WorldCat Identities

Leonard, Robert S.

Overview
Works: 45 works in 84 publications in 1 language and 4,032 library holdings
Classifications: UG1242.D7, 623.7469
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about  Robert S Leonard Publications about Robert S Leonard
Publications by  Robert S Leonard Publications by Robert S Leonard
Most widely held works by Robert S Leonard
Innovative management in the DARPA high altitude endurance unmanned aerial vehicle program phase II experience by Jeffrey A Drezner ( )
5 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 1,533 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The U.S. military's development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) has been hampered by cost overruns, schedule slippage, and disappointing operational results. The High Altitude Endurance UAV (HAE UAV) joint program, initiated under the direction of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), incorporates several innovative elements in its acquisition strategy that depart radically from traditional acquisition approaches. The program's development phase for the Global Hawk and DarkStar air vehicles is analyzed in this research. The HAE UAV program has experienced problems that are typical of newly implemented methods, but it has produced significant benefits, and provides lessons that could improve a wide variety of future acquisition processes
The arsenal ship acquisition process experience contrasting and common impressions from the contractor teams and joint program office by Robert S Leonard ( )
7 editions published between 1998 and 2000 in English and held by 1,518 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The Arsenal Ship acquisition program was unique in two respects: it represented a new operational concept for Navy weapon systems, and its management structure and process represented a significant departure from traditional military ship-building programs. The Arsenal Ship program was, in effect, an experiment; while the Navy envisioned an array of mission capabilities for the ship, it set the project budget as the single immovable requirement. In the end, political and financial constraints caused the program's cancellation. Nevertheless, its acquisition approach and technical innovations have already had--and will continue to have--significant influence on other Navy ship-building programs. The lessons learned from the Arsenal Ship program, applied to existing and planned systems, should more than recover the money spent on it
Application of F-117 acquisition strategy to other programs in the new acquisition environment by Giles K Smith ( Book )
4 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 153 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The argument is frequently made that special access or "black" programs accommodate more efficient and effective ways to buy weapon systems than do conventional acquisition programs. If so, perhaps some of the characteristics of these covert programs could be transferred to the more conventional procurement programs to enhance their efficiency. That hypothesis is what Project AIR FORCE researchers wanted to test by examining the F-117 Stealth Fighter acquisition program. They concluded that, although it was unlikely that the special set of circumstances surrounding the F-117 procurement could be fully replicated for many other programs (nor should they be), two elements of F-117 program management not only could be but also should be applied more broadly: greater delegation of authority to the program office and requiring only a very few performance requirements by contract. Applying these features to other programs requires considerable mutual trust among the government agencies involved and between the government and the contractor. The absence of such trust spawned many of the controls specifically waived for the F-117 program
Analysis of alternatives (AoA) for KC-135 recapitalization : executive summary ( Book )
2 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 123 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Aerial refueling tankers are a critical part of U.S. military and national security strategy. The KC-135 constitutes the bulk of the current tanker force, but this fleet is nearing 50 years of age and has exhibited some technical difficulties and increased costs of operation. The work described here summarizes the activities and results of an Analysis of Alternatives undertaken to address the cost-effectiveness of a wide range of alternatives for KC-135 recapitalization, including both different replacement systems and different replacement schedules. Among the conclusions were that medium to large commercial derivatives are the most cost-effective replacement aircraft and that, as long as the capability of the current fleet meets or exceeds the requirement, the costs are relatively insensitive to timing
Do joint fighter programs save money? : technical appendixes on methodology by Mark A Lorell ( Book )
2 editions published in 2013 in English and held by 100 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
These appendixes explain the methodology used in an analysis of the costs and savings of joint aircraft acquisition programs. They illustrate calculations for theoretical maximum joint aircraft savings in acquisition and in operations and support, historical joint aircraft cost-growth premiums, savings needed to offset premiums, and two cost-comparison methodologies
Do joint fighter programs save money? by Mark A Lorell ( Book )
2 editions published in 2013 in English and held by 98 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
