WorldCat Identities

Ockenfels, Axel

Overview
Works: 89 works in 200 publications in 2 languages and 1,603 library holdings
Roles: Author, Other, Editor
Classifications: HB74.P8, 330
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by Axel Ockenfels
Fairness, Reziprozität und Eigennutz : ökonomische Theorie und experimentelle Evidenz by Axel Ockenfels( Book )

5 editions published between 1998 and 1999 in German and held by 83 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The Selten School of Behavioral Economics : a collection of essays in honor of Reinhard Selten by Abdolkarim Sadrieh( Book )

11 editions published between 2010 and 2014 in English and held by 69 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Reinhard Selten, to date the only German Nobel Prize laureate in economics, celebrates his 80th birthday in 2010. While his contributions to game theory are well-known, the behavioral side of his scientific work has received less public exposure, even though he has been committed to experimental research during his entire career, publishing more experimental than theoretical papers in top-tier journals. This Festschrift is dedicated to Reinhard Selten's exceptional influence on behavioral and experimental economics. In this collection of academic highlight papers, a number of his students are joined by leading scholars in experimental research to document the historical role of the "Meister" in the development of the research methodology and of several sub-fields of behavioral economics. Next to the academic insight in these highly active fields of experimental research, the papers also provide a glance at Reinhard Selten's academic and personal interaction with his students and peers"--Publisher
Last minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctions : theory and evidence from a natural experiment on the Internet by Alvin E Roth( Book )

13 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 61 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

There is a great deal of late bidding on internet second price auctions. We show that this need not result from either common value properties of the objects being sold, or irrational behavior: late bidding can occur at equilibrium even in private value auctions. The reason is that very late bids have a positive probability of not being successfully submitted, and this opens a way for bidders to implicitly collude, and avoid bidding wars, in auctions such as those run by eBay, which have a fixed end time. A natural experiment is available because the auctions on Amazon, while operating under otherwise similar rules, do not have a fixed end time, but continue if necessary past the scheduled end time until ten minutes have passed without a bid. The strategic differences in the auction rules are reflected in the auction data by significantly more late bidding on eBay than on Amazon. Futhermore, more experienced bidders on eBay submit late bids more often than do less experienced bidders, while the effect of experience on Amazon goes in the opposite direction. On eBay, there is also more late bidding for antiques than for computers. We also find scale independence in the distribution over time of bidders' last bids, of a form strikingly similar to the deadline effect' noted in bargaining: last bids are distributed according to a power law. The evidence suggests that multiple causes contribute to late bidding, with strategic issues related to the rules about ending the auction playing an important role
Negotiation and market engineering executive summary ; Dagstuhl seminar 06461( )

2 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 32 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Essays on Economic Laboratory and Field Experiments by Felix Ebeling( )

1 edition published in 2013 in English and held by 31 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Essays on Behavior under Risk and Uncertainty by Julia Stauf( )

1 edition published in 2013 in English and held by 31 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Essays on Bidding Behavior in Auctions by Lyuba Ilieva( )

1 edition published in 2013 in English and held by 30 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Essays on Social Preferences by Bjoern Hartig( )

1 edition published in 2013 in English and held by 30 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The failure of the revenue equivalence principle: multiple objects, information acquisition and favoritism by Vitali Gretschko( )

1 edition published in 2012 in English and held by 30 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Evolutionary norm enforcement by Werner Güth( Book )

9 editions published between 1999 and 2000 in English and held by 30 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Applying an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation, we show that a legal system can induce players to reward trust even if material incentives dictate to exploit trust. By analyzing the crowding out or crowding in of trustworthiness implied by various verdict rules, we can assess how a court influences the share of kept promises of "truly" trustworthy players who evolutionarily evolved as trustworthy and of opportunistic players who are only trustworthy if inspired by material incentives
Online auctions by Axel Ockenfels( Book )

