WorldCat Identities

Fishman, Brian

Overview
Works: 20 works in 40 publications in 1 language and 836 library holdings
Genres: Interviews 
Roles: Author, Editor
Classifications: BP182, 363.325
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by Brian Fishman
Fault lines in global Jihad : organizational, strategic and ideological fissures by Assaf Moghadam( Book )

9 editions published between 2010 and 2011 in English and held by 123 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"This book is a detailed discussion of the internal problems and weaknesses of the global jihad movement led by Al-Qaeda"--
Iranian strategy in Iraq politics and "other means" by Joseph H Felter( Book )

2 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 8 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"This report addresses Iran's dual-strategy of providing military aid to Iraqi militia groups while simultaneously giving political support to Iraqi political parties. Although the report details the scope and nature of Iranian support to Iraqi militias, it concludes that Iran's political efforts are the core of its effort to project influence in Iraq. The report also concludes that Iran has recently worked to reduce the level of violence in Iraq while concentrating on a political campaign to shape the SFA and SOFA agreements to its strategic ends. The report does not address Iran's economic and social influence in Iraq."--Author's note
Dysfunction and decline lessons learned from inside Al Qa`ida in Iraq by Brian Fishman( Book )

3 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Drawing on Al-Qa`ida in Iraq's (AQI's) own lessons-learned documents, this monograph identifies a number of structural weaknesses that contributed to AQI's decline, including creating unrealistic expectations among foreign fighters, weak indoctrination and training mechanisms, and command and control structures that diluted command authority within the group
Bombers, bank accounts, & bleedout : al-Qa`ida's road in and out of Iraq( Book )

5 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 6 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This report ... expands on the first Sinjar Report, introducing new documents and new analysis to provide a better picture of al-Qa`ida in Iraq's operations and its prospects for the future. This is the CTC's fifth major Harmony Report
Self-inflicted wounds : debates and divisions within Al-Qa'ida and its periphery( Book )

4 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 6 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This report examines the internal, or endogenous, reasons that have hastened the decline of the jihadi movement. In doing so, it exposes the jihadi movement, with al-Qa'ida at its helm, as one that lacks coherence and unity, despite its claims to the contrary. The report divides the jihadis' endogenous problems into two categories: internal divisions plaguing al-Qa'ida and the jihadi movement proper; and fault lines dividing the jihadi movement from other Muslim and Islamist actors
Al-Qa'ida's foreign fighters in Iraq : a first look at the Sinjar records by Joseph H Felter( Book )

3 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 4 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

On December 4, 2007 Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, the reputed Emir of al-Qa'ida's Islamic State of Iraq (151), claimed that his organization was almost purely Iraqi, containing only 200 foreign fighters. Twelve days later, on December 16, 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri urged Sunnis in Iraq to unite behind the 151. Both statements are part of al-Qa'ida's ongoing struggle to appeal to Iraqis, many of whom resent the ISI's foreign leadership and its desire to impose strict Islamic law. In November 2007, received the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point nearly 700 records of foreign nationals that entered Iraq between August 2006 and August 2007. The data compiled and analyzed in this report is drawn from these personnel records, which was collected by al-Qa'ida's Iraqi affiliates, first the Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC) and then the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). The records contain varying levels of information on each fighter, but often include the fighter's country of origin, hometown, age, occupation, the name of the fighter's recruiter, and even the route the fighter took to Iraq. The records were captured by coalition forces in October 2007 in a raid near Sinjar, along Iraq's Syrian border. Although there is some ambiguity in the data, it is likely that all of the fighters listed in the Sinjar Records crossed into Iraq from Syria. The Sinjar Records' existence was first reported by The New York Times' Richard Oppel, who was provided a partial summary of the data. The Combating Terrorism Center is pleased to make the Sinjar Records publicly available for the first time. The purpose of this initial assessment of the Sinjar Records is to provide scholars access to this unique data, in the hope that their scholarship will complement and compete with our own
Bill Moyers journal( Visual )

