WorldCat Identities

Peleg, Bezalel

Overview
Works: 175 works in 329 publications in 5 languages and 1,972 library holdings
Roles: Author, Honoree
Classifications: HB846.8, 302.34
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by Bezalel Peleg
Game theoretic analysis of voting in committees by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

14 editions published between 1984 and 2008 in English and held by 353 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Introduction to the theory of cooperative games by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

30 editions published between 1988 and 2007 in 3 languages and held by 337 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Moreover, important variants are defined or even intensively analyzed. Separate chapters cover continuity, dynamics, and geometric properties of solutions of TU games. This study culminates in uniform and coherent axiomatizations of all the foregoing solutions (excluding the bargaining set). Except for the Shapley value such axiomatizations have not appeared in any book
Geometric properties of the kernel, nucleolus, and related solution concepts by Michael Maschler( Book )

4 editions published in 1977 in English and held by 58 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Strategic social choice : stable representations of constitutions by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

13 editions published between 2010 and 2013 in English and held by 52 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part, the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution
The kernal and bargaining set for convex games by Michael Maschler( Book )

6 editions published between 1967 and 1971 in English and held by 23 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Many solution concepts for cooperative games agree or partially agree if the game happens to be convex. For example, convex games have a unique von-Neumann Morgenstern solution which coincides with the core. Also, the (Shapley) value is a center of gravity of the extreme points of the core of a convex game; (namely, the center of gravity when the extreme points are assigned appropriate multiplicities). It is proved in this paper that the kernel (for the grand coalition) of a convex game lies in the relative interior of its core and that the bargaining set (for the grand coalition) coincides with the core. (Author)
An axiomatization of Nash equilibria in economic situations by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

3 editions published in 1994 in English and German and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Single peakedness and coalition proofness by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

2 editions published between 1998 and 1999 in English and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The kernel of homogeneous games with steps by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

3 editions published in 1992 in English and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The positive prekernel of a cooperative game by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

3 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 8 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

On ring formation in auctions by Werner Güth( Book )

5 editions published between 1993 and 1995 in English and German and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The consistency principle for games in strategic form by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

4 editions published between 1992 and 1993 in English and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

When will the fittest survive? : an indirect evolutionary analysis by Werner Güth( Book )

4 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

A note on existence of equilibria in generalized economies by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

2 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

On the non-emptiness of the mas-colell bargaining set by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

5 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Representation( Book )

1 edition published in 1996 in English and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

4 editions published between 2001 and 2003 in English and held by 6 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

A game form constitutionally implements a social choice correspondence if it implements it in Nash equilibrium and, moreover, the associated effectivity functions coincide. This paper presents necessary and sufficient conditions for a unanimous social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable, and sufficient and almost necessary conditions for an arbitrary (but surjective) social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable. It is shown that the results apply to interesting classes of scoring and veto rules
Nucleodi as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions by Peter Sudhölter( Book )

1 edition published in 1996 in English and held by 6 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

On the set of Lorenz-Maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game by Jens Leth Hougaard( Book )

5 editions published between 1998 and 2001 in English and Danish and held by 6 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

4 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Effectivity functions for finitely many players and alternatives are considered. It is shown that every monotonic and superadditive effectivity function can be augmented with equal chance lotteries to a finite lottery model - i.e., an effectivity function that preserves the original effectivity in terms of supports of lotteries - which has a Nash consistent representation. In other words, there exists a finite game form which represents the lottery model and which has a Nash equilibrium for any profile of utility functions, where lotteries are evaluated by their expected utility. No additional condition on the original effectivity function is needed
Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

3 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 4 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Voting problems with a continuum of voters and finitely many alternatives are considered. The classical Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems are shown to persist in this model, not for single voters but for coalitions of positive size. The emphasis of the study is on strategic considerations, relaxing the nonmanipulability requirement: are there social choice functions such that for every profile of preferences there exists a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the alternative assigned by the social choice function? Such social choice functions are called exactly and strongly consistent. The study offers an extension of the work of Peleg (1978a) and others. Specifically, a class of anonymous social choice functions with the required property is characterized through blocking coefficients of alternatives, and associated effectivity functions are studied. Finally, representation of effectivity functions by game forms having a strong Nash equilibrium is studied
 
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Game theoretic analysis of voting in committees
Alternative Names
Peleg, B.

Peleg, B. 1936-

Languages
English (110)

German (2)

Hebrew (2)

Danish (1)

Chinese (1)

Covers
Introduction to the theory of cooperative gamesStrategic social choice : stable representations of constitutions