Tabellini, Guido Enrico 1956-
Most widely held works about Guido Enrico Tabellini
Most widely held works by Guido Enrico Tabellini
The economic effects of constitutions by Torsten Persson ( Book )
9 editions published between 2003 and 2005 in English and held by 826 libraries worldwide
Monetary and fiscal policy ( Book )
10 editions published between 1994 and 1995 in English and held by 709 libraries worldwide
How will the private sector react to different government policies? What policies will produce the most desirable outcomes? The two volumes of Monetary and Fiscal Policy bring together major contributions to a new theory of macroeconomic policy that analyzes which policies are credible or politically feasible -- topics that are central to the practical policy debate but that traditional theory cannot address. This volume examines problems of policy credibility caused by incentives to deviate from announced policy.
Political economics : explaining economic policy by Torsten Persson ( Book )
14 editions published between 2000 and 2007 in English and Chinese and held by 464 libraries worldwide
Macroeconomic policy, credibility and politics by Torsten Persson ( Book )
13 editions published between 1990 and 2007 in 3 languages and held by 235 libraries worldwide
The size and scope of government : comparative politics with rational politicians by Torsten Persson ( Book )
12 editions published between 1998 and 1999 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 105 libraries worldwide
Political economics and public finance by Torsten Persson ( Book )
10 editions published in 1999 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 103 libraries worldwide
Electoral rules and corruption by Torsten Persson ( Book )
15 editions published in 2001 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 98 libraries worldwide
Monetary cohabitation in Europe by Torsten Persson ( Book )
11 editions published in 1996 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 96 libraries worldwide
Political economics and macroeconomic policy by Torsten Persson ( Book )
12 editions published between 1997 and 2000 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 94 libraries worldwide
Economic and political liberalizations by Francesco Giavazzi ( Book )
13 editions published in 2004 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 87 libraries worldwide
"This paper studies empirically the effects of and the interactions amongst economic and political liberalizations. Economic liberalizations are measured by a widely used indicator that captures the scope of the market in the economy, and in particular of policies towards freer international trade (cf. Sachs and Werner 1995, Wacziarg and Welch 2003). Political liberalizations correspond to the event of becoming a democracy. Using a difference-in-difference estimation, we ask what are the effects of liberalizations on economic performance, on macroeconomic policy and on structural policies. The main results concern the quantitative relevance of the feedback and interaction effects between the two kinds of reforms. First, we find positive feedback effects between economic and political reforms. The timing of events indicates that causality is more likely to run from political to economic liberalizations, rather than viceversa, but we cannot rule out feedback effects in both directions. Second, the sequence of reforms matters. Countries that first liberalize and then become democracies do much better than countries that pursue the opposite sequence, in almost all dimensions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
How do electoral rules shape party structures, government coalitions, and economic policies by Torsten Persson ( Book )
12 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 81 libraries worldwide
We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal policies are endogenously determined. The model predicts that, relative to proportional elections, majoritarian elections reduce government spending because they reduce party fragmentation and, therefore, the incidence of coalition governments. Party fragmentation can persist under majoritarian rule if party supporters are unevenly distributed across electoral districts. Economic and political data, from up to 50 post-war parliamentary democracies, strongly support our joint predictions from the electoral rule, to the party system, to the type of government, and to government spending.