1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"As the Bush administration promotes the idea of a growing al Qaeda threat in Iraq, the Journal analyses the facts on the ground to explore who the U.S. is really fighting. In this program, Bill Moyers gets the perspectives of Brian Fishman of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, whose research focuses on the impact of the war in Iraq on terrorism globally, and Fawaz A. Gerges of Sarah Lawrance College and the author of the highly acclaimed books 'The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global' and 'Journey of the Jihadist : Inside Muslim Militancy.' Also reports on the hidden Congressional spending provisions known as earmarks--often used as payback for political contributions--and reflects on the death of a young soldier "--Container
The power of truth : questions for Ayman al-Zawahiri by Jarret Brachman( Book )

1 edition published in 2008 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Fighting Fire with Fire : Destroying the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood by Brian Fishman( )

1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Countering domestic radicalization : lessons for intelligence collection and community outreach by Brian Fishman( Book )

1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Dysfunction and Decline: Lessons Learned from Inside Al-Qa'ida in Iraq( Book )

1 edition published in 2009 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Dysfunction and Decline: Lessons Learned from Inside Al-Qa'ida in Iraq is based in part on newly declassified documents drawn from the Department of Defense's Harmony database. Most of the documents released with this report have never been seen before; a few have been previously released by media organizations partially redacted, still others are versions of messages released publicly by al-Qa'ida or other insurgents. The documents released with this report are being released in their entirety. Readers should be aware that analyzing such data is fraught with risk. Documents in the Harmony database were collected on the battlefield unscientifically. There is no way to know how representative documents captured by U.S. forces are of the larger body of information produced by al-Qa'ida or other insurgents. Likewise, the vast database in which they are stored is imperfect and virtually impossible to search systematically. Readers and researchers should therefore be wary of conclusions drawn solely from these documents. Captured documents offer unique insight into al-Qa'ida's decisionmaking process, but they are most valuable when contextualized with information drawn from open sources. Dysfunction and Decline is the latest Combating Terrorism Center report to do just that
The Imaginary Emir: Al-Qa'ida in Iraq's Strategic Mistake( )

1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

On July 18, 2007, GEN Kevin Bergner confirmed suspicions that the "Emir" of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) -- Abu Umar al-Baghdadi -- is fictitious. The information was provided by Khalid al-Mashadani, who was the Minister of Information within the ISI before he was captured by U.S. forces on July 4, 2007. If al-Mashadani's information is accurate, the al-Baghdadi deception underscores the fact that al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) made a major strategic mistake when it established the ISI in October 2006. To exploit this mistake, the United States should not simply attack the AQI/ISI organization in Iraq, but rather highlight the ISI's ideological failures. The ISI was created to replace the al-Qa'ida in Iraq "brand name" to improve AQI's appeal with two constituencies: Sunnis in Iraq -- including insurgents -- and senior jihadi scholars outside of Iraq. The ISI's fundamental problem is that these constituencies have contradictory goals and interests: Sunnis in Iraq tend to be focused on pragmatic issues like security, occupation, and electricity; Jihadi ideologues outside of Iraq are primarily interested in the "proper" imposition of Islamic law and using the ISI to publicize their ideas. The ISI cannot satisfy the jihadi ideologues without controlling Sunnis in Iraq enough to credibly impose Islamic law. Conversely, the ISI cannot control Sunnis in Iraq without moderating its ideology, which alienates some jihadi scholars and discourages AQI's diehards. The ISI did have its defenders, including central al-Qa'ida figures Abu Yahya al-Libi and Ayman al-Zawahiri. But despite these efforts, the ISI is failing. It has alienated Sunni insurgents in Iraq by demanding obedience and still cannot generate consistent support from jihadi scholars outside of Iraq. The revelation that al-Baghdadi is fictitious implies that AQI/ISI is still commanded by Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir, who is thought to be Abu Ayyub al-Masri, an Egyptian
After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of Al Qaeda in Iraq( )

