WorldCat Identities

Peleg, Bezalel

Overview
Works: 158 works in 377 publications in 4 languages and 2,133 library holdings
Roles: Author, Honoree
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by Bezalel Peleg
Introduction to the theory of cooperative games by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

32 editions published between 1988 and 2007 in 3 languages and held by 367 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games systematically studies the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games, and the [epsilon]-core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games. To each solution a separate chapter is devoted, in which its properties are investigated in full detail
Game theoretic analysis of voting in committees by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

17 editions published between 1984 and 2008 in English and held by 356 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Strategic social choice : stable representations of constitutions by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

17 editions published between 2010 and 2013 in English and held by 71 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part, the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution
Geometric properties of the kernel, nucleolus, and related solution concepts by Michael Maschler( Book )

5 editions published between 1971 and 1977 in English and held by 57 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The kernal and bargaining set for convex games by Michael Maschler( Book )

8 editions published between 1967 and 1971 in English and held by 28 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Many solution concepts for cooperative games agree or partially agree if the game happens to be convex. For example, convex games have a unique von-Neumann Morgenstern solution which coincides with the core. Also, the (Shapley) value is a center of gravity of the extreme points of the core of a convex game; (namely, the center of gravity when the extreme points are assigned appropriate multiplicities). It is proved in this paper that the kernel (for the grand coalition) of a convex game lies in the relative interior of its core and that the bargaining set (for the grand coalition) coincides with the core. (Author)
The positive prekernel of a cooperative game by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

6 editions published between 1998 and 2000 in English and held by 13 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Co-evolution of preferences and information in simple games of trust by Werner Güth( Book )

7 editions published between 1998 and 1999 in English and held by 12 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In standard rational choice modelling decisions are made according to given information and preferences. In the model presented here the 'information technology' of individual decision makers as well as their preferences evolve in a dynamic process. In this process decisions are made rationally by players who differ in their informational as well as in their preference type. Relative success of alternative decisions feeds back on the type composition of the population which in turn influences rational decision making. An indirect evolutionary analysis of an elementary yet important basic game of trust shows that under certain parameter constellations the population dynamics of the evolutionary process specify a unique completely mixed rest point. However, as opposed to previous studies of preference formation in the game of trust there is no convergence to but only cycling around the rest point if the informational status of individuals evolves rather than being chosen strategically. -- Evolutionary game models ; Endogenous preference formation ; Trust relationships
Single peakedness and coalition proofness by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

5 editions published between 1998 and 1999 in English and held by 11 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

On ring formation in auctions by Werner Güth( Book )

6 editions published between 1993 and 1996 in English and German and held by 10 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

A formal approach to Nash's program by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

4 editions published between 1995 and 1996 in English and held by 10 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Partial equilibrium in pure exchange economies by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

6 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 10 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Nucleodi as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions by Peter Sudhölter( Book )

4 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and German and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

When will the fittest survive? An indirect evolutionary analysis by Werner Güth( Book )

4 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

An axiomatization of Nash equilibria in economic situations by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

4 editions published in 1994 in English and German and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The kernel of homogeneous games with steps by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

4 editions published in 1992 in English and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

A note on existence of equilibria in generalized economies by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

4 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

On the non-emptiness of the mas-colell bargaining set by Bezalel Peleg( Book )

6 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and held by 8 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

A note on an axiomatization of the core of market games by Peter Sudhölter( Book )

4 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments by Hans Keiding( Book )

6 editions published between 1999 and 2001 in English and Undetermined and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Representation of effectivity functions in coalition proof Nash equilibrium : a complete characterization by Hans Keiding( Book )

6 editions published between 1999 and 2000 in English and Undetermined and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

 
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Game theoretic analysis of voting in committees
Alternative Names
Bezalel Peleg economist (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

Bezalel Peleg Wirtschaftswissenschaftler/in (Tätig am Inst. of Mathematics, Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem, Israel; Tätig an der Cornell Univ.; Tätig am Inst. of Mathematical Economics, Univ. of Bielefeld)

Peleg, B.

Peleg, B. 1936-

Languages
English (147)

German (3)

Hebrew (2)

Chinese (1)

Covers
Game theoretic analysis of voting in committeesStrategic social choice : stable representations of constitutions