WorldCat Identities

Lai, Edwin L.-C

Overview
Works: 15 works in 64 publications in 1 language and 231 library holdings
Classifications: HB1, 330
Publication Timeline
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Publications about  Edwin L.-C Lai Publications about Edwin L.-C Lai
Publications by  Edwin L.-C Lai Publications by Edwin L.-C Lai
Most widely held works by Edwin L.-C Lai
International protection of intellectual property by Gene M Grossman ( Book )
24 editions published between 2001 and 2002 in English and held by 113 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
"We study the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual property in a trading world economy. We consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in two countries that differ in market size, in their capacities for innovation, and in their absolute and comparative advantage in manufacturing. We associate the strength of IPR protection with the duration of a country's patents that are applied with national treatment. After describing the determination of national policies in a non-cooperative regime of patent protection, we ask, Why are patents longer in the North? We also study international patent agreements by deriving the properties of an efficient global regime of patent protection and asking whether harmonization of patent policies is necessary or sufficient for global efficiency"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Parallel imports and price controls by Gene M Grossman ( )
12 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 63 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
"Price controls create opportunities for international arbitrage. Many have argued that such arbitrage, if tolerated, will undermine intellectual property rights and dull the incentives for investment in research-intensive industries such as pharmaceuticals. We challenge this orthodox view and show, to the contrary, that the pace of innovation often is faster in a world with international exhaustion of intellectual property rights than in one with national exhaustion. The key to our conclusion is to recognize that governments will make different choices of price controls when parallel imports are allowed by their trade partners than they will when they are not"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
A theory of government procrastination by Taiji Furusawa ( Book )
4 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
We present a theory to explain government procrastination as a consequence of its present-bias resulting from the political uncertainty in a two-party political system. We show that under a two-party political system the party in office tends to be present-biased. This may lead to inefficient procrastination of socially beneficial policies that carry upfront costs but yield long-term benefits. However, procrastination is often not indefinite even as we consider an infinite-horizon game. There exist equilibria in which the policy is implemented, and in many cases carried out to completion in finite time. When the net social benefit is large, there is no procrastination problem. When the net social benefit is small, the policy can be procrastinated indefinitely, though there may co-exist some gradual implementation equilibria. When the net social benefit is intermediate in magnitude, there are all sorts of procrastination equilibria, including gradual implementation. The theory predicts that a government with a more strongly predominant party tends to procrastinate less. -- present-bias ; procrastination ; policy implementation
A model of trade with Ricardian comparative advantage and intra-sectoral firm heterogeneity by Haichao Fan ( )
5 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
In this paper, we merge the heterogenous firm trade model of Melitz (2003) with the Ricardian model of Dornbusch, Fisher and Samuelson (DFS 1977) to explain how the pattern of international specialization and trade is determined by the interaction of comparative advantage, economies of scale, country sizes and trade barriers. The model is able to capture the existence of inter-industry trade and intra-industry trade in a single unified framework. It explains how trade openness affects the pattern of international specialization and trade. It generalizes Melitz's firm selection effect in the face of trade liberalization to a setting where the patterns of inter-industry trade and intra-industry are endogenous. Although opening to trade is unambiguously welfare-improving in both countries, trade liberalization can lead to an counter-Melitz effect in the larger country if it is insufficiently competitive in the sectors where it has the strongest comparative disadvantage but still produces. In this case, the operating productivity cutoff is lowered while the exporting cutoff increases in the face of trade liberalization. This is because the intersectoral resource allocation (IRA) effect dominates the Melitz effect in these sectors. Consequently, the larger country can lose from trade liberalization. Some hypotheses related to firms' exporting behavior across sectors upon opening up to trade and upon trade liberalization are also derived. Analyses of firm-level data of Chinese manufacturing sectors confirm these hypotheses. -- inter-industry trade ; intra-industry trade ; heterogeneous firms ; trade liberalization
Global gains from trade liberalization by Haichao Fan ( Book )
5 editions published in 2012 in English and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
What has been the overall global welfare impact of the accession to the World Trade Organization of a large country like China, or the global welfare impact of the completion of the Uruguay round of GATT negotiations? Can we come up with a simple user-friendly formula to calculate the global welfare impact of the simultaneous trade liberalization of a number of countries? How sensitive is the answer to the assumption of the trade model? We find a striking answer to these questions. We find that, for a very broad class of models and settings, the global welfare impact of trade liberalization in a country, or a simultaneous liberalization of a number of countries, is given by the same simple formula. We find that the global welfare impact of the simultaneous trade liberalization of different countries only depends on two sets of statistics: (i) the ratio of the value of bilateral trade between each and every pair of trading partners and global income; and (ii) the change in exporting cost for each and every pair of trading partners. Most interestingly, the formula applies to a very broad class of models and settings, which include the general Ricardian model (including, for example, Anderson, 1979, and Eaton and Kortum, 2002), the models of Krugman (1980), Melitz (2003) and its extensions, and the extensions of these models to the multi-sectoral case, multi-factor production technology, multi-stage production, the existence of tradable intermediate goods and the existence of a large outside good sector in each country. We find that global welfare would have been 0.05% lower in the year 2008 if China had not gained accession to the WTO in 2001
