Conversely, a sales contract has the Agent reveal her information first. In this case, the Agent's performance incentives are affected by the information revealed by both parties. Because the Agent's information affects her compensation, the information revelation constraints are more complex under a sales contract, and provide a way to integrate Williamson's (1975) notion of guile into agency theory. We find that designing sales contracts for expert agents, such as physicians and financial advisors, are significantly more complex than designing optimal authority contracts
Wage premiums and profit maximisation in efficiency wage models by W. Bentley MacLeod( Book )

11 editions published between 1989 and 1990 in English and held by 24 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

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Alternative Names
Bentley MacLeod, W. 1954-

Bentley MacLeod, William 1954-

Mac Leod, William Bentley 1954-

Macleod, Bentley 1954-

MacLeod, W.B. 1954-

MacLeod, W.B. (William Bentley), 1954-

MacLeod, W. Bentley 1954-

MacLeod, William Bentley 1954-

McLeod, W. Bentley 1954-

W. Bentley MacLeod Canadian-American economist

W. Bentley MacLeod économiste allemand

W. Bentley MacLeod Ökonom

English (171)

German (2)