Peleg, BezalelOverview
Publication Timeline
Most widely held works by
Bezalel Peleg
Introduction to the theory of cooperative games
by Bezalel Peleg
(
Book
)
20 editions published between 1988 and 2007 in English and Hebrew and held by 445 libraries worldwide "This book systematically presents the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games, and the core, the main variants of the Shapley value, the ordinal bargaining set, and the Mas-Colell bargaining set of NTU games. To each solution the authors devote a separate chapter wherein they study its properties in full detail. Moreover, important variants are defined or even intensively analyzed. The authors also investigate in separate chapters continuity, dynamics, and geometric properties of solutions of TU games. The study culminates in uniform and coherent axiomatizations of all the foregoing solutions (excluding the bargaining set). Such axiomatizations have not appeared in any book. Moreover, the book contains a detailed analysis of the main results on cooperative games without side payments. Such analysis is very limited or non-existent in other books on game theory."--Jacket.
Game theoretic analysis of voting in committees
by Bezalel Peleg
(
Book
)
5 editions published between 1984 and 2008 in English and held by 339 libraries worldwide
Strategic social choice stable representations of constitutions
by Bezalel Peleg
(
Book
)
9 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 271 libraries worldwide This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part, the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution.
Geometric properties of the kernel, nucleolus, and related solution concepts
by M Maschler
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Book
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2 editions published in 1977 in English and held by 53 libraries worldwide
The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
by M Maschler
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Book
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2 editions published between 1967 and 1971 in English and held by 18 libraries worldwide
A formal approach to Nash's program
by Bezalel Peleg
(
Book
)
2 editions published in 1995 in English and held by 11 libraries worldwide
A note on existence of equilibria in generalized economies
by Bezalel Peleg
(
Book
)
3 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 10 libraries worldwide
The least-core, nucleolus, and kernel of homogeneous weighted majority games
by Joachim Rosenmüller
(
Book
)
3 editions published in 1990 in English and German and held by 9 libraries worldwide
The kernel of homogeneous games with steps
by Bezalel Peleg
(
Book
)
3 editions published in 1992 in English and held by 8 libraries worldwide
The positive prekernel of a cooperative game
by Bezalel Peleg
(
Book
)
2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 8 libraries worldwide
An axiomatization of Nash equilibria in economic situations
by Bezalel Peleg
(
Book
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2 editions published in 1994 in German and English and held by 8 libraries worldwide
Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models
by Bezalel Peleg
(
Book
)
4 editions published in 2005 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 7 libraries worldwide Effectivity functions for finitely many players and alternatives are considered. It is shown that every monotonic and superadditive effectivity function can be augmented with equal chance lotteries to a finite lottery model - i.e., an effectivity function that preserves the original effectivity in terms of supports of lotteries - which has a Nash consistent representation. In other words, there exists a finite game form which represents the lottery model and which has a Nash equilibrium for any profile of utility functions, where lotteries are evaluated by their expected utility. No additional condition on the original effectivity function is needed.
Single peakedness and coalition proofness
by Bezalel Peleg
(
Book
)
2 editions published between 1998 and 1999 in English and held by 7 libraries worldwide
Partial equilibrium in pure exchange economies
by Bezalel Peleg
(
Book
)
2 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 7 libraries worldwide
On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game
by Jens Leth Hougaard
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Book
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3 editions published between 1998 and 1999 in English and held by 6 libraries worldwide
Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters
by Bezalel Peleg
(
Book
)
3 editions published in 2002 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 6 libraries worldwide Voting problems with a continuum of voters and finitely many alternatives are considered. The classical Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems are shown to persist in this model, not for single voters but for coalitions of positive size. The emphasis of the study is on strategic considerations, relaxing the nonmanipulability requirement: are there social choice functions such that for every profile of preferences there exists a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the alternative assigned by the social choice function? Such social choice functions are called exactly and strongly consistent. The study offers an extension of the work of Peleg (1978a) and others. Specifically, a class of anonymous social choice functions with the required property is characterized through blocking coefficients of alternatives, and associated effectivity functions are studied. Finally, representation of effectivity functions by game forms having a strong Nash equilibrium is studied.
Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences
by B Peleg
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Book
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3 editions published in 2003 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 6 libraries worldwide A game form constitutionally implements a social choice correspondence if it implements it in Nash equilibrium and, moreover, the associated effectivity functions coincide. This paper presents necessary and sufficient conditions for a unanimous social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable, and sufficient and almost necessary conditions for an arbitrary (but surjective) social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable. It is shown that the results apply to interesting classes of scoring and veto rules.
Nucleodi as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions
by Peter Sudhölter
(
Book
)
1 edition published in 1996 in English and held by 6 libraries worldwide more
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Audience Level
 Related Identities
Associated Subjects
Coalitions Committees--Mathematical models Constitutional law Consumption (Economics)--Mathematical models Cooperation Decision making--Mathematical models Economics Economics, Mathematical Economics--Decision making--Mathematical models Equilibrium (Economics) Equilibrium (Economics)--Mathematical models Evolution (Biology)--Mathematical models Fixed point theory Game theory Game theory--Econometric models Game theory--Mathematical models Geometry Group decision making International trade--Mathematical models Lyapunov functions Mathematical sociology Mathematics Point processes Prices--Mathematical models Production functions (Economic theory) Social choice--Mathematical models Social sciences--Methodology Stability Statics and dynamics (Social sciences) Voting--Mathematical models
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Alternative Names
Peleg, B.
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