In the past 50 years, the U.S. Department of Defense has pursued numerous joint aircraft programs, the largest and most recent of which is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Joint aircraft programs are thought to reduce Life Cycle Cost (LCC) by eliminating duplicate research, development, test, and evaluation efforts and by realizing economies of scale in procurement, operations, and support. But the need to accommodate different service requirements in a single design or common design family can lead to greater program complexity, increased technical risk, and common functionality or increased weight in excess of that needed for some variants, potentially leading to higher overall cost, despite these efficiencies. To help Air Force leaders (and acquisition decisionmakers in general) select an appropriate acquisition strategy for future combat aircraft, this report analyzes the costs and savings of joint aircraft acquisition programs. The project team examined whether historical joint aircraft programs have saved LCC compared with single-service programs. In addition, the project team assessed whether JSF is on track to achieving the joint savings originally anticipated at the beginning of full-scale development. Also examined were the implications of joint fighter programs for the health of the industrial base and for operational and strategic risk
Global Hawk and Darkstar : transitions within and out of the HAE UAV ACTD program by Jeffrey A Drezner ( Book )
3 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 78 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Over the past three decades, a number of attempts have been made to develop unmanned aerial vehicles, but many of these efforts have met with suboptimal results. Recently, however, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), in conjunction with the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office, launched an effort — designated the High-Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Advanced concept Technology Demonstration (HAE UAV ACTD) program — whose objective was to overcome past constraints in UAV development through the use of a new acquisition policy. This report assesses two transitions of the HAE UAV ACTD program — the first from DARPA to Air Force management and the second from an ACTD to a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) — toward the goal of determining which elements of the program's novel acquisition strategy facilitated these transitions and which engendered problems. The authors found that in aggregate, the innovative acquisition strategy adopted in the HAE UAV ACTD program had a positive effect on program execution in that it successfully attained the program's key goals: demonstrating a new operational concept at a lower cost and in a shorter time frame than would have been possible with a traditional acquisition approach. The program's transition from the ACTD construct to an MDAP, however — although ultimately successful — posed a number of challenges, many of which stemmed directly from its acquisition strategy. To circumvent these problems in the future, the authors recommend that all organizations involved in a program, particularly operational users, be given substantive input into program planning at the earliest possible juncture
Global Hawk and Darkstar : HAE UAV ACTD program description and comparative analysis by Robert S Leonard ( Book )
3 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 78 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The past three decades have seen a number of less-than-successfulefforts to develop high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles. In 1994, theDefense Advanced Research Projects Agency, in conjunction with the DefenseAirborne Reconnaissance Office, initiated an effort--designated theHigh-Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Advanced Concept TechnologyDemonstrator (HAE UAV ACTD) --whose goal was to facilitate the developmentof UAVs through the use of a new and innovative acquisition strategy. Thisreport addresses the effect of that acquisition strategy on the flight testprogram of the two air vehicles: the conventional Global Hawk and thelow-observable DarkStar. The authors found that because DarkStar wascanceled after having logged only 6.5 flight hours, not enough flightexperience was accumulated to allow for an understanding of the vehicle'sflight characteristics or military utility. By contrast, Global Hawkaccumulated ample experience to permit a demonstration of its militaryutility, achieving a level of performance that was close to predicted goals. The precise effect of the HAE UAV acquisition strategy remains the subjectof debate. The strategy did, however, influence some key aspects of theflight test program, most notably its increased contractor involvement andits early operational testing in the form of user demonstrations. The flighttest program also served to illustrate the vital need for early involvementof operational users to bolster the capabilities and perspective of thecontractor
Innovative development : Global Hawk and Darkstar by Jeffrey A Drezner ( Book )
4 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 76 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
In 1994, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office launched a joint initiative with the goal to overcome the impediments that had hampered past unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) development. This effort--designated the High-Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (HAE UAV ACTD) program--applied an innovative acquisition strategy to the development of two UAVs: one conventionally configured (Global Hawk) and the other with a low-observable configuration (DarkStar). The report summarizes the major research findings regarding the HAE UAV ACTD program's acquisition strategy. The authors conclude that despite DarkStar's cancellation--and despite overall program cost growth and schedule slippage in basic design and test of the two HAE UAV concepts, the ACTD program did accomplish its primary objective by successfully demonstrating the military utility of a UAV with a continuous, all-weather, wide-area surveillance capability. Although the program's single requirement--the unit flyaway price--was not met, it did promote cost consciousness while at the same time preventing the imposition of additional system capabilities during the basic system development. The authors found the program's use of Other Transaction Authority to lend considerable flexibility to the effort. While the program's designation as an ACTD imposed cost and schedule boundaries that constrained system development, it also provided a high degree of flexibility to adjust the program execution. Areas of risk were addressed as they arose, and early flight test experience was assimilated into continuing system development efforts. Relatively modest changes in up-front planning processes, the structured participation of operational users early in the program, and contract language regarding oversight processes and incentives would ensure successful application of the acquisition strategy to a broader range of systems
