Fleiner, Tamás 1971
Overview
Works:  10 works in 17 publications in 1 language and 39 library holdings 

Genres:  Conference papers and proceedings 
Roles:  Author 
Classifications:  QA164, 511.6 
Publication Timeline
.
Most widely held works by
Tamás Fleiner
Stable and crossing structures by
Tamás Fleiner(
Book
)
5 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 14 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
5 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 14 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
On the core of directed acyclic graph games by Balázs Sziklai(
)
1 edition published in 2014 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
In this paper we consider a natural generalization of standard tree games where the underlying network is a directed acyclic graph. We briefly discuss the relation of directed acyclic graph (DAG) games with other networkbased cost games. We show that in general a DAGgame is not concave, even its core might be empty, but we provide an efficiently verifiable condition satisfied by a large class of directed acyclic graphs that is sufficient for balancedness of the associated DAGgame. We introduce a network canonization process and prove various structural results for the core of canonized DAGgames, for example, we characterize classes of coalitions that have a constant payoff in the core. In addition, we identify a subset of the coalitions that is sufficient to determine the core
1 edition published in 2014 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
In this paper we consider a natural generalization of standard tree games where the underlying network is a directed acyclic graph. We briefly discuss the relation of directed acyclic graph (DAG) games with other networkbased cost games. We show that in general a DAGgame is not concave, even its core might be empty, but we provide an efficiently verifiable condition satisfied by a large class of directed acyclic graphs that is sufficient for balancedness of the associated DAGgame. We introduce a network canonization process and prove various structural results for the core of canonized DAGgames, for example, we characterize classes of coalitions that have a constant payoff in the core. In addition, we identify a subset of the coalitions that is sufficient to determine the core
Fractional solutions for capacitated NTUgames, with applications to stable matchings by
Péter Biró(
)
1 edition published in 2012 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
In this paper we investigate some new applications of Scarf's Lemma. First, we introduce the notion of fractional core for NTUgames, which is always nonempty by the Lemma. Stable allocation is a general solution concept for games where both the players and their possible cooperations can have capacities. We show that the problem of finding a stable allocation, given a finitely generated NTUgame with capacities, is always solvable by a variant of Scarf's Lemma. Then we describe the interpretation of these results for matching games. Finally we consider an even more general setting where players' contributions in a joint activity may be different. We show that a stable allocation can be found by the Scarf algorithm in this case as well, and we demonstrate the usage of this method for the hospitals resident problem with couples. This problem is relevant in many practical applications, such as NRMP (National Resident Matching Program).  Scarf lemma ; core ; stable matching ; stable allocation ; hospitals residents problem ; couples
1 edition published in 2012 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
In this paper we investigate some new applications of Scarf's Lemma. First, we introduce the notion of fractional core for NTUgames, which is always nonempty by the Lemma. Stable allocation is a general solution concept for games where both the players and their possible cooperations can have capacities. We show that the problem of finding a stable allocation, given a finitely generated NTUgame with capacities, is always solvable by a variant of Scarf's Lemma. Then we describe the interpretation of these results for matching games. Finally we consider an even more general setting where players' contributions in a joint activity may be different. We show that a stable allocation can be found by the Scarf algorithm in this case as well, and we demonstrate the usage of this method for the hospitals resident problem with couples. This problem is relevant in many practical applications, such as NRMP (National Resident Matching Program).  Scarf lemma ; core ; stable matching ; stable allocation ; hospitals residents problem ; couples
The nucleolus of directed acyclic graph games by Balázs Sziklai(
)
1 edition published in 2013 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
In this paper we consider a natural generalization of standard tree games where the underlying structure is a directed acyclic graph. We analyze the properties of the game and illustrate its relation with other graph based cost games. We show that although the game is not convex its core is always nonempty. Furthermore we provide a painting algorithm for large families of directed acyclic graph games that finds the nucleolus in polynomial time
1 edition published in 2013 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
In this paper we consider a natural generalization of standard tree games where the underlying structure is a directed acyclic graph. We analyze the properties of the game and illustrate its relation with other graph based cost games. We show that although the game is not convex its core is always nonempty. Furthermore we provide a painting algorithm for large families of directed acyclic graph games that finds the nucleolus in polynomial time
Notes on the bankruptcy problem : an application of hydraulic rationing by
Tamás Fleiner(
)
1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
