WorldCat Identities

MacLeod, W. Bentley (William Bentley) 1954-

Works: 104 works in 298 publications in 2 languages and 1,178 library holdings
Roles: Author, Creator
Classifications: HB1, 331.255
Publication Timeline
Most widely held works by W. Bentley MacLeod
Supply side hysterisis [i.e. hysteresis] : the case of the Canadian unemployment insurance system by Thomas Lemieux( Book )
13 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 102 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This paper presents results from a 1971 natural experiment carried out by the Canadian government on the unemployment insurance system. At that time, they dramatically increased the generosity of the system. We find that the propensity to collect UI increases with a first time exposure to the system. Hence as more individuals experience unemployment their lifetime use of the system increases. This supply side hysterisis effect may explain why unemployment has steadily increased over the 1972 - 1992 period, even though the generosity of unemployment insurance did not
Institutions and Contract Enforcement by Armin Falk( )
14 editions published between 2008 and 2011 in English and German and held by 91 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions - dismissal barriers, and bonus pay - affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and market efficiency, by interfering with firms' use of firing threat as an incentive device. Dismissal barriers also distort the dynamics of worker effort levels over time, cause firms to rely more on the spot market for labor, and create a distribution of relationship lengths in the market that is more extreme, with more very short and more very long relationships. The introduction of a bonus pay option dramatically changes the market outcome. Firms are observed to substitute bonus pay for threat of firing as an incentive device, almost entirely offsetting the negative incentive and efficiency effects of dismissal barriers. Nevertheless, contract enforcement behavior remains fundamentally changed, because the option to pay bonuses causes firms to rely less on long-term relationships. Our results show that market outcomes are the result of a complex interplay between contract enforcement policies and the institutions in which they are embedded
Cut to the bone? : hospital takeovers and nurse employment contracts by Janet M Currie( Book )
9 editions published between 2002 and 2004 in English and held by 75 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This paper uses data from the 1990s to examine changes in the wages, employment, and effort of nurses in California hospitals following takeovers by large chains. The market for nurses has been described as a classic monopsony, so that one might expect increases in firm market power to be associated with declines in wages. However, we show that if one extends the monopsony model to consider effort, or if we apply a basic contracting model to the data, then we would expect to see effects on effort rather than on wages. This prediction is bourne out by the data nurses see few declines in wages following takeovers, but see increases in the number of patients per nurse, our measure of effort. We also find that these changes are similar in the largest for-profit and non-profit chains, suggesting that market forces are more more important than institutional form
Great expectations law, employment contracts, and labor market performance by W. Bentley MacLeod( )
9 editions published in 2010 in English and German and held by 57 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This paper reviews the literature on employment and labor law. It is observed that all jurisdictions in the world have extensive employment and labor law, even though many economists recommend a reduction in legal restrictions. The review of the law illustrates that it has evolved in response to problems of market and contract incompleteness, that often leads to inefficient allocations ex post. In contrast, due to data limitations, the economic analysis of legal rules tends to focus upon ex post inefficiencies. The review concludes that in order to understand the structure of current legal rules, and the appropriate way to modify them there needs to be more empirical research that explicitly incorporates transactions costs
First do no harm? : tort reform and birth outcomes by Janet M Currie( Book )
8 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 54 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
"We examine the impact of tort reforms using U.S. birth records for 1989-2001. We make four contributions: First, we develop a model that analyzes the incentives created by specific tort reforms. Second, we assemble new data on tort reform. Third, we examine a range of outcomes. Finally, we allow for differential effects by demographic/risk group. We find that reforms of the "deep pockets rule" reduce complications of labor and C-sections, while caps on noneconomic damages increase them. Our results demonstrate there are important interactions between incentives created by tort law and other incentives facing physicians"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts by W. Bentley MacLeod( )
9 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 53 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This paper discusses the literature on the enforcement of incomplete contracts. It compares legal enforcement to enforcement via relationships and reputations. A number of mechanisms, such as the repeat purchase mechanism (Klein and Leffler (1981)) and efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)), have been offered as solutions to the problem of enforcing an incomplete contract. It is shown that the efficiency of these solutions is very sensitive to the characteristics of the good or service exchanged. In general, neither the repeat purchase mechanism nor efficiency wages is the most efficient in the set of possible relational contracts. In many situations, total output may be increased through the use of performance pay and through increasing the quality of law. -- contract ; law and economics ; reputation ; repeated games ; incomplete contracts ; transactions costs ; institutional economics ; contract enforcement
Contracts between legal persons by Lewis Kornhauser( )
8 editions published in 2010 in English and German and held by 53 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Contract law and the economics of contract have, for the most part, developed independently of each other. In this essay, we briefly review the notion of a contract from the perspective of lawyer, and then use this framework to organize the economics literature on contract. The review thus provides an overview of the literature for economists who are interested in exploring the economic implications of contract law. The title, Contracts between Legal Persons, limits the review to that part of contract law that is generic to any legal person. A legal person is any individual, firm or government agency with the right to enter into binding agreements. Our goal is to discuss the role of the law in enforcing these agreements under the hypothesis that the legal persons have well defined goals and objectives
Performance pay and wage inequality by Thomas Lemieux( )
8 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 52 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
We document that an increasing fraction of jobs in the U.S. labor market explicitly pay workers for their performance using bonuses, commissions, or piece-rates. We find that compensation in performance-pay jobs is more closely tied to both observed (by the econometrician) and unobserved productive characteristics of workers. Moreover, the growing incidence of performance-pay can explain 24 percent of the growth in the variance of male wages between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, and accounts for nearly all of the top-end growth in wage dispersion(above the 80th percentile)
