WorldCat Identities

Wolfstetter, Elmar 1945-

Overview
Works: 96 works in 194 publications in 2 languages and 771 library holdings
Roles: Editor, Creator, Honoree
Classifications: HB172, 338.5
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about  Elmar Wolfstetter Publications about Elmar Wolfstetter
Publications by  Elmar Wolfstetter Publications by Elmar Wolfstetter
Most widely held works by Elmar Wolfstetter
Topics in microeconomics : industrial organization, auctions, and incentives by Elmar Wolfstetter ( Book )
20 editions published between 1999 and 2003 in English and held by 367 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
"This text in microeconomics focuses on the strategic analysis of markets under imperfect competition, incomplete information, and incentives." "Each chapter introduces the core issues in an accessible yet rigorous fashion, and then investigates specialized themes. An attempt is made to develop a coherent story, with self-contained explanations and proofs. The only prerequisites are a basic knowledge of calculus and probability, and familiarity with intermediate undergraduate microeconomics." "The text can be used as a textbook in courses on microeconomics, theoretical industrial organization, and information and incentives for senior undergraduate or first-year graduate students."--BOOK JACKET
Wert, Profitrate und Beschäftigung : Aspekte d. Marxschen u.d. klass. Wirtschaftstheorie by Elmar Wolfstetter ( Book )
5 editions published in 1977 in German and held by 59 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions the GSM spectrum auction in Germany by Veronika Grimm ( Book )
5 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 23 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Implementing efficent market structure by Veronika Grimm ( Book )
5 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 21 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Auctions and corruption by Yvan Lengwiler ( Book )
5 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 20 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The third generation (UMTS) spectrum auction in Germany by Veronika Grimm ( Book )
5 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 19 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
A sealed bid auction that matches the English auction by Motty Perry ( Book )
6 editions published between 1998 and 2000 in English and held by 19 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Die Marxsche Theorie und ihre Kritik : eine Textsammlung z. Kritik d. polit. Ökonomie ( Book )
3 editions published in 1974 in German and held by 18 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Die Marxsche Theorie und ihre Kritik : eine Textsammlung zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie by Hans G Nutzinger ( Book )
7 editions published between 1974 and 2008 in German and held by 18 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Auctions when bidders prepare by investing in ideas by Thomas D Jeitschko ( Book )
4 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 18 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers ( )
2 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 17 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The Swiss UMTS spectrum auction flop bad luck or bad design? by Elmar Wolfstetter ( Book )
6 editions published between 2001 and 2003 in English and held by 17 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Partnership dissolution, complementarity, and investment incentives by Jianpei Li ( Book )
3 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 13 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Die Marxsche Theorie und ihre Kritik eine Textsammlung zur Kritik der Polotischen Okonomie by Hans G Nutzingen ( Book )
1 edition published in 1974 in German and held by 12 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending bid auctions by Frank Riedel ( Book )
3 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 11 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Bid Rigging : an analysis of corruption in auctions by Yvan Lengwiler ( Book )
3 editions published in 2005 in English and German and held by 10 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This invites corruption. We propose a model of corruption in which the auctioneer orchestrates bid rigging by inviting a bidder to either lower or raise his bid, whichever is more profitable. We characterize equilibrium bidding in first- and second-price auctions, show how corruption distorts the allocation, and why both the auctioneer and bidders may have a vested interest in maintaining corruption. Bid rigging is initiated by the auctioneer after bids have been submitted in order to minimize illegal contact and to realize the maximum gain from corruption
Surplus labour, synchronized labour costs and Marx's theory of value by Elmar Wolfstetter ( Book )
2 editions published in 1972 in German and English and held by 4 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Security bid auctions for agency contracts by Byoung-heon Jun ( Book )
1 edition published in 2013 in English and held by 4 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of hidden action and hidden information. Securities range from cash to equity and call options. Steeperʺ securities are better surplus extractors that narrow the gap between the two highest valuations, yet reduce effort incentives. In view of this trade-off, a hybrid share auction that includes a (possibly negative) cash reward to the winner, a minimum share, and an option to call a fixed wage contract, tends to outperform all other auctions, although it is not an optimal mechanism. However, by adding output targets to hybrid share auctions one can (arbitrary closely) implement the optimal mechanism
Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may serve as a signal by Byoung Heon Jun ( Book )
1 edition published in 2014 in English and held by 4 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by strategic non-participation, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer’s type, which drives a unique separating and a multitude of pooling equilibria. If one eliminates belief systems that violate the intuitive criterionʺ, one obtains a unique equilibrium reserve price equal to the seller’s own valuation. Paradoxically, even if bidders initially believe that the auctioneer is bound by his reserve almost with certainty, commitment has no value
Optimal unemployment insurance and experience rating by Murray Brown ( Book )
3 editions published in 1988 in English and German and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
 
moreShow More Titles
fewerShow Fewer Titles
Audience Level
0
Audience Level
1
  Kids General Special  
Audience level: 0.58 (from 0.27 for Die Marxsc ... to 0.90 for Die Marxsc ...)
Alternative Names
Wolfstetter, E. 1945-
Wolfstetter, Elmar G. 1945-
Languages
English (71)
German (19)
Covers