Most widely held works by Daron Acemoglu
Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy by Daron Acemoglu ( Book )
20 editions published between 2005 and 2009 in English and Chinese and held by 920 libraries worldwide
"This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentives to overthrow it. These processes depend on the strength of civil society, the structure of political institutions, the nature of political and economic crises, the level of economic inequality, the structure of the economy, and the form and extent of globalization."--Publisher description.
Introduction to modern economic growth by Daron Acemoglu ( Book )
7 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 313 libraries worldwide
Introduction to Modern Economic Growth is a groundbreaking text from one of today's leading economists. Daron Acemoglu gives graduate students not only the tools to analyze growth and related macroeconomic problems, but also the broad perspective needed to apply those tools to the big-picture questions of growth and divergence. And he introduces the economic and mathematical foundations of modern growth theory and macroeconomics in a rigorous but easy to follow manner. After covering the necessary background on dynamic general equilibrium and dynamic optimization, the book presents the basic w.
Changes in unemployment and wage inequality : an alternative theory and some evidence by Daron Acemoglu ( Book )
16 editions published between 1996 and 1999 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 104 libraries worldwide
Consequences of employment protection? : the case of the Americans with Disabilities Act by Daron Acemoglu ( Book )
9 editions published in 1998 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 102 libraries worldwide
Efficient unemployment insurance by Daron Acemoglu ( Book )
10 editions published between 1997 and 1998 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 102 libraries worldwide
Why do firms train? : theory and evidence by Daron Acemoglu ( Book )
13 editions published between 1996 and 1998 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 101 libraries worldwide
The structure of wages and investment in general training by Daron Acemoglu ( Book )
11 editions published between 1997 and 1998 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 99 libraries worldwide
In the standard model of human capital with perfect labor markets, workers pay for general training. When labor market frictions compress the structure of wages, firms may invest in the general skills of their employees. The reason is that the distortion in the wage structure turns "technologically" general skills into "specific" skills. Labor market frictions and institutions, such as minimum wages and union wage setting, are crucial in shaping the wage structure, and thus have an important impact on training. Our results suggest that the more frictional and regulated labor markets in Europe and Japan may generate more firm-sponsored general training than the U.S.
Productivity differences by Daron Acemoglu ( Book )
16 editions published between 1998 and 2000 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 98 libraries worldwide
Minimum wages and on-the-job training by Daron Acemoglu ( Book )
17 editions published between 1999 and 2002 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 93 libraries worldwide
Beyond Becker : training in imperfect labor markets by Daron Acemoglu ( Book )
11 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 92 libraries worldwide
Productivity gains from unemployment insurance by Daron Acemoglu ( Book )
10 editions published between 1999 and 2001 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 92 libraries worldwide
How large are the social returns to education? : evidence from compulsory schooling laws by Daron Acemoglu ( Book )
9 editions published in 1999 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 87 libraries worldwide
Patterns of skill premia by Daron Acemoglu ( Book )
9 editions published in 1999 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 86 libraries worldwide
The world income distribution by Daron Acemoglu ( Book )
14 editions published between 2000 and 2002 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 83 libraries worldwide
We show that even in the absence of diminishing returns in production and technological spillovers, international trade leads to a stable world income distribution. This is because specialization and trade introduce de facto diminishing returns: Countries that accumulate capital faster than average experience declining export prices, depressing the rate of return to capital and discouraging further accumulation. Because of constant returns to capital accumulation at the country level, the cross-sectional behavior of the world economy is similar to that of existing exogenous growth models: Cross-country variation in economic policies, savings, and technology translate into cross-country variation in incomes, and country dynamics exhibit conditional convergence as in the Solow-Ramsey model. The dispersion of the world income distribution is determined by the forces that shape the strength of the terms of trade-effects--the degree of openness to international trade and the extent of specialization. Finally, we provide evidence that those countries accumulating faster experience a worsening in their terms of trade. Our estimates imply that, all else equal, a 1 percentage point faster growth is associated with approximately a 0.7 percentage point deline in the terms of trade. Keywords: Cross-Country Income Differences; Endogenous Growth; International Trade;Specialization; Terms of Trade Effects.
Distance to frontier, selection, and economic growth by Daron Acemoglu ( Book )
12 editions published in 2002 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 81 libraries worldwide
We analyze an economy where managers engage both in the adoption of technologies from the world frontier and in innovation activities. The selection of high-skill managers is more important for innovation activities. As the economy approaches the technology frontier, selection becomes more important. As a result, countries at early stages of development pursue an investment-based strategy, with long-term relationships, high average size and age of firms, large average investments, but little selection. Closer to the world technology frontier, there is a switch to an innovation-based strategy with short-term relationships, younger firms, less investment and better selection of managers. We show that relatively backward economies may switch out of the investment-based strategy too soon, so certain economic institutions and policies, such as limits on product market competition or investment subsidies, that encourage the investment-based strategy may be beneficial. However, societies that cannot switch out of the investment based strategy fail to converge to the world technology frontier. Non-convergence traps are more likely when policies and institutions are endogenized, enabling beneficiaries of existing policies to bribe politicians to maintain these policies. Keywords: appropriate institutions, convergence, economic growth, innovation, imitation, political economy of growth, selection, technical change, traps. JEL Classifications: O31, O33, O38, O40, L16.