Global Hawk and Darkstar : flight test in the HAE UAV ACTD program by Jeffrey A Drezner ( Book )
3 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 76 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The past three decades have seen a number of less-than-successful efforts to develop high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles. In 1994, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, in conjunction with the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office, initiated an effort — designated the High-Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrator (HAE UAV ACTD) — whose goal was to facilitate the development of UAVs through the use of a new and innovative acquisition strategy. This report addresses the effect of that acquisition strategy on the flight test program of the two air vehicles: the conventional Global Hawk and the low-observable DarkStar. The authors found that because DarkStar was canceled after having logged only 6.5 flight hours, not enough flight experience was accumulated to allow for an understanding of the vehicle's flight characteristics or military utility. By contrast, Global Hawk accumulated ample experience to permit a demonstration of its military utility, achieving a level of performance that was close to predicted goals. The precise effect of the HAE UAV acquisition strategy remains the subject of debate. The strategy did, however, influence some key aspects of the flight test program, most notably its increased contractor involvement and its early operational testing in the form of user demonstrations. The flight test program also served to illustrate the vital need for early involvement of operational users to bolster the capabilities and perspective of the contractor
Global Hawk and Darkstar : their advanced concept, technology demonstration, program experience by Jeffrey A Drezner ( Book )
2 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 73 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
boundaries that constrained system development, it also provided a high degree of flexibility to adjust the program execution. Areas of risk were addressed as they arose, and early flight test experience was assimilated into continuing system development efforts. Relatively modest changes in up-front planning processes, the structured participation of operational users early in the program, and contract language regarding oversight processes and incentives would ensure successful application of the acquisition strategy to a broader range of systems
Innovative Development Executive Summary Global Hawk and Darkstar - Their Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration Program Experience, Executive Summary by Jeffrey A Drezner ( )
3 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 18 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
An assessment of the innovative management approach used to develop two unmanned aerial vehicles. The HAE UAV Management Approach Was Highly InnovativeActivity Content Changed Substantially from the PlanCost to the Government Remained Stable While Costs Grew and Activity Content Changed Overall Schedule Grew Only ModeratelyUFP Was Not Met but Did Help Control Costs and RequirementsFlight Testing Was Dominated by the Nature of the System and the Operational DemonstrationsPerformance Goals Were Mostly AttainedThe Innovative Acquisition Strategy Had a Significant Effect
Sources of weapon system cost growth analysis of 35 major defense acquisition programs by Joseph G Bolten ( )
3 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 13 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This analysis uses data from Selected Acquisition Reports to determine the causes of cost growth in 35 mature major defense acquisition programs. Four major sources of growth are identified: (1) errors in estimation and scheduling, (2) decisions by the government, (3) financial matters, and (4) miscellaneous. The analysis shows that more than two-thirds of cost growth (measured as simple averages) is caused by decisions, most of which involve quantity changes, requirements growth, and schedule changes
Innovative Development Global Hawk and DarkStar - Flight Test in the HAE UAV ACTD Program by Robert S Leonard ( )
1 edition published in 2002 in English and held by 12 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
In 1994 the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency initiated an effort to facilitate the development of UAVs through the use of an innovative acquisition strategy. This report addresses the effect of that strategy on the flight test program of two air vehicles: Global Hawk and DarkStar
Innovative Development - Global Hawk and DarkStar Transitions Within and Out of the HAE UAV ACTD Program (2002) by Jeffrey A Drezner ( )
1 edition published in 2002 in English and held by 11 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This title looks at the effect of new acquisition strategies on an unmanned aerial vehicle's transition from one agency to another as well as from development and test to production
Innovative Development - Global Hawk and DarkStar HAE UAV ACTD Program Description and Comparative Analysis (2002) by Robert S Leonard ( )
