WorldCat Identities

Felter, Joseph H.

Overview
Works: 12 works in 20 publications in 1 language and 30 library holdings
Roles: Author
Classifications: DS326, 327.55056
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by Joseph H Felter
Iranian strategy in Iraq politics and "other means" by Joseph H Felter( Book )

2 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 8 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"This report addresses Iran's dual-strategy of providing military aid to Iraqi militia groups while simultaneously giving political support to Iraqi political parties. Although the report details the scope and nature of Iranian support to Iraqi militias, it concludes that Iran's political efforts are the core of its effort to project influence in Iraq. The report also concludes that Iran has recently worked to reduce the level of violence in Iraq while concentrating on a political campaign to shape the SFA and SOFA agreements to its strategic ends. The report does not address Iran's economic and social influence in Iraq."--Author's note
Al-Qa'ida's foreign fighters in Iraq : a first look at the Sinjar records by Joseph H Felter( Book )

3 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 4 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

On December 4, 2007 Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, the reputed Emir of al-Qa'ida's Islamic State of Iraq (151), claimed that his organization was almost purely Iraqi, containing only 200 foreign fighters. Twelve days later, on December 16, 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri urged Sunnis in Iraq to unite behind the 151. Both statements are part of al-Qa'ida's ongoing struggle to appeal to Iraqis, many of whom resent the ISI's foreign leadership and its desire to impose strict Islamic law. In November 2007, received the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point nearly 700 records of foreign nationals that entered Iraq between August 2006 and August 2007. The data compiled and analyzed in this report is drawn from these personnel records, which was collected by al-Qa'ida's Iraqi affiliates, first the Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC) and then the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). The records contain varying levels of information on each fighter, but often include the fighter's country of origin, hometown, age, occupation, the name of the fighter's recruiter, and even the route the fighter took to Iraq. The records were captured by coalition forces in October 2007 in a raid near Sinjar, along Iraq's Syrian border. Although there is some ambiguity in the data, it is likely that all of the fighters listed in the Sinjar Records crossed into Iraq from Syria. The Sinjar Records' existence was first reported by The New York Times' Richard Oppel, who was provided a partial summary of the data. The Combating Terrorism Center is pleased to make the Sinjar Records publicly available for the first time. The purpose of this initial assessment of the Sinjar Records is to provide scholars access to this unique data, in the hope that their scholarship will complement and compete with our own
Taking guns to a knife fight : a case for empirical study of counterinsurgency by Joseph H Felter( )

3 editions published between 2005 and 2007 in English and held by 4 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The effect of civilian casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq by Luke N Condra( Book )

4 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Abstract: A central question in intrastate conflicts is how insurgents are able to mobilize supporters to participate in violent and risky activities. A common explanation is that violence committed by counterinsurgent forces mobilizes certain segments of the population through a range of mechanisms. We study the effects of civilian casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan to quantify the effect of such casualties on subsequent insurgent violence. By comparing uniquely detailed micro-data along temporal, spatial, and gender dimensions we can distinguish short-run 'information' and 'capacity' effects from the longer run 'propaganda' and 'revenge' effects. In Afghanistan we find strong evidence that local exposure to civilian casualties caused by international forces leads to increased insurgent violence over the long-run, what we term the 'revenge' effect. Matching districts with similar past trends in violence shows that counterinsurgent-generated civilian casualties from a typical incident are responsible for 1 additional violent incident in an average sized district in the following 6 weeks and lead to increased violence over the next 6 months. There is no evidence that out-of-area eventserrant air strikes for examplelead to increased violence, nor is there evidence of short run effects, thus ruling out the propaganda, information, and capacity mechanisms. Critically, we find no evidence of a similar reaction to civilian casualties in Iraq, suggesting the constraints on insurgent production of violence may be quite conflict-specific. Our results imply that minimizing harm to civilians may indeed help counterinsurgent forces in Afghanistan to reduce insurgent recruitment
Taking guns to a knife fight : a case for empirical study of counterinsurgency ; a dissertation by Joseph H Felter( Book )