Vertical integration and distance to frontier by Daron Acemoglu ( Book )
11 editions published in 2002 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 77 libraries worldwide
Economic backwardness in political perspective by Daron Acemoglu ( Book )
9 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 76 libraries worldwide
We construct a simple model where political elites may block technological and institutional development, because of a "political replacement effect." Innovations often erode elites' incumbency advantage, increasing the likelihood that they will be replaced. Fearing replacement, political elites are unwilling to initiate change, and may even block economic development. We show that elites are unlikely to block development when there is a high degree of political competition, or when they are highly entrenched. It is only when political competition is limited and also their power is threatened that elites will block development. We also show that such blocking is more likely to arise when political stakes are higher, and that external threats may reduce the incentives to block. We argue that this model provides an interpretation for why Britain, Germany and the U.S. industrialized during the nineteenth century, while the landed aristocracy in Russia and Austria-Hungary blocked development. Keywords: Political Economy, Institutions, Development, Industrialization. JEL Classification: H2, N10, N40, O1, O3, O4.
Kleptocracy and divide-and-rule : a model of personal rule by Daron Acemoglu ( Book )
11 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 74 libraries worldwide
Many developing countries have suffered under the personal rule of kleptocrats', who implement highly inefficient economic policies, expropriate the wealth of their citizens, and use the proceeds for their own glorification or consumption. We argue that the success of kleptocrats rests, in part, on their ability to use a divide-and-rule' strategy, made possible by weaknesses in the institutions in these societies. Members of society need to cooperate in order to depose a kleptocrat, yet such cooperation may be defused by imposing punitive rates of taxation on any citizen who proposes such a move, and redistributing the benefits to those who need to agree to it. Thus the collective action problem can be intensified by threats which remain off the equilibrium path. In equilibrium, all are exploited and no one challenges the kleptocrat. Kleptocratic policies are more likely when foreign aid and rents from natural resources provide rulers with substantial resources to buy off opponents; when opposition groups are shortsighted; when the average productivity in the economy is low; and when there is greater inequality between producer groups (because more productive groups are more difficult to buy off).
Institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run growth by Daron Acemoglu ( Book )
9 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 73 libraries worldwide
"This paper develops the empirical and theoretical case that differences in economic institutions are the fundamental cause of differences in economic development. We first document the empirical importance of institutions by focusing on two 'quasi-natural experiments' in history, the division of Korea into two parts with very different economic institutions and the colonization of much of the world by European powers starting in the fifteenth century. We then develop the basic outline of a framework for thinking about why economic institutions differ across countries. Economic institutions determine the incentives of and the constraints on economic actors, and shape economic outcomes. As such, they are social decisions, chosen for their consequences. Because different groups and individuals typically benefit from different economic institutions, there is generally a conflict over these social choices, ultimately resolved in favor of groups with greater political power. The distribution of political power in society is in turn determined by political institutions and the distribution of resources. Political institutions allocate de jure political power, while groups with greater economic might typically possess greater de facto political power. We therefore view the appropriate theoretical framework as a dynamic one with political institutions and the distribution of resources as the state variables. These variables themselves change over time because prevailing economic institutions affect the distribution of resources, and because groups with de facto political power today strive to change political institutions in order to increase their de jure political power in the future. Economic institutions encouraging economic growth emerge when political institutions allocate power to groups with interests in broad-based property rights enforcement, when they create effective constraints on power-holders, and when there are relatively few rents to be captured by power-holders. We illustrate the assumptions, the workings and the implications of this framework using a number of historical examples"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Institutional causes, macroeconomic symptoms : volatility, crises and growth ( Book )
8 editions published in 2002 in English and No Linguistic content and held by 71 libraries worldwide
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (United States) Capital investments Colonies--Economic conditions Comparative government Democracy Democracy--Economic aspects Democratization Developing countries Dictatorship Economic development Economic development--Econometric models Economic development--Mathematical models Economic history Economic policy Economics Economics--Political aspects Employees--Training of Employees--Training of--Econometric models Employees--Training of--Economic aspects Equality Europe Germany Great Britain History Income distribution Income distribution--Econometric models Income distribution--Social aspects Industrial productivity Industrial productivity--Econometric models Institutional economics Institution building Labor market Labor market--Econometric models Labor market--Mathematical models Labor supply Macroeconomics Minimum wage--Econometric models Political culture Right of property Search theory Skilled labor Technological innovations--Econometric models Technological innovations--Economic aspects Unemployment--Econometric models Unemployment insurance--Econometric models United States Wage differentials Wage differentials--Econometric models Wages Wages--Mathematical models
Acemoglu, D. 1967-
Acemoglu, Daron 1967-
Acemoglu, K. Daron 1967-
Acemoglu, Kamer Daron
Acemoglu, Kamer Daron, 1967-