WorldCat Identities

Peleg, Bezalel

Overview
Works: 155 works in 330 publications in 4 languages and 2,064 library holdings
Roles: Author, Honoree
Classifications: HB846.8, 302.34
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by Bezalel Peleg
Introduction to the theory of cooperative games by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

32 editions published between 1988 and 2007 in 3 languages and held by 360 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Moreover, important variants are defined or even intensively analyzed. Separate chapters cover continuity, dynamics, and geometric properties of solutions of TU games. This study culminates in uniform and coherent axiomatizations of all the foregoing solutions (excluding the bargaining set). Except for the Shapley value such axiomatizations have not appeared in any book
Game theoretic analysis of voting in committees by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

16 editions published between 1984 and 2008 in English and held by 358 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Geometric properties of the kernel, nucleolus, and related solution concepts by Michael Maschler( Book )

5 editions published between 1971 and 1977 in English and held by 58 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Strategic social choice : stable representations of constitutions by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

16 editions published between 2010 and 2013 in English and held by 57 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part, the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution
The kernal and bargaining set for convex games by Michael Maschler( Book )

7 editions published between 1967 and 1971 in English and held by 26 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Convex games were introduced in a previous paper where it was shown that these are precisely the games for which the core has a certain regular structure. It was also shown that convex games have a unique von-Neumann-Morgenstern solution which coincides with the core, and that their Shapley value is essentially the center of gravity of the extreme points of the core. One purpose of the paper is to prove that the kernel (for the grand coalition) of convex games consists of a unique point. As such, it coincides with the nucleolus of the game and therefore occupies a central position in the core (which is different, in general, from that of the Shapley value). The authors also prove that the bargaining set M(sub 1)(Sup i) (for the grand coalition) coincides with the core. Thus, it appears that for convex games, many solution concepts either coincide with the core or occupy a central position within the core. (Author)
The positive prekernel of a cooperative game by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

5 editions published between 1998 and 2000 in English and held by 13 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Single peakedness and coalition proofness by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

3 editions published between 1998 and 1999 in English and held by 11 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The kernel of homogeneous games with steps by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

3 editions published in 1992 in English and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

When will the fittest survive? : an indirect evolutionary analysis by Werner Güth( Book )

4 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

An axiomatization of Nash equilibria in economic situations by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

3 editions published in 1994 in English and German and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

On the non-emptiness of the mas-colell bargaining set by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

6 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and held by 8 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Efficiency prices for optimal consumption plans III by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

2 editions published between 1969 and 1970 in English and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

A note on an axiomatization of the core of market games by Peter Sudhölter( Book )

3 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Representation of effectivity functions in coalition proof Nash equilibrium : a complete characterization by Hans Keiding( Book )

6 editions published between 1999 and 2000 in English and Undetermined and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments by Hans Keiding( Book )

6 editions published between 1999 and 2001 in English and Undetermined and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The consistency principle for games in strategic form by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

4 editions published between 1992 and 1993 in English and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Representation( Book )

1 edition published in 1996 in English and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Nucleodi as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions by Peter Sudhölter( Book )

1 edition published in 1996 in English and held by 6 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The dummy paradox of the bargaining set by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

3 editions published in 2001 in English and Hebrew and held by 6 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

4 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Effectivity functions for finitely many players and alternatives are considered. It is shown that every monotonic and superadditive effectivity function can be augmented with equal chance lotteries to a finite lottery model - i.e., an effectivity function that preserves the original effectivity in terms of supports of lotteries - which has a Nash consistent representation. In other words, there exists a finite game form which represents the lottery model and which has a Nash equilibrium for any profile of utility functions, where lotteries are evaluated by their expected utility. No additional condition on the original effectivity function is needed
 
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Game theoretic analysis of voting in committees
Alternative Names
Peleg, B.

Peleg, B. 1936-

Languages
English (123)

Hebrew (3)

German (1)

Chinese (1)

Covers
Game theoretic analysis of voting in committeesStrategic social choice : stable representations of constitutions