WorldCat Identities
Fri Mar 21 17:15:44 2014 UTClccn-n920234740.35Emission taxes and the design of refunding schemes /0.590.94Economic growth, education, and AIDS in Kenya : a long-run analysis /85111175n 920234743122044Gersbach, H. 1959-lccn-n84135643Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain)lccn-nr2004035426Haller, Hanslccn-n92021646Schmutzler, Armincrelccn-n82054232Bell, Clive1943-crelccn-n91108395Universita╠łt HeidelbergDepartment of Economicslccn-nr2005013841Schniewind, Achimlccn-nr2005005926Erlenmaier, Ulrichviaf-274510899Hahn, Volkerlccn-nr2003037936Liessem, Verenalccn-n93110854Hahn, VolkerGersbach, HansElectionsDemocracy--Mathematical modelsEconomic policyAIDS (Disease)--Economic aspectsSouth AfricaHIV infections--Economic aspectsHuman capitalEconomicsKenyaEconomic forecastingPolitical scienceEconomics, MathematicalCommercial lawFinanceHuman capital--Econometric modelsGross domestic product--Econometric modelsMortality--Econometric modelsDiseasesArtEconomic developmentDebt--Mathematical modelsBanks and banking--Mathematical modelsGross domestic productMortalityPolitical science--Decision makingEquilibrium (Economics)Banks and banking, CentralInterpersonal relations--Mathematical modelsPolitical planningHouseholds--Mathematical modelsHealth educationHealth planningWage bargaining--Econometric modelsOrganizational effectivenessGlobalizationIncentives in industryGame theoryEmployees--Training ofLabor productivityUnemployment--Econometric modelsAgency (Law)CommerceStructural adjustment (Economic policy)Law and economicsEducation, PrimaryDemocracyYoung adultsProgressVictims19591989199019911993199419951996199719981999200020012002200320042005200620072008200920102011201220132883239780321.8JC423ocn783474785ocn861063283ocn775653260ocn862555297ocn723852978ocn724127781ocn75323714672920ocn209859749file20040.63Gersbach, HansDesigning democracy ideas for better rules"This book presents a number of ideas for drawing up new rules to improve the functioning of democracies. The first part examines ways of combining incentive contracts with democratic elections. Such a judicious combination can alleviate a wide range of political failures without impairing the principles on which democracies are founded. The second part presents new rules for decision-making, agendas and agenda settings which can transcend the limitations of prevailing democracies in achieving desirable outcomes. An example is flexible majority rules where the size of the majority depends on the proposal. The book comprises a sequence of simple models and intuitive explanations of the results they yield."--Jacket+-+0759775908586ocn165579512book19900.50Gersbach, HansDie Informationseffizienz in Mehrheitsentscheidungen4814ocn057253637book19990.53Erlenmaier, UlrichFlexible majority rulesIn this paper we introduce flexible majority decision rules where the size of the majority depends on the proposal made by the agenda setter. Flexible majority rules can mitigate the disadvantages of democracies in the provision of public projekts. In many cases, the combination of the priciples taxation constraint to majority winners, a ban of subsidies, costly agenda setting and flexible majority rules constitute a socially optimal democratic constitution. Flexible majority rules might also be a useful decision-making procedure in other circumstances436ocn223753810book20030.93Bell, CliveThe long-run economic costs of AIDS : theory and an application to South Africa355ocn429461451com20060.39Gersbach, HansCake Division by Majority DecisionWe consider a collective choice process where three players make proposals sequentially on how to divide a given quantity of resources. Afterwards, one of the proposals is chosen by majority decision. If no proposal obtains a majority, a proposal is drawn by lot. We establish the existence of the set of subgame perfect equilibria, using a suitable refinement concept. In any equilibrium, the first agent offers the whole cake to the second proposal-maker, who in turn offers the whole cake back to the first agent. The third agent is then indifferent about dividing the cake between himself and the first or the second agent3210ocn317293506com20050.53Gersbach, HansThe effects of gobalization on worker trainingWe consider a three-stage game to examine how market integration affects firms' incentives to provide general worker training. In stage 1, firms invest in productivity-enhancing training. In stage 2, they can make wage offers for each others' workers. Finally, Cournot competition takes place. When two product markets become integrated, that is, replaced by a market with greater demand and more firms, training by each firm increases, provided the two markets are initially sufficiently concentrated. When barriers between less concentrated markets are eliminated, training is reduced. Integration increases welfare if it does not reduce training. However, for large parameter regions, welfare decreases if integration reduces training. We also show that opening product markets to countries with publicly funded training or cheap, low-skilled labor can threaten apprenticeship systems313ocn048722598book20010.37Gersbach, HansVoting transparency and conflicting interests in central bank councils303ocn048722574book20010.37Gersbach, HansShould the individual voting records of central bankers be published?306ocn076192243book20000.37Gersbach, HansCompetition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections2911ocn060607536book20010.56Gersbach, HansAwareness of general equilibrium effects and unemploymentWe examine wage-bargaining in a two-sector economy when employers and labor unions in each sector are not always aware of all general equilibrium feedback effects. We show analytically that if agents only consider labor demand effects, low real wages and low unemployment result. With an intermediate view, i.e. when partial equilibrium effects within a sector are taken into account, high real wages and unemployment result. If all general equilibrium effects are considered at once, low real wages and low unemployment again result. The assumption that unions and employers' federations are not able to incorporate all feedback effects from other sectors may explain