WorldCat Identities

Tabellini, Guido Enrico 1956-

Works: 205 works in 891 publications in 5 languages and 8,400 library holdings
Genres: Cross-cultural studies 
Roles: Author, Editor, Honoree
Classifications: HG230.3, 338.9
Publication Timeline
Most widely held works by Guido Enrico Tabellini
Political economics : explaining economic policy by Torsten Persson( Book )

22 editions published between 2000 and 2007 in English and Chinese and held by 578 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

What determines the size and form of redistributive programmes, the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of business and electoral cycles? A large and rapidly growing literature in political economics attempts to answer these questions. But so far there is little consensus on the answers and disagreement on the appropriate mode of analysis
The economic effects of constitutions by Torsten Persson( Book )

19 editions published between 2003 and 2005 in English and held by 485 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The authors of The Economic Effects of Constitutions use econometric tools to study what they call the "missing link" between constitutional systems and economic policy; the book is an uncompromisingly empirical sequel to their previous theoretical analysis of economic policy. Taking recent theoretical work as a point of departure, they ask which theoretical findings are supported and which are contradicted by the facts. The results are based on comparisons of political institutions across countries or time, in a large sample of contemporary democracies. They find that presidential/parliamentary and majoritarian/proportional dichotomies influence several economic variables: presidential regimes induce smaller public sectors, and proportional elections lead to greater and less targeted government spending and larger budget deficits. Moreover, the details of the electoral system (such as district magnitude and ballot structure) influence corruption and structural policies toward economic growth. Persson and Tabellini's goal is to draw conclusions about the causal effects of constitutions on policy outcomes. But since constitutions are not randomly assigned to countries, how the constitutional system was selected in the first place must be taken into account. This raises challenging methodological problems, which are addressed in the book. The study is therefore important not only in its findings but also in establishing a methodology for empirical analysis in the field of comparative politics
Monetary and fiscal policy by Torsten Persson( Book )

26 editions published between 1994 and 1995 in English and held by 462 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

How will the private sector react to different government policies? What policies will produce the most desirable outcomes? The two volumes of Monetary and Fiscal Policy bring together major contributions to a new theory of macroeconomic policy that analyzes which policies are credible or politically feasible -- topics that are central to the practical policy debate but that traditional theory cannot address. This volume examines problems of policy credibility caused by incentives to deviate from announced policy
Macroeconomic policy, credibility and politics by Torsten Persson( Book )

25 editions published between 1990 and 2012 in 3 languages and held by 275 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Uses a game theoretic approach to explore which economic policies are 'credible' and 'politically feasible', questions that had eluded traditional macroeconomic approaches
The size and scope of government : comparative politics with rational politicians by Torsten Persson( Book )

20 editions published between 1998 and 1999 in English and held by 100 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics, relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system. A Downsian model of electoral competition and forward-looking voting indicates that majoritarian -- as opposed to proportional -- elections increase competition between parties by focusing it into some key marginal districts. This leads to less public goods, less rents for politicians, more redistribution and larger government. A model of legislative bargaining and backward-looking voting indicates that presidential -- as opposed to parliamentary -- regimes increase competition between both politicians and voters. This leads to less public goods, less rents for politicians redistribution, and smaller government. We confront these predictions with cross-country data from around 1990, controlling for economic and social determinants of government spending. We find strong and robust support for the prediction that the size of government is smaller under presidential regimes, and weaker support for the prediction that majoritarian elections are associated with less public goods
Monetary cohabitation in Europe by Torsten Persson( Book )

19 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 93 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

How can monetary policy in stage III of European Monetary Union be coordinated between the ìns' and the òuts'? This paper compares alternative institutional mechanisms, and concludes that a generalized system of inflation targets at the European level has several merits. It strengthens domestic credibility of monetary policy. It rules out deliberate attempts to gain competitiveness through devaluations. It forces monetary policy to respond automatically to various macroeconomic shocks which is stabilizing for the real exchange rate. It distributes these shocks symmetrically across countries. On the basis of a simple theoretical model of policy coordination, the paper shows that a system of inflation targets approximates an optimal policy of international cooperation. Preliminary empirical evidence supports these theoretical results
Political economics and public finance by Torsten Persson( Book )

17 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 90 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Observed fiscal policy varies greatly across time and countries. How can we explain this variation across time and countries? This paper surveys the recent literature that has tried to answer this question. We adopt a unified approach in portraying public policy as the equilibrium outcome of an explicitly specified political process. We divide the material into three parts. In Part I, we focus on median-voter equilibria that apply to policy issues where disagreement between voters is likely to be one-dimensional. We thus study the general redistributive programs which are typical of the modern welfare state: redistribution between rich and poor, young and old, employed and unemployed, resident of different regions, and labor and capital. In Part II we study special interest politics. Here the policy problem is multi-dimensional and we focus on specific political mechanisms: we study legislative bargaining, lobbying, and electoral competition, as well as the possible interactions between these different forms of political activity. Finally, Part III deals with a set of questions that can be brought under the label of comparative politics. Here we deal with policy choice under alternative political constitutions; we model the rationale for separation of powers and contrast the stylized features of congressional and parliamentary political systems, focusing on their implications for rent extraction by politicians, redistribution and public goods provision
Electoral rules and corruption by Torsten Persson( Book )