9 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 24 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The economic literature on online auctions is rapidly growing because of the enormous amount of freely available field data. Moreover, numerous innovations in auction-design features on platforms such as eBay have created excellent research opportunities. In this article, we survey the theoretical, empirical, and experimental research on bidder strategies (including the timing of bids and winner's-curse effects) and seller strategies (including reserve-price policies and the use of buy-now options) in online auctions, as well as some of the literature dealing with online-auction design (including stopping rules and multi-object pricing rules)
An experimental analysis of ending rules in internet auctions by Dan Ariely( Book )

5 editions published between 2002 and 2003 in English and held by 23 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

A great deal of late bidding has been observed on internet auctions such as eBay, which employ a second price auction with a fixed deadline. Much less late bidding has been observed on internet auctions such as those run by Amazon, which employ similar auction rules, but use an ending rule that automatically extends the auction if necessary after the scheduled close until ten minutes have passed without a bid. This paper reports an experiment that allows us to examine the effect of the different ending rules under controlled conditions, without the other differences between internet auction houses that prevent unambiguous interpretation of the field data. We find that the difference in auction ending rules is sufficient by itself to produce the differences in late bidding observed in the field data. The experimental data also allow us to examine how individuals bid in relation to their private values, and how this behavior is shaped by the different opportunities for learning provided in the auction conditions
Late and multiple bidding in second price internet auctions : theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction by Axel Ockenfels( Book )

4 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 18 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Retributive responses by Werner Güth( Book )

5 editions published between 2000 and 2002 in English and held by 18 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Social Context and Behavior under Uncertainty by Christoph Feldhaus( )

1 edition published in 2016 in English and held by 16 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

On the design of simple multi-unit online auctions( )

1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 16 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Essays on Procurement Design by Nicolas Fugger( )

1 edition published in 2016 in English and held by 16 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The limits of trust in economic transactions investigations of perfect reputation systems by Gary E Bolton( Book )

6 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 14 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

How social reputation networks interact with competition in anonymous online trading by Gary E Bolton( Book )

5 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Many Internet markets rely on 'feedback systems', essentially social networks of reputation, to facilitate trust and trustworthiness in anonymous transactions. Market competition creates incentives that arguably may enhance or curb the effectiveness of these systems. We investigate how different forms of market competition and social reputation networks interact in a series of laboratory online markets, where sellers face a moral hazard. We find that competition in strangers networks (where market encounters are one-shot) most frequently enhances trust and trustworthiness, and always increases total gains-from-trade. One reason is that information about reputation trumps pricing in the sense that traders usually do not conduct business with someone having a bad reputation not even for a substantial price discount. We also find that a reliable reputation network can largely reduce the advantage of partners networks (where a buyer and a seller can maintain repeated exchange with each other) in promoting trust and trustworthiness if the market is sufficiently competitive. We conclude that, overall, competitive online markets have more effective social reputation networks
Negotiation, auctions, and market engineering : international seminar Dagstuhl Castle, Germany, November 12-17, 2006, revised selected papers by Henner Gimpel( Book )

5 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

This book contains a selection of papers presented at the International Seminar "Negotiation and Market Engineering", held at Dagstuhl Castle, Germany, in November 2006. The 17 revised full papers presented in this volume were carefully selected and reviewed after the seminar. The papers deal with the complexity of negotiations, auctions, and markets as economic, social, and IT systems. The authors give a broad overview on the major issues to be addressed and the methodologies used to approach them, covering highly interdisciplinary research from computer science, economics, business administration, and mathematics
 
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The Selten School of Behavioral Economics : a collection of essays in honor of Reinhard Selten
Alternative Names
Axel Ockenfels deutscher Wirtschaftswissenschaftler

Axel Ockenfels Duits econoom

Axel Ockenfels economista alemán

Axel Ockenfels economista alemany

Axel Ockenfels économiste allemand

Axel Ockenfels German economist

Axel Ockenfels tysk ekonom

Axel Ockenfels tysk økonom

Ockenfels, A. 1969-

アクセル・オッケンフェルス

Languages
English (82)

German (5)

Covers
Negotiation, auctions, and market engineering : international seminar Dagstuhl Castle, Germany, November 12-17, 2006, revised selected papers