WorldCat Identities
Fri Mar 21 17:04:40 2014 UTClccn-no970027060.66Economic analysis of accident law0.770.93Transition policy : a conceptual framework /139859234no 970027064247222Harvard Law School. Center for Law, Economics, and BusinessHarvard Law School. John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and BusinessOlin Center for Law, Economics, and BusinesscontainsVIAFID/132598571Harvard Law School. Program in Law and Economicslccn-n88623171Bebchuk, Lucian A.lccn-n81124442Harvard UniversityPresslccn-n86116832Shavell, Steven1946-lccn-n88621620Kaplow, Louislccn-n78095398Viscusi, W. Kiplccn-n91013381Ramseyer, J. Mark1954-lccn-n82156421Miwa, Yoshirō1948-lccn-no99026300Hersch, Joni1956-lccn-no2002094144Bar-Gill, Orenlccn-no2003006524Cohen, AlmaJohn M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and BusinessPeriodicalsHistoryTorts--Economic aspectsRisk (Insurance)TortsUnited StatesLawLaw reviewsMassachusettsLaw and economicsLiability (Law)--Economic aspectsAccident law--Economic aspectsBankruptcyRight of property--Econometric modelsLiability (Law)--Econometric modelsContracts--Econometric modelsStockholders--Legal status, laws, etcCorporations--ValuationExecutives--Salaries, etcLaw--Interpretation and constructionSociological jurisprudenceTime (Law)Law--Political aspectsLabor laws and legislationCompensation managementDirectors of corporations--Salaries, etcBoards of directorsChief executive officers--Salaries, etcExternalities (Economics)Right of property--Economic aspectsProperty--Economic aspectsIntellectual property--Economic aspectsLegal assistance to the poorStock ownershipLegal aidCorporations--FinanceMeans testsAssets (Accounting)Business failuresDebtor and creditorGoing public (Securities)Creditors' billsPrivate companies--FinanceConsumer protection--Law and legislationEconomics--Psychological aspectsBankruptcy--Law and legislationLiability (Law)--Mathematical modelsLaw enforcementLaw enforcement--Economic aspectsRisk management--Mathematical modelsJurisprudenceCorporations--Finance--Econometric models19831990199519961997199819992000200120022003200420052006200720082009201020112185505793346.7303K9232495ocn299040662file0.70The journal of legal analysisPeriodicals232ocn052255063book20030.93Kaplow, LouisTransition policy : a conceptual frameworkDiscusses policies on legal transitions--the period between the enactment of a law, announcement of a regulation, change of a government rule, etc., and its implementation, which may be retroactive, effective immediately or later, and may include phase-in, grandfathering, or other special provisions186ocn051639348book19990.66Shavell, StevenEconomic analysis of accident law"Surveys the economic analysis of five primary fields of law: property law; liability for accidents; contract law; litigation; and public enforcement and criminal law"--Abstract122ocn061426381com0.93Discussion paper124ocn046637670book20010.76Miwa, YoshirōThe fable of the Keiretsu, and other tales of Japan we wish were trueHistoryConsists of an abstract and the introduction from a larger work104ocn052427213book20030.86Viscusi, W. KipThe value of life : estimates with risks by occupation and industry"The economic approach to valuing risks to life focuses on risk-money tradeoffs for very small risks of death, or the value of statistical life (VSL). These VSL levels will generally exceed the optimal insurance amounts. A substantial literature has estimated the wage-fatality risk tradeoffs, implying a median VSL of $7 million for U.S. workers. International evidence often indicates a lower VSL, which is consistent with the lower income levels in less developed countries. Preference heterogeneity also generates different tradeoff rates across the population as people who are more willing to bear risk will exhibit lower wage-risk tradeoffs"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site102ocn055519670book20020.92Shavell, StevenMinimum asset requirements"Minimum asset and liability insurance requirements must often be met in order for parties to participate in potentially harmful activities. Such financial responsibility requirements may improve parties' decisions whether to engage in harmful activities and, if so, their efforts to reduce risk. However, the requirements may undesirably prevent some parties with low assets from engaging in activities. Liability insurance requirements tend to improve parties' incentives to reduce risk when insurers can observe levels of care, but dilute incentives to reduce risk when insurers cannot observe levels of care. In the latter case, compulsory liability insurance may be inferior to minimum asset requirements"--NBER website94ocn057665808book20040.92Cools, SofieThe real difference in corporate law between the United States and continental Europe : distribution of powersDiscusses: (Part I) The index measuring investor protection in the paper "Law and finance" by Rafael La Porta (et al.)