Construction Contracts (or 'How to Get the Right Building at the Right Price?') by Surajeet Chakravarty( )
6 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 49 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Most contracts that individuals enter into are not written from scratch; rather, they depend upon forms and terms that have been successful in the past. In this paper, we study the structure of form construction contracts published by the American Institute of Architects (AIA). We show that these contracts are an efficient solution to the problem of procuring large, complex projects when unforeseen contingencies are inevitable. This is achieved by carefully structuring the ex post bargaining game between the Principal and the Agent. The optimal mechanism corresponding to the AIA construction form is consistent with decisions of the courts in several prominent but controversial cases, and hence it provides an economic foundation for a number of the common-law excuses from performance. Finally, the case of form contracts for construction is an example of how markets, as opposed to private negotiations, can be used to determine efficient contract terms
State dependence and unemployment insurance by Thomas Lemieux( Book )
3 editions published in 1995 in English and held by 45 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Contracting in the shadow of the law by Surajeet Chakravarty( )
7 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 44 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Economic models of contract typically assume that courts enforce obligations on the basis of verifiable events. As a matter of law, this is not the case. This leaves open the question of optimal contract design given the available remedies that are enforced by a court of law. This paper shows that standard form construction contracts can be viewed as an optimal solution to this problem. It is shown that a central feature of construction contracts is the inclusion of governance covenants that shape the scope of authority, and regulate the ex post bargaining power of parties. Our model also provides a unified framework for the study of the legal remedies of mistake, impossibility and the doctrine limiting damages for unforeseen events developed in the case of Hadley vs. Baxendale
Anti-lemons school reputation and educational quality by W. Bentley MacLeod( )
8 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 43 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Friedman (1962) argued that a free market in which schools compete based upon their reputation would lead to an efficient supply of educational services. This paper explores this issue by building a tractable model in which rational individuals go to school and accumulate skill valued in a perfectly competitive labor market. To this it adds one ingredient: school reputation in the spirit of Holmstrom (1982). The first result is that if schools cannot select students based upon their ability, then a free market is indeed efficient and encourages entry by high productivity schools. However, if schools are allowed to select on ability, then competition leads to stratification by parental income, increased transmission of income inequality, and reduced student effort---in some cases lowering the accumulation of skill. The model accounts for several (sometimes puzzling) findings in the educational literature, and implies that national standardized testing can play a key role in enhancing learning
Accidental death and the rule of joint and several liability by Daniel Carvell( )
7 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 42 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Reforms to the Joint and Several Liability rule (JSL) are one of the most common tort reforms and have been implemented by most US states. JSL allows plaintiffs to claim full recovery from one of the defendants, even if that defendant is only partially responsible for the tort. We develop a theoretical model that shows that the efficiency of the JSL rule depends critically on both whether the care taken by potential tortfeasors is observed, and on how the actions of the potential tortfeasors interact to cause the harm. We then provide evidence that reforms of the JSL rule have been accompanied by reductions in the accidental death rate in the U.S. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the reform of JSL causes potential tortfeasors to take more care
Diagnosis and unnecessary procedure use evidence from C-section by Janet M Currie( )
4 editions published in 2013 in English and held by 29 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This paper provides a model of diagnostic skill as an element of provider quality that is separate from a doctor's skill in performing procedures. Unlike higher surgical skill, which leads to higher use of surgical procedures across the board, better diagnostic skill results in fewer procedures for the low risk, but more procedures for the high risk. That is, better diagnostic skill improves the matching between patients and procedures leading to better health outcomes. Taking the model to data on C-sections, the most common surgical procedure performed in the U.S., we show that improving diagnostic skills from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the observed distribution would reduce C-section rates by 11.7% among the low risk, and increase them by 4.6% among the high risk. Since there are many more low risk than high risk women, improving diagnosis would reduce overall C-section rates. Moreover, such an improvement in diagnostic skill would improve health outcomes for both high risk and low risk women, while improvements in surgical skill have the greatest impact on high risk women. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that efforts to improve diagnosis through methods such as checklists, computer assisted diagnosis, and collaborative decision making may improve patient outcomes
Institutions and contract enforcement ( )
2 editions published in 2008 in Undetermined and English and held by 18 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Implicit contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment by W. Bentley MacLeod( Book )
6 editions published between 1984 and 1986 in English and held by 17 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Wage premiums and profit maximisation in efficiency wage models by W. Bentley MacLeod( Book )
4 editions published between 1989 and 1990 in English and held by 14 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Motivation and markets by W. Bentley MacLeod( Book )
3 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 13 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Labour turnover and the natural rate of unemployment : efficiency wage vs frictional unemployment by W. Bentley MacLeod( Book )
5 editions published in 1989 in English and held by 13 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Efficiency and renegotiation in repeated games by James Bergin( Book )
5 editions published between 1989 and 1991 in English and held by 13 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
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Audience Level
  Kids General Special  
Audience level: 0.79 (from 0.47 for Reputation ... to 0.94 for Implicit c ...)
Alternative Names
Bentley MacLeod, W. 1954-
Bentley MacLeod, William 1954-
Mac Leod, William Bentley 1954-
Macleod, Bentley 1954-
MacLeod, W. Bentley 1954-
MacLeod, William Bentley 1954-
McLeod, W. Bentley 1954-
English (134)
German (3)