1 edition published in 2005 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The power of truth : questions for Ayman al-Zawahiri by Jarret Brachman( Book )

1 edition published in 2008 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Taking guns to a knife fight : effective military support to COIN by Joseph H Felter( Book )

1 edition published in 2009 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

The qualities and structures of a state's internal security forces have a significant impact on reducing the risks and overall casualties from insurgent violence. To test this argument, I introduce a new micro-conflict dataset on counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines between 2001 and 2008 and measure the relationship between conflict deaths and the capacities of small military units tasked with suppressing rebel threats at local levels. My empirical tests isolate qualities of security forces not directly tied to aggregate state resources. I find that small units possessing superior leadership, training, and access to local information are more likely to conduct effective and discriminate counterinsurgency. Deploying locally recruited soldiers with specially trained elite forces is particularly effective at achieving this potent combination of capabilities. These findings demonstrate that variation in the qualities of the military forces tasked with combating insurgent threats affect important conflict outcomes. Significantly, they indicate this variation is not fully determined by factors such as state wealth and level of development and that there is thus a major role for professional training of militaries in reducing the damage from, and possible prospects for, protracted insurgencies and civil war
The effect of civilian casualities in Afhanistan and Iraq( Book )

1 edition published in 2010 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Aligning Incentives to combat Terror by Joseph H Felter( )

1 edition published in 2005 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Taking Guns to a Knife Fight: Effective Military Support to COIN( )

1 edition published in 2008 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The qualities and structures of a state's internal security forces have a significant impact on reducing the risks and overall casualties from insurgent violence. To test this argument, I introduce a new micro-conflict dataset on counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines between 2001 and 2008 and measure the relationship between conflict deaths and the capacities of small military units tasked with suppressing rebel threats at local levels. My empirical tests isolate qualities of security forces not directly tied to aggregate state resources. I find that small units possessing superior leadership, training, and access to local information are more likely to conduct effective and discriminate counterinsurgency. Deploying locally recruited soldiers with specially trained elite forces is particularly effective at achieving this potent combination of capabilities. These findings demonstrate that variation in the qualities of the military forces tasked with combating insurgent threats affect important conflict outcomes. Significantly, they indicate this variation is not fully determined by factors such as state wealth and level of development and that there is thus a major role for professional training of militaries in reducing the damage from, and possible prospects for, protracted insurgencies and civil wars
Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and 'Other Means'( )

1 edition published in 2008 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Iran has a robust program to exert influence in Iraq to limit American power projection capability in the Middle East, ensure the Iraqi government does not pose a threat to Iran, and build a reliable platform for projecting influence further abroad. Iran has two primary modes of influence. First, and most importantly, it projects political influence by leveraging close historical relationships with several Shi'a organizations in Iraq: the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), the Badr organization, and the Dawah political party. Second, Iran uses the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Qods Force (QF) to provide aid in the form of paramilitary training, weapons, and equipment to various Iraqi militant groups, including Moqtada al-Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and the Special Group Criminals (SGCs). Iranian influence in Iraq is inevitable, and some of it is legal and constructive. Nonetheless, Iranian policy in Iraq is also duplicitous. Iran publicly calls for stability while subverting Iraq's government and illegally sponsoring anti-government militias. Iran has achieved three major accomplishments in Iraq. First, the unstable security situation and political opposition means the United States is not in a position to use Iraq as a platform for targeting Iran. Second, Iran's political allies have secured high-ranking positions in the Iraqi government. Third, the Iraqi constitution calls for a highly federalized state. Iran values a decentralized Iraq because it will be less capable of projecting power, and because Iran is primarily concerned with Iraq's southern, oil rich, Shi'a dominated provinces. In addition to public sources, this report draws on a substantial body of information never before released to the public. These include internal Iraqi intelligence documents written before 2003, details from reports of Significant Activities by U.S. and Coalition Forces, as well as summaries of interrogations of detained militants
An assessment of 516 Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) unclassified summaries( )

1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

 
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Languages
English (20)