WorldCat Identities

Morgan, John 1967-

Overview
Works: 21 works in 36 publications in 1 language and 893 library holdings
Classifications: HB131, 330.01
Publication Timeline
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Publications about  John Morgan Publications about John Morgan
Publications by  John Morgan Publications by John Morgan
Most widely held works by John Morgan
Experimental and behavioral economics by J Morgan ( )
8 editions published between 2005 and 2009 in English and held by 810 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
As demand to substantiate predictions from economic theory with causal empirical evidence increases, economists have more and more turned towards controlled laboratory experiments. As this field has blossomed it has provided evidence confirming some of the key predictions of economic theory and exposed some of the weaker theoretical predictions. This has resulted in a symbiotic relationship where experimental evidence not only is used to support theoretical conclusions but has pointed economists into bold and exciting new areas of investigation. In this volume, I am proud to present some of the most stimulating work in this field. The first three chapters provide a fresh look at some of the classical issues in experimental economics. These papers provide novel insights into psychology in ultimatum games, the impact of social interaction on learning, and communication in coordination games. The next two chapters look at how experiments can illuminate our understanding of what determines trust. These papers examine how monitoring within an organization influences trust, as well as examining how individual political ideologies are related to an individuals level of trust.; The final two chapters show how experiments can be fruitfully applied to vertical relationships and auction design, two of the most important areas in contemporary contract theory
On the buyability of voting bodies by John Morgan ( )
4 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 32 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
We study vote buying by competing interest groups in a variety of electoral and contractual settings. While increasing the size of a voting body reduces its buyability in the absence of competition, we show that larger voting bodies may be more buyable than smaller voting bodies when interest groups compete. In contrast, imposing the secret ballot---which we model as forcing interest groups to contract on outcomes rather than votes---is an effective way to fight vote buying in the presence of competition, but much less so in its absence. We also study more sophisticated vote buying contracts. We show that, regardless of competition, the option to contract on both votes and outcomes is worthless, as it does not affect buyability as compared to contracting only on votes. In contrast, when interest groups can contract on votes and vote shares, we show that voting bodies are uniquely at risk of being bought
Relative prifit auctions by John Morgan ( Book )
5 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 10 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Diversity in the workplace by John Morgan ( Book )
1 edition published in 2006 in English and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
We study a model where an employer, trying to fill a vacancy, engages in optimal sequential search by drawing from two subpopulations of candidates who differ in their "discourse systems": during an interview, a minority candidate with a discourse system not shared with the employer conveys a noisier unbiased signal of ability than does a majority candidate. We show that, when the employer is "selective," minority candidates are underrepresented in the permanent workforce, fired at greater rates, and underrepresented among initial hires, even though the employer has no taste for discrimination and the populations are alike in their average ability. Furthermore, workplace diversity is increased if: (1) the cost of firing is reduced, (2) the cost of interviewing is increased, (3) the opportunity cost of leaving the position unfilled is increased, or (4) the prior probability that a candidate can perform the job is increased. Indeed, if the prior probability is sufficiently high, or the cost of firing sufficiently low, then minority candidates may be overrepresented in the permanent workforce
Lake Wobegon revisited : equilibrium embellishment and discrimination in recruiting by John Morgan ( Book )
1 edition published in 1998 in English and held by 6 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
(Anti- ) competitive effects of joint bidding and bidder restrictions by Vijay Krishna ( Book )
2 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 6 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Information gatekeepers and the competitiveness of homogeneous procduct markets by Michael R Baye ( Book )
1 edition published in 1998 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
An experimental study of price dispersion by John Morgan ( Book )
1 edition published in 2001 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Corruption, competition, and contracts a model of vote buying by John Morgan ( Book )
1 edition published in 2006 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
In the presence of competing interest groups, this paper examines how the form of votebuying contracts affects policy outcomes. We study contracts contingent upon individual votes, policy outcomes, and/or vote shares. Voters either care about their individual votes, or about the policy outcome. We find that vote buying is cheaper when what can be contracted upon coincides with what voters care about. Vote buying becomes extremely costly, or even impossible, when there is no such coincidence. Finally, vote buying is extremely cheap, or even free, when contracts can be contingent upon both individual votes and vote shares
"Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise" : transparency in contests by Philipp Denter ( Book )
1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Increasingly, lobbying groups are subject to transparency requirements, obliging them to provide detailed information about their business. We study the effect this transparency policy has on the nature of lobbying competition. Under mild conditions, mandated transparency leads to an increase in wastefulness of lobbying competition and a decline in expected allocative efficiency. Hence we identify a negative side-effect of transparency policy, which also has implications for various other fields such as political campaigning or firm competition. Transparency Policy, Rent-seeking Contests, Information Disclosure, Value of Ignorance
When do markets tips? : an experimental study by Tanjim Hossain ( Book )
1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
Leadership in groups a monetary policy experiment by Alan S Blinder ( )
1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
In an earlier paper (Blinder and Morgan, 2005), we created an experimental apparatus in which Princeton University students acted as ersatz central bankers, making monetary policy decisions both as individuals and in groups. In this study, we manipulate the size and leadership structure of monetary policy decisionmaking. We find no evidence of superior performance by groups that have designated leaders. Groups without such leaders do as well as or better than groups with well-defined leaders. Furthermore, we find rather little difference between the performance of four-person and eight-person groups; the larger groups outperform the smaller groups by a very small margin. Finally, we successfully replicate our Princeton results, at least qualitatively: Groups perform better than individuals, and they do not require more "time" to do so
Network architecture and traffic flows ( )
1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
Horizontal mergers of online firms : structural estimation and competitive effects ( )
1 edition published in 2010 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
This paper (1) presents a general model of online price competition, (2) shows how to structurally estimate the underlying parameters of the model when the number of competing firms is unknown or in dispute, (3) estimates these parameters based on UK data for personal digital assistants, and (4) uses these estimates to simulate the competitive effects of horizontal mergers. Our results suggest that competitive effects in this online market are more closely aligned with the simple homogeneous product Bertrand model than might be expected given the observed price dispersion and number of firms. Our estimates indicate that so long as two firms remain in the market post merger, the average transaction price is roughly unaffected by horizontal mergers. However, there are potential distributional effects; our estimates indicate that a three-to-two merger raises the average transaction price paid by price sensitive "shoppers" by 2.88 percent, while lowering the average transaction price paid by consumers "loyal" to a particular firm by 1.37 percent. -- Antitrust ; E-Retail ; Stuctural Estimation ; Mergers
Online pricing and the Euro changeover : cross-country comparisons ( )
1 edition published in 2002 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
Brand awareness and price competition in online markets by John Morgan ( Book )
1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
Communism, post-communism and moral education ( Book )
1 edition published in 2005 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
Are two heads better than one? : an experimental analysis of group vs. individual decisionmaking by Alan S Blinder ( )
1 edition published in 2001 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
Abstract: Two laboratory experiments - one a statistical urn problem, the other a monetary policy experiment - were run to test the commonly-believed hypothesis that groups make decisions more slowly than individuals do. Surprisingly, this turns out not to be true there is no significant difference in average decision lags. Furthermore, and also surprisingly, there is no significant difference in the decision lag when groups decisions are made by majority rule versus when they are made under a unanimity requirement. In addition, group decisions are on average superior to individual decisions. The results are strikingly similar across the two experiments
Endogenous entry in contests ( )
1 edition published in 2008 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
We report the results of laboratory experiments on rent-seeking contests with endogenous participation. Theory predicts that (a) contest entry and rent-seeking expenditures increase with the size of the prize; and (b) earnings are equalized between the contest and the outside option. While the directional predictions offered in (a) are supported in the data, the level predictions are not. Prediction (b) is not supported in the data: When the prize is large, contest participants earn more than the outside option. When the prize is small, contest participants earn less. Previous studies of gender and contest competition suggest that females should (a) not perform as well in the contest; and (b) enter at a lower rate. We find some support for (a) but not for (b). Women participate in the contest at the same rate as men. -- Contests ; Competition ; Entry ; Experiments
A laboratory study of advertising and price competition ( )
1 edition published in 2003 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
 
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Alternative Names
Morgan, John Roy 1967-
Morgan, Roy John 1967-...
Languages
English (35)
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