WorldCat Identities

Fehr, Ernst

Works: 245 works in 698 publications in 3 languages and 2,378 library holdings
Roles: Author, Editor, Creator, Thesis advisor, Honoree, Contributor, Recipient
Classifications: QP360.5, 330.019
Publication Timeline
Most widely held works by Ernst Fehr
Neuroeconomics : decision making and the brain( Book )

15 editions published between 2013 and 2014 in English and held by 103 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The third section contains both overview and in-depth chapters on the fundamentals of reinforcement learning, value learning, and value representation. The fourth section, 'The Neural Mechanisms for Choice, integrates what is known about the decision-making architecture into state-of-the-art models of how we make choices. The final section embeds these mechanisms in a larger social context, showing how these mechanisms function during social decision-making in both humans and animals. The book provides a historically rich exposition in each of its chapters and emphasizes both the accomplishments and the controversies in the field. A clear explanatory style and a single expository voice characterize all chapters, making core issues in economics, psychology, and neuroscience accessible to scholars from all disciplines. The volume is essential reading for anyone interested in neuroeconomics in particular or decision making in general
Does money illusion matter? : an experimental approach by Ernst Fehr( Book )

37 editions published between 1998 and 2000 in English and held by 70 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Money illusion means that people behave differently when the same objective situation is represented in nominal terms rather than in real terms. This paper shows that seemingly innocuous differences in payoff representation cause pronounced differences in nominal price inertia indicating the behavioral importance of money illusion. In particular, if the payoff information is presented to subjects in nominal terms, price expectations and actual price choices after a fully anticipated negative nominal shock are much stickier than when payoff information is presented in real terms. In addition we show that money illusion causes asymmetric effects of negative and positive nominal shocks. While nominal inertia is quite substantial and long-lasting after a negative shock, it is rather small after a positive shock
A nation-wide laboratory examining trust and trustworthiness by integrating behavioral experiments into representative surveys by Ernst Fehr( Book )

26 editions published between 2002 and 2003 in English and Spanish and held by 65 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Psychologische Grundlagen der Ökonomie : über Vernunft und Eigennutz hinaus( Book )

7 editions published between 2002 and 2003 in German and held by 64 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Money illusion and coordination failure by Ernst Fehr( Book )

18 editions published in 2004 in English and German and held by 58 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Economists long considered money illusion to be largely irrelevant. Here we show, however, that money illusion has powerful effects on equilibrium selection. If we represent payoffs in nominal terms, choices converge to the Pareto inefficient equilibrium; however, if we lift the veil of money by representing payoffs in real terms, the Pareto efficient equilibrium is selected. We also show that strategic uncertainty about the other players' behavior is key for the equilibrium selection effects of money illusion: even though money illusion vanishes over time if subjects are given learning opportunities in the context of an individual optimization problem, powerful and persistent effects of money illusion are found when strategic uncertainty prevails
Ökonomische Theorie der Selbstverwaltung und Gewinnbeteiligung by Ernst Fehr( Book )

6 editions published in 1988 in German and held by 56 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Fairness, incentives and contractual incompleteness by Ernst Fehr( Book )

15 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 44 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Theories of fairness and reciprocity - evidence and economic applications by Ernst Fehr( Book )

13 editions published between 2000 and 2001 in English and held by 42 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Is strong reciprocity a maladaptation? : on the evolutionary foundations of human altruism by Ernst Fehr( Book )

17 editions published between 2003 and 2008 in English and held by 39 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In recent years a large number of experimental studies have documented the existence of strong reciprocity among humans. Strong reciprocity means that people willingly repay gifts and punish the violation of cooperation and fairness norms even in anonymous one-shot encounters with genetically unrelated strangers. We provide ethnographic and experimental evidence suggesting that ultimate theories of kin selection, reciprocal altruism, costly signaling and indirect reciprocity do not provide satisfactory evolutionary explanations of strong reciprocity. The problem of these theories is that they can rationalize strong reciprocity only if it is viewed as maladaptive behavior whereas the evidence suggests that it is an adaptive trait. Thus, we conclude that alternative evolutionary approaches are needed to provide ultimate accounts of strong reciprocity
The robustness and real consequences of nominal wage rigidity by Ernst Fehr( Book )

15 editions published between 2000 and 2007 in English and held by 38 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Spite and development( )

1 edition published in 2008 in English and held by 34 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Screening, competition, and job design: economic origins of good jobs by Bjrn Bartling( )

12 editions published between 2009 and 2010 in English and German and held by 33 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These "high-performance work systems" are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show experimentally that complementarities between high effort discretion, rent-sharing, screening opportunities, and competition are important driving forces behind these new forms of work organization. We document in particular the endogenous emergence of two fundamentally distinct types of employment strategies. Employers either implement a control strategy, which consists of low effort discretion and little or no rent-sharing, or they implement a trust strategy, which stipulates high effort discretion and substantial rent-sharing. If employers cannot screen employees, the control strategy prevails, while the possibility of screening renders the trust strategy profitable. The introduction of competition substantially fosters the trust strategy, reduces market segmentation, and leads to large welfare gains for both employers and employees
Psychological foundations of incentives by Ernst Fehr( Book )

