WorldCat Identities

John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business

Overview
Works: 458 works in 645 publications in 1 language and 2,183 library holdings
Genres: Periodicals  Law reviews  History 
Classifications: HD2756.2.J3, 340
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business
The journal of legal analysis by Economics, and Business John M. Olin Center for Law( )

in English and held by 376 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Transition policy : a conceptual framework by Louis Kaplow( Book )

2 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 28 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Discusses policies on legal transitions--the period between the enactment of a law, announcement of a regulation, change of a government rule, etc., and its implementation, which may be retroactive, effective immediately or later, and may include phase-in, grandfathering, or other special provisions
Discussion paper( )

in English and held by 18 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

A new approach to takeover law and regulatory competition by Lucian A Bebchuk( Book )

2 editions published between 2000 and 2002 in English and held by 10 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The development of U.S. state takeover law in the past three decades has produced considerable and quite possibly excessive protection for incumbent managers from hostile takeovers. Although the shortcomings of state takeover law have been widely recognized, there has been little support for federal intervention because of the concern that such intervention might produce even worse takeover arrangements. This paper puts forward a novel form of federal intervention in the regulation of takeovers that would address these shortcomings without raising such a concern. Rather than mandating particular substantive takeover arrangements, this form of federal intervention would focus on increasing shareholder choice. Choice-enhancing' federal intervention would consist of two elements: (i) an optional body of substantive federal takeover law which shareholders would be able to opt into (or out of) and (ii) a mandatory process rule that would provide shareholders the right to initiate and adopt, regardless of managers' wishes, proposals for opting into (or out of) the federal takeover law. We argue that such a federal role in takeover law cannot harm and would likely improve the regulation of takeovers. Moreover, by showing how federal law can be used to improve regulatory competition in the provision of takeover law rather than preempt it, our analysis lays the groundwork for a more general reconsideration of regulatory competition in the corporate law area
Preference-eliciting statutory default rules by Einer Elhauge( Book )

2 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Corporate ownership structures : private versus social optimality by Lucian A Bebchuk( Book )

1 edition published in 1996 in English and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper analyzes the inefficiencies that might arise in the ownership structure chosen at the initial public offering stage. We show that, contrary to what is commonly believed, the desire of initial owners to maximize their proceeds leads them to choices that, although privately optimal, may be socially inefficient. This distortion tends to be in the direction of excessive incidence of controlling shareholder structures and excessive divestment of cash flow rights. Our analysis has far-reaching policy implications for dual class stock, stock pyramiding, sale of control rules, and public offerings of minority shares. Among its positive implications, our analysis suggests reasons for the substantial differences in the incidence of control blocks across different countries
Liability for accidents by Steven Shavell( Book )

4 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 8 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Legal liability for accidents determines the circumstances under which injurers must compensate injurers for harm. The effects of liability on incentives to reduce risk, on risk-bearing and insurance (both direct coverage for victims and liability coverage for injurers), and on administrative expenses are considered. Liability is also compared to other methods of controlling harmful activities, notably, to corrective taxation and regulation"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site
The value of life by W. Kip Viscusi( Book )

3 editions published between 2003 and 2005 in English and held by 8 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"The economic approach to valuing risks to life focuses on risk-money tradeoffs for very small risks of death, or the value of statistical life (VSL). These VSL levels will generally exceed the optimal insurance amounts. A substantial literature has estimated the wage-fatality risk tradeoffs, implying a median VSL of $7 million for U.S. workers. International evidence often indicates a lower VSL, which is consistent with the lower income levels in less developed countries. Preference heterogeneity also generates different tradeoff rates across the population as people who are more willing to bear risk will exhibit lower wage-risk tradeoffs"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site
Agency law and contract formation by Eric Rasmusen( Book )

3 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Chapter 1. Japanese distribution : background, issues, examples by Yoshirō Miwa( Book )

3 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The new market for federal judicial law clerks by Christopher Avery( Book )

2 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In the past, judges have often hired applicants for judicial clerkships as early as the beginning of the second year of law school for positions commencing approximately two years down the road. In the new hiring regime for federal judicial law clerks, by contrast, judges are exhorted to follow a set of start dates for considering and hiring applicants during the fall of the third year of law school. Using the same general methodology as we employed in a study of the market for federal judicial law clerks conducted in 1998-2000, we have broadly surveyed both federal appellate judges and law students about their experiences of the new market for law clerks. This paper analyzes our findings within the prevailing economic framework for studying markets with tendencies toward "early" hiring. Our data make clear that the movement of the clerkship market back to the third year of law school is highly valued by judges, but we also find that a strong majority of the judges responding to our surveys has concluded that nonadherence to the specified start dates is very substantial -- a conclusion we are able to corroborate with specific quantitative data from both judge and student surveys. The consistent experience of a wide range of other markets suggests that such nonadherence in the law clerk market will lead to either a reversion to very early hiring or the use of a centralized matching system such as that used for medical residencies. We suggest, however, potential avenues by which the clerkship market could stabilize at something like its present pattern of mixed adherence and nonadherence, thereby avoiding the complete abandonment of the current system
Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation by Lucian A Bebchuk( Book )