1 edition published in 2006 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Although they worked together nominally, the central Al Qaeda network, as led by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's terrorist group in Iraq held vastly different conceptions of jihad. The U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq minimized the magnitude of that ideological clash, enabling Zarqawi's limited cooperation with Al Qaeda in the Iraqi arena. Although they used each other for tactical support, publicity, and recruiting purposes, their doctrinal differences made them only allies of convenience rather than genuine partners, and as Zarqawi's tactics grew more extreme and indiscriminate, Al Qaeda chose to distance itself from his handiwork. The U.S. air strike that killed Zarqawi on June 7, 2006, deprived Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) of its strategic leader. But the knowledge that U.S., Iraqi, and Jordanian intelligence effectively penetrated AQI to gather information on Zarqawi's whereabouts is just as important to the group's future as Zarqawi's elimination. The coalition ' demonstrated ability to gather accurate intelligence is likely to frighten and sow distrust among AQI's remaining members. This heightens the leadership challenge for AQI's new emir, identified only under the alias Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir. His response to the internal security questions and the lingering doctrinal impasse with Al Qaeda proper will determine the organization's future trajectory. The challenge for Muhajir is to strike a balance between appealing to secular and tribal Sunnis in Iraq, some of whom likely provided intelligence that helped doom Zarqawi, while maintaining an insular terrorist network that can sustain potentially weakening criticism from Islamic, Arab, and Western sources
Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and 'Other Means'( )

1 edition published in 2008 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Iran has a robust program to exert influence in Iraq to limit American power projection capability in the Middle East, ensure the Iraqi government does not pose a threat to Iran, and build a reliable platform for projecting influence further abroad. Iran has two primary modes of influence. First, and most importantly, it projects political influence by leveraging close historical relationships with several Shi'a organizations in Iraq: the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), the Badr organization, and the Dawah political party. Second, Iran uses the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Qods Force (QF) to provide aid in the form of paramilitary training, weapons, and equipment to various Iraqi militant groups, including Moqtada al-Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and the Special Group Criminals (SGCs). Iranian influence in Iraq is inevitable, and some of it is legal and constructive. Nonetheless, Iranian policy in Iraq is also duplicitous. Iran publicly calls for stability while subverting Iraq's government and illegally sponsoring anti-government militias. Iran has achieved three major accomplishments in Iraq. First, the unstable security situation and political opposition means the United States is not in a position to use Iraq as a platform for targeting Iran. Second, Iran's political allies have secured high-ranking positions in the Iraqi government. Third, the Iraqi constitution calls for a highly federalized state. Iran values a decentralized Iraq because it will be less capable of projecting power, and because Iran is primarily concerned with Iraq's southern, oil rich, Shi'a dominated provinces. In addition to public sources, this report draws on a substantial body of information never before released to the public. These include internal Iraqi intelligence documents written before 2003, details from reports of Significant Activities by U.S. and Coalition Forces, as well as summaries of interrogations of detained militants
Al-Qa'ida's Spymaster Analyzes the U.S. Intelligence Community( )

1 edition published in 2006 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

On August 6, 2006 Al Jazeera broadcast a video in which Ayman al-Zawahiri claimed that al-Gamaa al-Islamiya (Egyptian Islamic Group Gamaa Islamiya) had joined Al-Qa'ida. The video also included Muhammad Khalil al-Hakaymah, a player in Egyptian Islamist movements since 1979 swearing allegiance to Al-Qa'ida on behalf of the Egyptian group. Despite al-Zawahiri's star power, al-Hakaymah's claims were subsequently disputed by members of al-Gamaa al-Islamiya, which had formally renounced violence in 1997. Al-Hakaymah's bayat to Al Qa'ida corresponded with the publication of his book, The Myth of Delusion, a detailed dissertation designed to demystify the U.S. intelligence community. Arab observers, in and outside of Egypt, have since speculated that Al-Hakaymah will play an increasingly significant role in Al-Qa'ida because of his expertise on the United States security community and disillusionment with Gamaa Islamiya's nonviolent approach. Since releasing Myth, al-Hakaymah has circulated a brief exhortation to individual jihad entitled Toward a New Strategy and a tactical handbook entitled Fighting Alone
Redefining the Islamic state the fall and rise of Al-Qaeda in Iraq by Brian Fishman( )

1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Fourth Generation Governance -- Sheikh Tamimi defends the Islamic State of Iraq( )

