WorldCat Identities

Suarez, Javier

Overview
Works: 74 works in 247 publications in 2 languages and 624 library holdings
Roles: Author, Honoree
Classifications: HB1, 330.072
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by Javier Suarez
Stakeholders, transparency and capital structure by Andres Almazan( Book )
17 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and held by 81 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
"Firms that are more highly levered are forced to raise capital more often, a process that generates information about them. Of course transparency can improve the allocation of capital. However, when the information about the firm affects the terms under which the firm transacts with its customers and employees, transparency can have an offsetting negative effect. Under relatively general conditions, good news improves these terms of trade less than bad news worsens them, implying that increased transparency can lower firm value. In addition, we show that transparency can reduce the incentives of firms and stakeholders to undertake relationship specific investments. The negative effects of transparency can lead firms to pass up positive NPV investments that require external funding and to choose more conservative capital structures that they would otherwise choose. These effects should be especially important for technology firms that require a reputation for being on the leading edge.'"--NBER website
Monitoring, liquidation, and security design by Rafael Repullo( Book )
9 editions published between 1995 and 1996 in English and held by 45 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Firms' stakeholders and the costs of transparency by Andres Almazan( )
8 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 44 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
We develop a model of a firm whose production process requires it to start and nurture a relationship with its stakeholders. Because there are spillover benefits associated with being associated with a "winner," the perceptions of stakeholders and potential stakeholders can affect firm value. Our analysis indicates that while transparency (i.e., generating information about a firm's quality) may improve the allocation of resources, a firm may have a higher ex ante value if information about its quality is not prematurely generated. The costs associated with transparency arise because of asymmetric information regarding the extent to which stakeholders benefit from having a relationship with a high quality firm. These costs are higher when firms can initiate non-contractible innovative investments that enhance the value of their stakeholder relationships. Stakeholder effects of transparency are especially important for younger firms with less established track records (e.g., start-ups)
Entrepreneurial moral hazard and bank monitoring : a model of the credit channel by Rafael Repullo( Book )
15 editions published between 1995 and 1999 in English and held by 39 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Endogenous cycles in a Stiglitz-Weiss economy by Javier Suarez( Book )
14 editions published between 1995 and 1997 in English and held by 37 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Venture capital finance : a security design approach by Rafael Repullo( Book )
12 editions published between 1998 and 1999 in English and held by 31 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Last bank standing : what do I gain if you fail? by Enrico Camillo Perotti( Book )
9 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 26 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Managerial compensation and the market reaction to bank loans by Andres Almazan( Book )
8 editions published between 2000 and 2001 in English and held by 24 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Loan pricing under basel capital requirements by Rafael Repullo( Book )
8 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 19 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Social contracts and occupational choice by Samuel Bentolila( Book )
7 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 19 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Financing and the protection of innovators by Gerard Llobet( Book )
7 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 17 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
A pigovian approach to liquidity regulation by Enrico Camillo Perotti( Book )
7 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 16 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This paper discusses liquidity regulation when short-term funding enables credit growth but generates negative systemic risk externalities. It focuses on the relative merit of price versus quantity rules, showing how they target different incentives for risk creation. When banks differ in credit opportunities, a Pigovian tax on short-term funding is efficient in containing risk and preserving credit quality, while quantity-based funding ratios are distorsionary. Liquidity buffers are either fully ineffective or similar to a Pigovian tax with deadweight costs. Critically, they may be least binding when excess credit incentives are strongest. When banks differ instead mostly in gambling incentives (due to low charter value or overconfidence), excess credit and liquidity risk are best controlled with net funding ratios. Taxes on short-term funding emerge again as efficient when capital or liquidity ratios keep risk shifting incentives under control. In general, an optimal policy should involve both types of tools
Hot and cold housing markets : international evidence by Jose A Ceron( Book )
6 editions published between 2005 and 2006 in English and held by 15 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The procyclical effects of Basel II by Rafael Repullo( )
5 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 14 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The macroeconomics of money market freezes by Max Bruche( )
6 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 13 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Interest rates and credit risk by Carlos González-Aguado( Book )
6 editions published between 2010 and 2011 in English and Spanish and held by 13 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This paper explores the effects of shifts in interest rates on corporate leverage and default. We develop a dynamic model in which the relationship between firms and their outside financiers is affected by a moral hazard problem and entrepreneurs' initial wealth is scarce. The endogenous link between leverage and default risk comes from the lower incentives of overindebted entrepreneurs to guarantee the survival of their firms. Firms start up with leverage typically higher than some state-contingent target leverage ratio, and adjust gradually to it through earnings retention. The dynamic response of leverage and default to cut and rises in interest rates is both asymmetric (since it is easier to adjust to a higher target leverage than to a lower one) and heterogeneously distributed across firms (since interest rates affect the burden of outstanding leverage, which differs across firms). We find that both interest rate rises and interest rate cuts increase the aggregate default rate in the short-run. Instead, higher rates produce lower default rates in the longer run since they induce lower target leverage across all firms. These results help rationalize some of the empirical evidence regarding the so-called risk-taking channel of monetary policy
Liquidity shocks, roll-over risk and debt maturity by Anatoli Segura( Book )
4 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 13 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
We develop an infinite horizon model of an economy in which banks finance long term assets by placing non-tradable debt among savers. Banks choose the overall principal, interest rate, and maturity of their debt taking into account two opposite forces: (i) investors' preference for short maturities (which stems from their exposure to preference shocks) and (ii) banks' exposure to systemic liquidity crises (during which debt refinancing becomes specially expensive). Importantly, the terms of access to refinancing during crises depend endogenously on banks' aggregate refinancing needs. Due to pecuniary externalities, the unregulated equilibrium exhibits inefficiently short debt maturities. We analyze the possibility of restoring efficiency or improving welfare by means of limits to debt maturity, Pigovian taxes, and liquidity insurance schemes
A macroeconomic model of endogenous systemic risk taking by David Martinez-Miera( Book )
7 editions published in 2012 in English and held by 13 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
We analyze banks' systemic risk taking in a simple dynamic general equilibrium model. Banks collect funds from savers and make loans to firms. Banks are owned by risk-neutral bankers who provide the equity needed to comply with capital requirements. Bankers decide their (unobservable) exposure to systemic shocks by trading off risk-shifting gains with the value of preserving their capital after a systemic shock. Capital requirements reduce credit and output in
Capital budgeting and stock option plans by Haizhou Huang( Book )
5 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 12 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The procyclical effects of bank capital regulation by Rafael Repullo( Book )
5 editions published between 2010 and 2012 in English and held by 11 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
We develop and calibrate a dynamic equilibrium model of relationship lending in which banks are unable to access the equity markets every period and the business cycle is a Markov process that determines loans' probabilities of default. Banks anticipate that shocks to their earnings and the possible variation of capital requirements over the cycle can impair their future lending capacity and, as a precaution, hold capital buffers. We compare the relative performance of several capital regulation regimes, including one that maximizes a measure of social welfare. We show that Basel II is significantly more procyclical than Basel I, but makes banks safer. For this reason, it dominates Basel I in terms of welfare except for small social costs of bank failure. We also show that for high values of this cost, Basel III points in the right direction, with higher but less cyclically-varying capital requirements
 
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Audience level: 0.72 (from 0.54 for Last bank ... to 0.96 for Monitoring ...)
Alternative Names
Suárez Bernaldo de Quirós, F. Javier 1966-
Suárez Bernaldo de Quirós, Francisco Javier 1966-
Suárez, F. Javier 1966-
Suárez, J.
Languages
English (164)
Spanish (1)