(1996, rev. 1998), and: (Parts II-III) compares the distribution of powers in corporations in the United States and western Europe73ocn047683756book20010.73Rasmusen, EricAgency law and contract formation73ocn056947352book20040.84Bebchuk, Lucian AWhat matters in corporate governance?"We investigate which provisions, among a set of twenty-four governance provisions followed by the Institutional Investors Research Center (IRRC), are correlated with firm value and stockholder returns. Based on this analysis, we put forward an entrenchment index based on six provisions -- four ?constitutional? provisions that prevent a majority of shareholders fromhaving their way (staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, supermajorityrequirements for mergers, and supermajority requirements for charter amendments), and two?takeover readiness? provisions that boards put in place to be ready for a hostile takeover (poisonpills and golden parachutes). We find that increases in the level of this index are monotonicallyassociated with economically significant reductions in firm valuation, as measured by Tobin's Q. We also find that firms with higher level of the entrenchment index were associated with largenegative abnormal returns during the 1990-2003 period. Furthermore, we find that the provisionsin our entrenchment index fully drive the correlation, identified by prior work, that the IRRCprovisions in the aggregate have with reduced firm value and lower stock returns during the1990s. We find no evidence that the other eighteen IRRC provisions are negatively correlatedwith either firm value or stock returns during the 1990-2003 period"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site73ocn056947551book20040.93Jolls, Christine MDebiasing through law"Human beings are often boundedly rational. In the face of bounded rationality, the legal system might attempt either to ?debias law,? by insulating legal outcomes from the effects of boundedly rational behavior, or instead to ?debias through law,? by steering legal actors in more rational directions. Legal analysts have focused most heavily on insulating outcomes from the effects of bounded rationality. In fact, however, a large number of actual and imaginable legal strategies are efforts to engage in debiasing through law -- to help people reduce or even eliminate boundedly rational behavior. In important contexts, these efforts promise to avoid the costs and inefficiencies associated with regulatory approaches that take bounded rationality as a given and respond by attempting to insulate outcomes from its effects. This Article offers both a general theory of debiasing through law and a description of how such debiasing does or could work to address central legal questions in a large number of domains, from employment law to consumer safety law to corporate law to property law. Discussion is devoted to the risks of overshooting and manipulation that are sometimes raised when government engages in debiasing through law"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site73ocn047047640book20010.92Bebchuk, Lucian AA new approach to valuing secured claims in bankruptcyIn many business bankruptcies in which the firm is to be preserved as a going concern, one of the most difficult and important problems is that of valuing the assets that serve as collateral for secured creditors. Valuing a secured creditor's collateral is needed to determine the amount of the creditor's secured claim, which in turn affects the payout that must be made to the creditor. Such valuation has generally been believed to require either litigation or bargaining among the parties, which in turn give rise to uncertainty, delay, and deviations from parties' entitlements. This paper puts forward a new approach to valuing collateral that involves neither bargaining nor litigation. Under this approach, a market-based mechanism would determine the value of collateral in such a way that no participant in the bankruptcy would have a basis for complaining that secured creditors are either over- or under-compensated. Our approach would considerably improve the performance of business bankruptcy and could constitute an important element of any proposal for bankruptcy reform73ocn047871865book20010.76Klement, AlonIncentive structures for class action lawyers73ocn056947337book20040.84Ferrell, AllenThe case for mandatory disclosure in securities regulation around the world"The desirability of mandatory disclosure requirements in securities regulation has been the subject of a longstanding debate among corporate law scholars and economists. The debate has largely focused on the desirability of mandatory disclosure requirements in the United States, a country characterized by dispersed ownership structures. This article argues that there are strong theoretical reasons to believe that mandatory disclosure requirements can play a socially useful role in countries with concentrated ownership structures. Controlling shareholders will tend to prefer poor firm transparency, to protect their private benefits of control, even if the presence of a demanding disclosure regime would have the socially desirable effect of increasing competition in the capital and product markets and reducing the agency costs associated with concentrated ownership structures. Recent empirical work is consistent with mandatory disclosure requirements fulfilling the valuable role of enhancing competition and reducing agency costs"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site74ocn123761937book20060.88Bebchuk, Lucian AThe myth of the shareholder franchise"The power of shareholders to replace the board is a central element in the accepted theory of the modern public corporation with dispersed ownership. This power, however, is largely a myth. I document in this paper that the incidence of electoral challenges has been very low during the 1996-2005 decade. After presenting this evidence, this paper first analyzes why electoral challenges to directors are so rare, and then makes the case for arrangements that would provide shareholders with a viable power to remove directors. Under the proposed default arrangements, a company will have, at least every two years, elections with shareholder access to the corporate ballot, shareholder power to replace all directors, and reimbursement of campaign expenses for candidates who receive a sufficiently significant number of votes (for example, one-third of the votes cast); and will have secret ballot and majority voting in all