13 editions published between 2001 and 2008 in English and held by 33 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding incentives, contracts and organisations. Yet, they constrained their attention to a very narrow and empirically questionable view of human motivation. The purpose of this paper is to show that this narrow view of human motivation may severely limit understanding the determinants and effects of incentives. Economists may fail to understand the levels and the changes in behaviour if they neglect motives like the desire to reciprocate or the desire to avoid social disapproval. We show that monetary incentives may backfire and reduce the performance of agents or their compliance with rules. In addition, these motives may generate very powerful incentives themselves
Appropriating the commons a theoretical explanation by Armin Falk( Book )

10 editions published between 2000 and 2001 in English and held by 27 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Contracts as reference points experimental evidence by Ernst Fehr( )

13 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 25 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In a recent paper, Hart and Moore (2008) introduce new behavioral assumptions that can explain long-term contracts and important aspects of the employment relation. However, so far there exists no direct evidence that supports these assumptions and, in particular, Hart and Moore's notion that contracts provide reference points. In this paper, we examine experimentally the behavioral forces stipulated in their theory. The evidence confirms the model's prediction that there is a tradeoff between rigidity and flexibility in a trading environment with incomplete contracts and ex ante uncertainty about the state of nature. Flexible contracts - which would dominate rigid contracts under standard assumptions - cause a significant amount of shading on ex post performance, while under rigid contracts, much less shading occurs. Thus, although rigid contracts rule out trading in some states of the world, parties frequently implement them. While our results are broadly consistent with established behavioral concepts, they cannot easily be explained by existing theories. The experiment appears to reveal a new behavioral force: ex ante competition legitimizes the terms of a contract, and aggrievement and shading occur mainly about outcomes within the contract
Caste and punishment the legacy of caste culture in norm enforcement by Karla Hoff( )

6 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 19 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Well-functioning groups enforce social norms that restrain opportunism, but the social structure of a society may encourage or inhibit norm enforcement. This paper studies how the exogenous assignment to different positions in an extreme social hierarchy - the caste system - affects individuals' willingness to punish violations of a cooperation norm. Although the analysis controls for individual wealth, education, and political participation, low-caste individuals exhibit a much lower willingness to punish norm violations that hurt members of their own caste, suggesting a cultural difference across caste status in the concern for members of one's own community. The lower willingness to punish may inhibit the low caste's ability to sustain collective action and so may contribute to its economic vulnerability
Psychological foundations of incentives by Armin Falk( Book )

5 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 15 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The development of egalitarianism, altruism, spite and parochialism in childhood and adolescence by Ernst Fehr( Book )

10 editions published in 2011 in 3 languages and held by 15 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We study how the distribution of other-regarding preferences develops with age. Based on a set of allocation choices, we can classify each of 717 subjects, aged 8 to 17 years, as either egalitarian, altruistic, or spiteful. Varying the allocation recipient as either an in-group or an out-group member, we can also study how parochialism develops with age. We find a strong decrease in spitefulness with increasing age. Egalitarianism becomes less frequent, and altruism much more prominent, with age. Women are more frequently classified as egalitarian than men, and less often as altruistic. Parochialism first becomes significant in the teenage years. -- other-regarding preferences ; egalitarianism ; altruism ; spite ; parochialism ; experiments with children and adolescents
How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points? by Ernst Fehr( Book )

11 editions published in 2011 in English and German and held by 8 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Previous experimental work provides encouraging support for some of the central assumptions underlying Hart and Moore (2008)s theory of contractual reference points. However, existing studies ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal agreements and ex post renegotiation. We investigate the relevance of these features experimentally. Our evidence indicates that the central behavioral mechanism underlying the concept of contractual reference points is robust to the presence of informal agreements and ex post renegotiation. However, our data also reveal new behavioral features that suggest refinements of the theory. In particular, we find that the availability of informal agreements and ex post renegotiation changes how trading parties evaluate ex post outcomes. Interestingly, the availability of these additional options affects ex post evaluations even in situations in which the parties do not use them
Tastes, Castes, and Culture the Influence of Society on Preferences by Ernst Fehr( )

10 editions published in 2011 in 3 languages and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Economists have traditionally treated preferences as exogenously given. Preferences are assumed to be influenced by neither beliefs nor the constraints people face. As a consequence, changes in behaviour are explained exclusively in terms of changes in the set of feasible alternatives. Here we argue that the opposition to explaining behavioural changes in terms of preference changes is ill-founded, that the psychological properties of preferences render them susceptible to direct social influences, and that the impact of "society" on preferences is likely to have important economic and social consequences
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Audience Level
  Kids General Special  
Audience level: 0.76 (from 0.23 for Neuroecono ... to 0.94 for Psychologi ...)

Alternative Names
Ernst Fehr austerriksk konom

Ernst Fehr Austrian economist

Ernst Fehr economista austriaco

Ernst Fehr sterrikisk ekonom

Ernst Fehr sterriksk konom

Ernst Fehr strigsk konom

Fehr, E. 1956-

Фер, Эрнст

ארנסט פהר


English (239)

German (18)

Spanish (1)