We offer a new approach to the wellknown bankruptcy problem based on Kaminski's idea. With the help of hydraulic rationing we give a proof to Aumann and Maschlers theorem i.e. the consistent solution of a bankruptcy problem is the nucleolus of the corresponding game. We use a system of vessels and water and the principles of mechanics to show this fact. The proof is not just simple and demonstrative but also provides an insight how the nucleolus is constructed in such games.  bankruptcy problem ; nucleolus ; hydraulic rationings
1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
We offer a new approach to the wellknown bankruptcy problem based on Kaminski's idea. With the help of hydraulic rationing we give a proof to Aumann and Maschlers theorem i.e. the consistent solution of a bankruptcy problem is the nucleolus of the corresponding game. We use a system of vessels and water and the principles of mechanics to show this fact. The proof is not just simple and demonstrative but also provides an insight how the nucleolus is constructed in such games.  bankruptcy problem ; nucleolus ; hydraulic rationings
Matching couples with Scarf's algorithm by
Péter Biró(
)
1 edition published in 2013 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Scarf's algorithm [18] provides fractional core elements for NTUgames. Biró and Fleiner [3] showed that Scarf's algorithm can be extended for capacitated NTUgames. In this setting agents can be involved in more than one coalition at a time, cooperations may be performed with different intensities up to some limits, and the contribution of the agents can also differ in a coalition. The fractional stable solutions for the above model, produced by the extended Scarf algorithm, are called stable allocations. In this paper we apply this solution concept for the Hospitals Residents problem with Couples (HRC). This is one of the most important general stable matching problems due to its relevant applications, also wellknown to be NPhard. We show that if a stable allocation yielded by the Scarf algorithm turns outto be integral then it provides a stable matching for an instance of HRC, so this method can be used as a heuristic. In an experimental study, we compare this method with other heuristics constructed for HRC that are applied in practice in the American and Scottish resident allocation programs, respectively. Our main finding is that the Scarf algorithm outperforms all the other known heuristics when the proportion of couples is high
1 edition published in 2013 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Scarf's algorithm [18] provides fractional core elements for NTUgames. Biró and Fleiner [3] showed that Scarf's algorithm can be extended for capacitated NTUgames. In this setting agents can be involved in more than one coalition at a time, cooperations may be performed with different intensities up to some limits, and the contribution of the agents can also differ in a coalition. The fractional stable solutions for the above model, produced by the extended Scarf algorithm, are called stable allocations. In this paper we apply this solution concept for the Hospitals Residents problem with Couples (HRC). This is one of the most important general stable matching problems due to its relevant applications, also wellknown to be NPhard. We show that if a stable allocation yielded by the Scarf algorithm turns outto be integral then it provides a stable matching for an instance of HRC, so this method can be used as a heuristic. In an experimental study, we compare this method with other heuristics constructed for HRC that are applied in practice in the American and Scottish resident allocation programs, respectively. Our main finding is that the Scarf algorithm outperforms all the other known heuristics when the proportion of couples is high
A fixedpoint approach to stable matchings and some applications by
Tamás Fleiner(
)
1 edition published in 2003 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
1 edition published in 2003 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
More sets, graphs, and numbers : a salute to Vera Sós and András Hajnal by
Ervin Győri(
Book
)
4 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
Discrete mathematics, including (combinatorial) number theory and set theory has always been a stronghold of Hungarian mathematics. The present volume honouring Vera Sos and Andras Hajnal contains survey articles (with classical theorems and stateoftheart results) and cutting edge expository research papers with new theorems and proofs in the area of the classical Hungarian subjects, like extremal combinatorics, colorings, combinatorial number theory, etc. The open problems and the latest results in the papers inspire further research. The volume is recommended to experienced specialists as well as to young researchers and students
4 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
Discrete mathematics, including (combinatorial) number theory and set theory has always been a stronghold of Hungarian mathematics. The present volume honouring Vera Sos and Andras Hajnal contains survey articles (with classical theorems and stateoftheart results) and cutting edge expository research papers with new theorems and proofs in the area of the classical Hungarian subjects, like extremal combinatorics, colorings, combinatorial number theory, etc. The open problems and the latest results in the papers inspire further research. The volume is recommended to experienced specialists as well as to young researchers and students
A constrained independent set problem for matroids by
Tamás Fleiner(
Book
)
1 edition published in 2003 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
1 edition published in 2003 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
Upper bounds on the maximal number of facets of 0/1polytopes by
Tamás Fleiner(
Book
)
1 edition published in 1998 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
1 edition published in 1998 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
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