1 edition published in 2002 in English and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting approach to executive compensation, which has dominated academic re-search on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize shareholder value. In contrast, the managerial power approach suggests that boards do not operate at arm's length in devising executive compensation arrangements; rather, executives have power to influence their own pay, and they use that power to extract rents. Furthermore, the desire to camouflage rent extraction might lead to the use of inefficient pay arrangements that provide suboptimal incentives and thereby hurt shareholder value. The authors show that the processes that produce compensation arrangements, and the various market forces and constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the large body of empirical work on executive compensation, the authors show that managerial power and the desire to camouflage rents can explain significant features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that have long been viewed as puzzling or problematic from the optimal contracting perspective. The authors conclude that the role managerial power plays in the design of executive compensation is significant and should be taken into account in any examination of executive pay arrangements or of corporate governance generally
What matters in corporate governance? by Lucian A Bebchuk( Book )

3 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 6 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"We investigate which provisions, among a set of twenty-four governance provisions followed by the Institutional Investors Research Center (IRRC), are correlated with firm value and stockholder returns. Based on this analysis, we put forward an entrenchment index based on six provisions -- four?constitutional? provisions that prevent a majority of shareholders fromhaving their way (staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, supermajorityrequirements for mergers, and supermajority requirements for charter amendments), and two?takeover readiness? provisions that boards put in place to be ready for a hostile takeover (poisonpills and golden parachutes). We find that increases in the level of this index are monotonicallyassociated with economically significant reductions in firm valuation, as measured by Tobin's Q. We also find that firms with higher level of the entrenchment index were associated with largenegative abnormal returns during the 1990-2003 period. Furthermore, we find that the provisionsin our entrenchment index fully drive the correlation, identified by prior work, that the IRRCprovisions in the aggregate have with reduced firm value and lower stock returns during the1990s. We find no evidence that the other eighteen IRRC provisions are negatively correlatedwith either firm value or stock returns during the 1990-2003 period"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site
A new approach to valuing secured claims in bankruptcy by Lucian A Bebchuk( Book )

3 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 6 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. presents an abstract of the May 2001 working paper entitled "A New Approach to Valuing Secured Claims in Bankruptcy," written by Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried. The full text of the paper may be purchased online. This paper develops a new approach to valuing collateral that does not involve bargaining or litigation. A market-based mechanism determines the value of collateral in such a way that no participant in the bankruptcy will have a basis for complaining that secured creditors are either over- or under-compensated
Property rights and indigenous tradition among early 20th century Japanese firms by Yoshirō Miwa( Book )

1 edition published in 2001 in English and held by 6 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The fable of the keiretsu : urban legends of the Japanese economy by Yoshirō Miwa( Book )

2 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 6 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"For Western economists and journalists, the most distinctive facet of the postwar Japanese business world has been the keiretsu, or the insular business alliances among powerful corporations. Within keiretsu groups, argue these observers, firms preferentially trade, lend money, take and receive technical and financial assistance, and cement their ties through cross-shareholding agreements. In The Fable of the Keiretsu, Yoshiro Miwa and J. Mark Ramseyer demonstrate that all this talk is really just urban legend." "Following World War II, the United States, in an effort to hasten democracy, dissolved Japan's zaibatsu empires - a small group of enormous family-owned conglomerates - into several smaller businesses. The new businesses, the legend goes, formed into keiretsu groups to regain large components of their operations that were lost in the dismantling. The authors show that the very idea of the keiretsu was created and propagated by Marxist scholars in post-war Japan. Western scholars merely repatriated the legend to show the culturally contingent nature of modern economic analysis." "Laying waste to the notion of keiretsu, the authors debunk several related "facts" as well: that Japanese firms maintain special arrangements with a "main bank," that firms are systematically poorly managed, and that the Japanese government guided postwar growth. In demolishing these long-held assumptions, they offer one of the few reliable chronicles of the realities of Japanese business."--BOOK JACKET
Toward an economic theory of pro-defendant criminal procedure by Keith N Hylton( Book )

2 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 6 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The real difference in corporate law between the United States and continental Europe : distribution of powers by Sofie Cools( Book )

3 editions published between 2004 and 2005 in English and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Discusses: (Part I) The index measuring investor protection in the paper "Law and finance" by Rafael La Porta (et al.)(1996, rev. 1998), and: (Parts II-III) compares the distribution of powers in corporations in the United States and western Europe
Debiasing through law by Christine M Jolls( Book )

2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Human beings are often boundedly rational. In the face of bounded rationality, the legal system might attempt either to?debias law,? by insulating legal outcomes from the effects of boundedly rational behavior, or instead to?debias through law,? by steering legal actors in more rational directions. Legal analysts have focused most heavily on insulating outcomes from the effects of bounded rationality. In fact, however, a large number of actual and imaginable legal strategies are efforts to engage in debiasing through law -- to help people reduce or even eliminate boundedly rational behavior. In important contexts, these efforts promise to avoid the costs and inefficiencies associated with regulatory approaches that take bounded rationality as a given and respond by attempting to insulate outcomes from its effects. This Article offers both a general theory of debiasing through law and a description of how such debiasing does or could work to address central legal questions in a large number of domains, from employment law to consumer safety law to corporate law to property law. Discussion is devoted to the risks of overshooting and manipulation that are sometimes raised when government engages in debiasing through law"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site
 
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Alternative Names

controlled identityHarvard Law School. Program in Law and Economics

Harvard Law School. Center for Law, Economics, and Business

Harvard Law School. John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business

Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business

Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business

Languages
English (47)