26 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 90 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Is corruption systematically related to electoral rules? A number of studies have tried to uncover economic and social determinants of corruption but, as far as we know, nobody has yet empirically investigated how electoral systems iné0141uence corruption. We try to address this lacuna in the literature, by relating corruption to dierent features of the electoral system in a sample from the late nineties encompassing more than 80 (developed and developing) democracies. Our empirical results are based on traditional regression methods, as well as non-parametric estimators. The evidence is consistent with the theoretical models reviewed in the paper. Holding constant a variety of economic and social variables, we find that larger voting districts - and thus lower barriers to entry - are associated with less corruption, whereas larger shares of candidates elected from party lists - and thus less individual accountability - are associated with more corruption. Altogether, proportional elections are associated with more corruption, since voting over party lists is the dominant effect, while the district magnitude effect is less robust
Political economics and macroeconomic policy by Torsten Persson( Book )

24 editions published between 1997 and 2000 in English and held by 89 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper surveys the recent literature on the theory of macroeconomic policy. We study the effect of various incentive constraints on the policy making process, such as lack of credibility, political opportunism, political ideology, and divided government. The survey is organized in three parts. Part I deals with monetary policy in a simply Phillips curve model: it covers credibility issues, political business cycles, and optimal design of monetary institutions. Part II deals with fiscal policy in a dynamic general equilibrium set up: the main topics here are credibility of tax policy, and political determinants of budget deficits. Part III studies economic growth in models with endogenous fiscal policy
Endogenous distortions in product and labor markets by Martn Rama( Book )

11 editions published between 1995 and 1999 in English and Undetermined and held by 74 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Is inequality harmful for growth? : theory and evidence by Torsten Persson( Book )

26 editions published between 1991 and 1993 in English and held by 73 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Abstract: Is inequality harmful for growth? We suggest that it is. To summarize our main argument: in a society where distributional conflict is more important, political decisions are more likely to produce economic policies that allow private individuals to appropriate less of the returns to growth promoting activities, such as accumulation of capital and productive knowledge. In the paper we first formulate a theoretical model that formally captures this idea. The model has a politico-economic equilibrium, which determines a sequence of growth rates depending on structural parameters, political institutions, and initial conditions. We then confront the testable empirical implications with two sets of data. A first data set pools historical evidence-which goes back to the mid 19th century-from the US and eight European countries. A second data set contains post-war evidence from a broad cross-section of developed and less developed countries. In both samples we find a statistically significant and quantitatively important negative relation between inequality and growth. After a comprehensive sensitivity analysis, we conclude that our findings are not distorted by measurement error, reverse causation, hetroskedasticity, or other econometric problems
How do electoral rules shape party structures, government coalitions, and economic policies? by Torsten Persson( Book )

21 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and held by 73 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal policies are endogenously determined. The model predicts that, relative to proportional elections, majoritarian elections reduce government spending because they reduce party fragmentation and, therefore, the incidence of coalition governments. Party fragmentation can persist under majoritarian rule if party supporters are unevenly distributed across electoral districts. Economic and political data, from up to 50 post-war parliamentary democracies, strongly support our joint predictions from the electoral rule, to the party system, to the type of government, and to government spending
Bureaucrats or politicians? by Alberto Alesina( Book )

23 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and held by 70 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats. This paper investigates the e fficiency criteria for allocating policy tasks to elected policymakers (politicians) or non elected bureaucrats. Politicians are more efficient for tasks that do not involve too much specific technical ability relative to effort; there is uncertainty about ex post preferences of the public and flexibility is valuable; time inconsistency is not an issue; small but powerful vested interests do not have large stakes in the policy outcome; effective decisions over policies require taking into account policy complementarities and compensating the losers. We then compare this benchmark with the case in which politicians choose when to delegate and we show that the two generally differ
Economic and political liberalizations by Francesco Giavazzi( Book )

20 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 68 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper studies empirically the effects of and the interactions amongst economic and political liberalizations. Economic liberalizations are measured by a widely used indicator that captures the scope of the market in the economy, and in particular of policies towards freer international trade (cf. Sachs and Werner 1995, Wacziarg and Welch 2003). Political liberalizations correspond to the event of becoming a democracy. Using a difference-in-difference estimation, we ask what are the effects of liberalizations on economic performance, on macroeconomic policy and on structural policies. The main results concern the quantitative relevance of the feedback and interaction effects between the two kinds of reforms. First, we find positive feedback effects between economic and political reforms. The timing of events indicates that causality is more likely to run from political to economic liberalizations, rather than viceversa, but we cannot rule out feedback effects in both directions. Second, the sequence of reforms matters. Countries that first liberalize and then become democracies do much better than countries that pursue the opposite sequence, in almost all dimensions
Democracy and development : the devil in the details by Torsten Persson( Book )