elections. Furthermore, opting out of default election arrangements through shareholder-approved bylaws should be facilitated, but boards should be constrained from adopting without shareholder approval bylaws that make director removal more difficult. Finally, I examine a wide range of objections to the proposed reform of corporate elections, and I conclude that the case for such a reform is strong"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site71ocn050192997book20020.90Bebchuk, Lucian AManagerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensationThis paper develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting approach to executive compensation, which has dominated academic re-search on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize shareholder value. In contrast, the managerial power approach suggests that boards do not operate at arm's length in devising executive compensation arrangements; rather, executives have power to influence their own pay, and they use that power to extract rents. Furthermore, the desire to camouflage rent extraction might lead to the use of inefficient pay arrangements that provide suboptimal incentives and thereby hurt shareholder value. The authors show that the processes that produce compensation arrangements, and the various market forces and constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the large body of empirical work on executive compensation, the authors show that managerial power and the desire to camouflage rents can explain significant features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that have long been viewed as puzzling or problematic from the optimal contracting perspective. The authors conclude that the role managerial power plays in the design of executive compensation is significant and should be taken into account in any examination of executive pay arrangements or of corporate governance generally73ocn056947638book20040.93Jolls, Christine MThe role and functioning of public-interest legal organizations in the enforcement of the employment laws"Many laws create important rights for today's employees, but the availability of legal representation for employees seeking to enforce those rights is uncertain. The goal of the present paper, part of the Emerging Labor Market Institutions for the 21st Century Project at the National Bureau of Economic Research, is to examine some of the distinctive public-interest legal organizations that exist to help to enforce the employment laws. The chapter focuses on two broad categories of such organizations: "national issue organizations," which are organizations that focus on one or more broad-based issues and are funded predominantly by private donations; and legal services organizations, which serve exclusively low-income individuals and are funded primarily by the government"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site71ocn035115869book19960.92Bebchuk, Lucian ACorporate ownership structures : private versus social optimalityThis paper analyzes the inefficiencies that might arise in the ownership structure chosen at the initial public offering stage. We show that, contrary to what is commonly believed, the desire of initial owners to maximize their proceeds leads them to choices that, although privately optimal, may be socially inefficient. This distortion tends to be in the direction of excessive incidence of controlling shareholder structures and excessive divestment of cash flow rights. Our analysis has far-reaching policy implications for dual class stock, stock pyramiding, sale of control rules, and public offerings of minority shares. Among its positive implications, our analysis suggests reasons for the substantial differences in the incidence of control blocks across different countries72ocn047911321book20010.88Bebchuk, Lucian AEx ante costs of violating absolute priority in bankruptcyA basic question for the design of bankruptcy law concerns whether value should be divided in accordance with absolute priority. Research done in the past decade has suggested that deviations from absolute priority have beneficial ex ante effects. In contrast, this paper shows that ex post deviations from absolute priority also have negative effects on ex ante decisions taken by shareholders. Such deviations aggravate the moral hazard problem with respect to project choice - increasing the equityholders' incentive to favor risky projects - as well as with respect to borrowing and dividend decisions73ocn062386036book20050.92Polinsky, A. MitchellThe theory of public enforcement of law"This chapter of the forthcoming Handbook of Law and Economics surveys the theory of the public enforcement of law — the use of governmental agents (regulators, inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. The theoretical core of our analysis addresses the following basic questions: Should the form of the sanction imposed on a liable party be a fine, an imprisonment term, or a combination of the two? Should the rule of liability be strict or fault-based? If violators are caught only with a probability, how should the level of the sanction be adjusted? How much of society's resources should be devoted to apprehending violators? We then examine a variety of extensions of the central theory, including: activity level; errors; the costs of imposing fines; general enforcement; marginal deterrence; the principal-agent relationship; settlements; self-reporting; repeat offenders; imperfect knowledge about the probability and magnitude of sanctions; corruption; incapacitation; costly observation of wealth; social norms; and the fairness of sanctions"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web siteFri Mar 21 16:06:05 EDT 2014batch33454