1 edition published in 2002 in English and held by 11 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Since the 1970s, efforts to develop unmanned aerial vehicles have been severely hampered by escalating costs, slipped schedules, and disappointing operational results. This text provides an evaluation of new acquisition strategies for the development of unmanned aerial vehicles
Innovative development by Jeffrey A Drezner ( Book )
3 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The past three decades have seen a number of less-than-successful efforts to develop high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles. In 1994, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, in conjunction with the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office, initiated an effort--designated the High-Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrator (HAE UAV ACTD)--whose goal was to facilitate the development of UAVs through the use of a new and innovative acquisition strategy. This report addresses the effect of that acquisition strategy on the flight test program of the two air vehicles: the conventional Global Hawk and the low-observable DarkStar. The authors found that because DarkStar was canceled after having logged only 6.5 flight hours, not enough flight experience was accumulated to allow for an understanding of the vehicle's flight characteristics or military utility. By contrast, Global Hawk accumulated ample experience to permit a demonstration of its military utility, achieving a level of performance that was close to predicted goals. The precise effect of the HAE UAV acquisition strategy remains the subject of debate. The strategy did, however, influence some key aspects of the flight test program, most notably its increased contractor involvement and its early operational testing in the form of user demonstrations. The flight test program also served to illustrate the vital need for early involvement of operational users to bolster the capabilities and perspective of the contractor
Innovative development Global Hawk and DarkStar by Jeffrey A Drezner ( Book )
4 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 6 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Over the past three decades, a number of attempts have been made to develop unmanned aerial vehicles, but many of these efforts have met with suboptimal results. Recently, however, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), in conjunction with the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office, launched an effort -- designated the High-Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Advanced concept Technology Demonstration (HAE UAV ACTD) program -- whose objective was to overcome past constraints in UAV development through the use of a new acquisition policy. This report assesses two transitions of the HAE UAV ACTD program -- the first from DARPA to Air Force management and the second from an ACTD to a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) -- toward the goal of determining which elements of the program's novel acquisition strategy facilitated these transitions and which engendered problems. The authors found that in aggregate, the innovative acquisition strategy adopted in the HAE UAV ACTD program had a positive effect on program execution in that it successfully attained the program's key goals: demonstrating a new operational concept at a lower cost and in a shorter time frame than would have been possible with a traditional acquisition approach. The program's transition from the ACTD construct to an MDAP, however -- although ultimately successful -- posed a number of challenges, many of which stemmed directly from its acquisition strategy. To circumvent these problems in the future, the authors recommend that all organizations involved in a program, particularly operational users, be given substantive input into program planning at the earliest possible juncture
Innovative development Global Hawk and DarkStar by Robert S Leonard ( Book )
3 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Over the past three decades, efforts to develop unmanned aerial vehicles have been severely hampered by escalating costs, slipped schedules, and disappointing operational results. Recently, however, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, in conjunction with the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office, launched an initiative -- designated the High-Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (HAE UAV ACTD) program -- whose objective was to overcome these deficits through the use of a new and innovative acquisition policy. This report evaluates several key elements of this new strategy toward the goal of determining how they affected the development of two air vehicles: the first a conventional vehicle (Global Hawk) and the second a low-observable configuration (DarkStar). The authors found that the ACTD approach required that the entire development effort be planned at the program's inception, which proved to be a detriment to the effort as a whole. In addition, the program's single requirement -- a $10 million unit flyaway price -- proved unattainable and was eventually abandoned. At the same time, the authors found that the program's designation as an ACTD, its use of Other Transaction Authority, and its delegation of considerable management responsibility to contractors greatly streamlined the oversight process and lent considerable flexibility to the effort. As a direct result of these factors, the Global Hawk program was judged to have successfully and cost-effectively produced a continuous, all-weather, wide-area surveillance capability for future warfighters. The authors thus conclude that although the DarkStar program was canceled before its capabilities could be fully demonstrated, the HAE UAV ACTD program was in aggregate a success
William Shakespeare's Much ado about nothing a romantic comedy for anyone who's ever been in love ( Visual )
1 edition published in 1995 in English and held by 4 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
 
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