23 editions published in 2006 in English and German and held by 51 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Does democracy promote economic development? This paper reviews recent attempts to address this question that exploited within-country variation. It shows that the answer is largely positive, but also depends on the details of democratic reforms. First, the sequence of economic vs political reforms matters: countries liberalizing their economy before extending political rights do better. Second, different forms of democratic government lead to different economic policies, and this might explain why presidential democracy leads to faster growth than parliamentary democracy. Third, it is important to distinguish between expected and actual political reforms. Taking expectations of regime change into account helps identify a stronger growth effect of democracy
External debt and political instability by Sule zler( Book )

15 editions published in 1991 in English and held by 49 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper studies theoretically and empirically the role of domestic political incentives in the accumulation of large external debts by developing countries during 1972-81. The theoretical model characterizes two equilibrium regimes. In one regime the borrower is on its demand curve and changes in the loan size demand are accommodated by the lenders. In the other regime the borrower is credit rationed, and the loan size is determined by the perceived country risk. Higher political instability increases the equilibrium loan size in the first regime and decreases it in the second. Using out-of-sample of evidence, we identify the two regimes in the data. We then find that in the unconstrained regime political instability has a significant positive effect on the loan size, whereas it has no significant effect in the credit rationing regime. Hence the evidence indicates a positive effect of political instability on the demand for sovereign loans, as predicted by the theory
Why is fiscal policy often procyclical? by Alberto Alesina( Book )

16 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 46 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Many countries, especially developing ones, follow procyclical fiscal polices, namely spending goes up (taxes go down) in booms and spending goes down (taxes go up) in recessions. We provide an explanation for this suboptimal fiscal policy based upon political distortions and incentives for less-than-benevolent government to appropriate rents. Voters have incentives similar to the 'starving the Leviathan' classic argument, and demand more public goods or fewer taxes to prevent governments from appropriating rents when the economy is doing well. We test this argument against more traditional explanations based purely on borrowing constraints, with a reasonable amount of success
The growth effect of democracy : is it heterogenous and how can it be estimated? by Torsten Persson( Book )

19 editions published between 2007 and 2011 in English and held by 38 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"We estimate the effect of political regime transitions on growth with semi-parametric methods, combining difference in differences with matching, that have not been used in macroeconomic settings. Our semi-parametric estimates suggest that previous parametric estimates may have seriously underestimated the growth effects of democracy. In particular, we find an average negative effect on growth of leaving democracy on the order of -2 percentage points implying effects on income per capita as large as 45 percent over the 1960-2000 panel. Heterogenous characteristics of reforming and non-reforming countries appear to play an important role in driving these results."--Abstract
Why do politicians delegate? by Alberto Alesina( Book )

13 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 34 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Opportunistic politicians maximize the probability of reelection and rents from office holding. Can it be optimal from their point of view to delegate policy choices to independent bureaucracies? The answer is yes: politicians will delegate some policy tasks, though in general not those that would be socially optimal to delegate. In particular, politicians tend not to delegate coalition forming redistributive policies and policies that create large rents or effective campaign contributions. Instead they prefer to delegate risky policies to shift risk (and blame) on bureaucracies
Democratic capital : the nexus of political and economic change by Torsten Persson( Book )

15 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 31 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We study the joint dynamics of economic and political change. Predictions of the simple model that we formulate in the paper get considerable support in a panel of data on political regimes and GDP per capita for about 150 countries over 150 years. Democratic capital -- measured by a nation's historical experience with democracy and by the incidence of democracy in its neighborhood -- reduces the exit rate from democracy and raises the exit rate from autocracy. In democracies, a higher stock of democratic capital stimulates growth in an indirect way by decreasing the probability of a successful coup. Our results suggest a virtuous circle, where the accumulation of physical and democratic capital reinforce each other, promoting economic development jointly with the consolidation of democracy
moreShow More Titles
fewerShow Fewer Titles
Audience Level
Audience Level
  Kids General Special  
Audience level: 0.52 (from 0.07 for Monetary a ... to 0.80 for Endogenous ...)

Political economics : explaining economic policy
Alternative Names
Guido Tabellini economista italiano

Guido Tabellini Italian economist

Guido Tabellini italienischer Wirtschaftswissenschaftler und Hochschullehrer

Guido Tabellini italiensk ekonom

Guido Tabellini italiensk konom

Tabellini, G. 1956-

Tabellini, Guido.

Tabellini, Guido 1956-

Tabellini, Guido Enrico

Tabellini, Guido Enrico 1956-

English (394)

Italian (2)

German (1)

Chinese (1)

Dutch (1)

The economic effects of constitutionsMonetary and fiscal policyMacroeconomic policy, credibility and politics