Bureaucrats or politicians by Alberto Alesina ( Book )
14 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 79 libraries worldwide
"Policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats. This paper investigates the efficiency criteria for allocating policy tasks to elected policymakers (politicians) or non elected bureaucrats. Politicians are more efficient for tasks that do not involve too much specific technical ability relative to effort; there is uncertainty about ex post preferences of the public and flexibility is valuable; time inconsistency is not an issue; small but powerful vested interests do not have large stakes in the policy outcome; effective decisions over policies require taking into account policy complementarities and compensating the losers. We then compare this benchmark with the case in which politicians choose when to delegate and we show that the two generally differ"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Is inequality harmful for growth? : theory and evidence by Torsten Persson ( Book )
13 editions published between 1991 and 1992 in English and held by 79 libraries worldwide
External debt and political instability by Sule Özler ( Book )
10 editions published in 1991 in English and held by 73 libraries worldwide
Why is fiscal policy often procyclical by Alberto Alesina ( Book )
9 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 71 libraries worldwide
"Many countries, especially developing ones, follow procyclical fiscal polices, namely spending goes up (taxes go down) in booms and spending goes down (taxes go up) in recessions. We provide an explanation for this suboptimal fiscal policy based upon political distortions and incentives for less-than-benevolent government to appropriate rents. Voters have incentives similar to the "starving the Leviathan" classic argument, and demand more public goods or fewer taxes to prevent governments from appropriating rents when the economy is doing well. We test this argument against more traditional explanations based purely on borrowing constraints, with a reasonable amount of success"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Democracy and development : the devil in the details by Torsten Persson ( Book )
14 editions published in 2006 in English and German and held by 68 libraries worldwide
Does democracy promote economic development? This paper reviews recent attempts to address this question that exploited within-country variation. It shows that the answer is largely positive, but also depends on the details of democratic reforms. First, the sequence of economic vs political reforms matters: countries liberalizing their economy before extending political rights do better. Second, different forms of democratic government lead to different economic policies, and this might explain why presidential democracy leads to faster growth than parliamentary democracy. Third, it is important to distinguish between expected and actual political reforms. Taking expectations of regime change into account helps identify a stronger growth effect of democracy.
Why do politicians delegate by Alberto Alesina ( Book )
6 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 66 libraries worldwide
"Opportunistic politicians maximize the probability of reelection and rents from office holding. Can it be optimal from their point of view to delegate policy choices to independent bureaucracies? The answer is yes: politicians will delegate some policy tasks, though in general not those that would be socially optimal to delegate. In particular, politicians tend not to delegate coalition forming redistributive policies and policies that create large rents or effective campaign contributions. Instead they prefer to delegate risky policies to shift risk (and blame) on bureaucracies"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
The politics of 1992 : fiscal policy and European integration by Torsten Persson ( Book )
8 editions published between 1990 and 1991 in English and held by 63 libraries worldwide
Die Reformbereitschaft der Bürger : der Sozialstaat in Europa ; eine Umfrage in vier Ländern by Tito Boeri ( Book )
1 edition published in 2000 in German and held by 61 libraries worldwide
Public confidence and debt management : a model and a case study of Italy by Alberto Alesina ( Book )
8 editions published between 1989 and 1990 in English and held by 55 libraries worldwide
Capital levy--Mathematical models Commercial policy--Mathematical models Comparative government Constitutional law--Economic aspects Cross-cultural studies Debts, External--Econometric models Debts, External--Mathematical models Debts, Public Debts, Public--Mathematical models Delegation of authority Democracy Democracy--Economic aspects Democratization--Economic aspects Developing countries Distribution (Economic theory)--Mathematical models Economic development--Mathematical models Economic development--Political aspects Economic policy Economic policy--Mathematical models Economics Election law Elections--Corrupt practices Elections--Econometric models Equilibrium (Economics) Europe 1992 Europe--European Economic Community countries Finance, Public Fiscal policy Fiscal policy--Econometric models Fiscal policy--Mathematical models Free enterprise Government executives Income distribution--Mathematical models Italy Macroeconomics Macroeconomics--Mathematical models Macroeconomics--Political aspects Monetary policy Monetary policy--Mathematical models Monetary unions Parliamentary practice Policy sciences Political stability--Economic aspects Politicians Politics, Practical Pressure groups--Economic aspects Proportional representation Representative government and representation Taxation Wages--Taxation--Mathematical models
Tabellini, G. 1956-
Tabellini, Guido, 1956-
Tabellini, Guido Enrico, 1956-
No Linguistic content (15)