the persistence of high unemployment in Europe299ocn055656019book20010.47Gersbach, HansThe dynamics of deposit insurance and the consumption trapWe investigate a banking system subject to repeated macroeconomic shocks and show that without deposit rate control, the banking system collapses with certainty. Any initial level of reserves will delay the collapse but not avoid it. Even without a banking collapse, the economy still converges to a consumption trap with positive probability. Savings are maximal in the consumption trap, but are used entirely to pay back obligations of banks. No long-term investments can be financed and GDP is minimal. We discuss stronger intervention rules that avoid both a collapse and the consumption trap, confirming that capital requirements are an early indicator signaling when intervention may become necessary. Our analysis provides an explanation why economies which experience a banking crisis may endure long-lasting economic downturns2912ocn039306195book19970.66Gersbach, HansDebt contracts, collapse and regulation as competition phenomenaThis paper studies a credit market with adverse selection and moral hazard where sufficient sorting is impossible.The crucial novel feature is the competition between lenders in their choice of contracts offered. Qualities of investment projects are not observable by banks and investment decisions of entrepreneurs are not contractible, but output conditional on investment is. We explain the empirically observed prevalence of debt contracts as an equilibrium phenomenon with competing lenders. Equilibrium contracts must be immune against raisin{picking by competitors. Non{debt contracts allow competitors to offer sweet deals to particularly good debtors, who will self{select to choose such a deal, while bad debtors distribute themselves across all offered contracts. Competition of banks introduces three possibilities for a breakdown of credit markets that do not occur when a bank has a monopoly. First, average returns decrease since banks compete for good lenders which may make the lending altogether unprofitable. Second, banks can have an incentive to offer a debt contract and additional equity contracts to intermediate debtors. This combination, however, is in turn dominated by a simple debt contract that is only attractive for very good entrepreneurs. As a result no equilibrium in pure strategies exists. Existence can be restored, if the permissible types of contracts are limited by regulation resembling the separation of investment and commercial banking in the U.S.Third, allowing for random delivery on credit contracts leads to a break-down since all banks want to avoid the contract with the highest chance of delivery: that contract attracts all bad entrepreneurs294ocn076894639book20060.94Bell, CliveEconomic growth, education, and AIDS in Kenya : a long-run analysisThe AIDS epidemic threatens Kenya with a long wave of premature adult mortality, and thus with an enduring setback to the formation of human capital and economic growth. To investigate this possibility, the authors develop a model with three overlapping generations, calibrate it to the demographic and economic series from 1950 until 1990, and then perform simulations for the period ending in 2050 under alternative assumptions about demographic developments, including the counterfactual in which there is no epidemic. Although AIDS does not bring about a catastrophic economic collapse, it does cause large economic costs-and many deaths. Programs that subsidize post-primary education and combat the epidemic are both socially profitable-the latter strikingly so, due to its indirect effects on the expected returns to education-and a combination of the two interventions profits from a modest long-run synergy effect2810ocn163476772book20000.47Gersbach, HansLearning of general equilibrium effects and the unemployment trapWe examine wage bargaining when employers and labor unions do not always take all general equilibrium effects into account but learn a steady state. If agents do hardly consider general equilibrium effects, low real wages and low unemployment results. With an intermediate view, when partial equilibrium effects are taken into account, high real wages and unemployment results, which may explain the persistence of high unemployment in Europe. If all general equilibrium effects are incorporated at once, again low real wages and low unemployment results. We thus obtain a hump-shaped relationship between the extend of feedback effects incorporated by the bargaining parties and real wages or unemployment279ocn059558096book20000.56Gersbach, HansProductivity improvements in public organizations278ocn321177060com20060.50Bell, CliveThe macroeconomics of targeting: the case of an enduring epidemicWhat is the right balance among policy interventions in order to ensure economic growth over the long run when an epidemic causes heavy mortality among young adults? We argue that, in general, policies to combat the disease and promote education must be concentrated, in certain ways, on some subgroups of society, at first to the partial exclusion of others. This concentration involves what we term the macroeconomics of targeting. The central comparison is then between programs under which supported families enjoy the benefits of spending on health and education simultaneously (DT), and those under which the benefits in these two domains are sequenced (ST). When levels of human capital are uniformly low at the outbreak, DT is superior to ST if the subsequent mortality rate exceeds some threshold value. Outside aid makes DT more attractive; but DT restricts support to fewer families initially and so increases inequality268ocn061083367book20020.56Gersbach, HansThe affectionate society : does competition for partners promote friendliness?266ocn076215029book20000.35Gersbach, HansEmission taxes and the design of refunding schemes258ocn053802236book20000.59Gersbach, HansIncentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi-task problems239ocn059312350book20030.56Gersbach, HansStructural reforms and the macroeconomy : the role of general equilibrium effects+-+0759775908+-+0759775908Fri Mar 21 16:12:01 EDT 2014batch28542