1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

On October 15, 2006 al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) and its allies declared an independent Islamic State across a swath of Western Iraq. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was widely scorned by Western counterterrorism experts, many of whom rightly concluded that the ISI would never be capable of developing the material and bureaucratic infrastructure widely expected of a modern state. The ISI has not been embraced in the Mideast either. More secularist elements of the Iraqi insurgency condemn it. Most importantly to al-Qa'ida, well-known jihadi scholars, who could provide the ISI critical legitimacy, have been slow to support the new organization. The scholars are apparently concerned about the strategic wisdom and theological correctness of establishing an Islamic State now. The ISI's defenders -- ranging from jihadi pundit Shaykh Atiyatallah to Al-Qa'ida commander Abu Yahya al-Libi -- have developed a series of theological, philosophical, and practical arguments to justify the ISI's existence to the ulema -- Islamic scholars. The most comprehensive defense, entitled "Informing the People about the Birth of the Islamic State of Iraq," was authored by Uthman Bin Abd al-Rahman al-Tamimi and released by Furqan Media, the ISI's official media development unit. This book is significant for two reasons: (1) it delineates the ideological schism within the jihadi movement over the ISI's existence, and (2) Tamimi defends the ISI by combining modern globalization theory with Koranic and hadith-based justifications to fundamentally redefine what a modern Islamic nation state should be. To limit the ISI's long-term effectiveness, the United States should carefully attack its material and human infrastructure inside Iraq and the intellectual infrastructure that Tamimi is trying to erect in "Informing the People." Specific recommendations are to challenge Tamimi's intellectual framework for the ISI, confuse the ISI's leadership picture, and beat the ISI on the ground
Al-Qa'ida's spymaster analyzes the U.S. intelligence community by Brian Fishman( )

1 edition published in 2006 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The Power of Truth: Questions for Ayman al-Zawahiri (Part 1)( )

1 edition published in 2008 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

On 16 December 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri invited journalists and Jihadist enthusiasts to ask him questions via the primary Jihadist web forums. Zawahiri promised to personally answer some of those questions in a subsequent statement. On 2 April 2008, As-Sahab Media released the first part of Zawahiri's response in the form of a 1 hour, 43-minute audio statement, which was accompanied by Arabic and English transcripts. Zawahiri answered some questions directly, like whether al-Qa'ida's willingness to kill innocent Muslims in the course of their operations is apostasy. He sidestepped other questions, including more politicized ones about al-Qa'ida's increasing difficulties in Iraq and, in particular, al-Qa'ida's official position toward Iran. The following analysis of Zawahiri's Part I response is broken into three sections. The first evaluates the most important themes that Zawahiri addressed on 2 April, namely HAMAS, the killing of innocents, Yusuf al-Qaradawi and the Muslim Brotherhood, the Lebanese Jihadist group Fatah al-Islam, and Zawahiri's dispute with Sayyid Imam Sharif, the former Emir of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The second section explores the issues that Zawahiri mentioned but failed to actually answer, namely al-Qa'ida's relationship with other insurgents in Iraq and al-Qa'ida's position toward Iran. Because Part II of his responses is forthcoming, one can only assume that Zawahiri is saving more complete answers on those questions. In the third section, the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) offers its analysis of 1,888 questions that were posed to Zawahiri on the password-protected Al-Ekhlass and Al-Hesbah web sites. The CTC acquired these questions as part of its ongoing effort to identify and release relevant information for scholars, researchers, and the global public that is contained in U.S. government databases. Additionally, we have made these questions available, in their entirety, on the CTC web site
Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qa'ida's Organizational Vulnerabilities( )

1 edition published in 2006 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This study, conducted by the faculty and research fellows of the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, serves multiple purposes, the most important of which is contributing to the depth of knowledge about the al-Qa'ida movement. Evidence supporting the conclusions and recommendations provided in this report is drawn from a collection of newly-released al-Qa'ida documents captured during recent operations in support of the Global War on Terror and maintained in the Department of Defense's Harmony database. In the text of these documents, readers will see how explicit al-Qa'ida has been in its internal discussions covering a range of organizational issues, particularly regarding the internal structure and functioning of the movement as well as with tensions that emerged within the leadership. In the first part of the report, we provide a theoretical framework, drawing on scholarly approaches including organization and agency theory, to predict where we should expect terrorist groups to face their greatest challenges in conducting operations. The framework is informed as much as possible by the captured documents, and provides a foundation upon which scholars can build as more of these documents are declassified and released to the public. Our analysis stresses that, by their nature, terrorist organizations such as al-Qa'ida face difficulties in almost any operational environment, particularly in terms of maintaining situational awareness, controlling the use of violence to achieve specified political ends, and of course, preventing local authorities from degrading the group's capabilities. But they also face problems common to other types of organizations, including private firms, political parties, and traditional insurgencies
 
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Fault lines in global Jihad : organizational, strategic and ideological fissures
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English (40)

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