Protection of trade for innovation : the roles of northern and southern tariffs by Larry D Qiu ( Book )
2 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 8 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Would global patent protection be too weak without international coordination? presented at CESIfo Area Conference on Global Economy, February 2011 by Edwin L.-C Lai ( Book )
2 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 6 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This paper analyzes the setting of national patent policies in the global economy. In the standard model with free trade and social-welfare-maximizing governments à la Grossman and Lai (2004), cross-border positive policy externalities induce individual countries to select patent strengths that are weaker than is optimal from a global perspective. The paper introduces three new features to the analysis: trade barriers, firm heterogeneity in terms of productivity and political economy considerations in setting patent policies. The first two features (trade barriers interacting with firm heterogeneity) tend to reduce the size of cross-border externalities in patent protection and therefore make national IPR policies closer to the global optimum. With firm lobbying creating profit-bias of the government, it is even possible that the equilibrium strength of global patent protection is greater than the globally efficient level. Thus, the question of under-protection or not is an empirical one. Based on calibration exercises, we find that there would be global under-protection of patent rights when there is no international policy coordination. Furthermore, requiring all countries to harmonize their patent standards with the equilibrium standard of the most innovative country (the US) does not lead to global over-protection of patent rights
Credit constraints, quality, and export prices theory and evidence from China by Haichao Fan ( Book )
2 editions published in 2013 in English and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This paper examines the relationship between the credit constraints faced by a firm and the unit value prices of its exports. The paper modifies Arkolakis’s (2010) model of trade with heterogeneous firms by introducing endogenous quality and credit constraints. The model predicts that tighter credit constraints faced by a firm reduce its optimal prices as its choice of lower-quality products dominates the price distortion effect resulting from credit constraints. However, a competing theory based on the alternative assumption that quality is exogenous across firms would predict completely opposite results: Prices increase as firms face tighter credit constraints. An empirical analysis using Chinese bank loans data, Chinese firm-level data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC), and Chinese customs data strongly supports the predictions of the endogenous-quality model. Moreover, the predictions of the exogenous-quality model are supported by using quality-adjusted prices in regression analysis. In addition, we confirm the mechanism of quality adjustment: firms optimally choose to produce lower-quality products when facing tighter credit constraints
Would global patent protection be too weak without international coordination? by Edwin L.-C Lai ( )
1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This paper analyzes the setting of national patent policies in the global economy. In the standard model with free trade and social-welfare-maximizing governments à la Grossman and Lai (2004), cross-border positive policy externalities induce individual countries to select patent strengths that are weaker than is optimal from a global perspective. The paper introduces three new features to the analysis: trade barriers, firm heterogeneity in terms of productivity and political economy considerations in setting patent policies. The first two features (trade barriers interacting with firm heterogeneity) tend to reduce the size of cross-border externalities in patent protection and therefore make national IPR policies closer to the global optimum. With firm lobbying creating profit-bias of the government, it is even possible that the equilibrium strength of global patent protection is greater than the globally efficient level. Thus, the question of under-protection or not is an empirical one. Based on calibration exercises, we find that there would be global under-protection of patent rights when there is no international policy coordination. Furthermore, requiring all countries to harmonize their patent standards with the equilibrium standard of the most innovative country (the US) does not lead to global over-protection of patent rights. -- intellectual property rights ; patents ; TRIPS ; harmonization
Cumulative Innovation, Growth and Welfare-Improving Patent Policy by Davin Chor ( )
2 editions published in 2013 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
We construct a tractable general equilibrium model of cumulative innovation and growth, in which new ideas strictly improve upon frontier technologies, and productivity improvements are drawn in a stochastic manner. The presence of positive knowledge spillovers implies that the decentralized equilibrium features an allocation of labor to R&D activity that is strictly lower than the social planner’s benchmark, which suggests a role for patent policy. We focus on a non-infringing inventive stepʺ requirement, which stipulates the minimum improvement to the best patented technology that a new idea needs to make for it to be patentable and non-infringing. We establish that there exists a finite required inventive step that maximizes the rate of innovation, as well as a separate optimal required inventive step that maximizes welfare, with the former being strictly greater than the latter. These conclusions are robust to allowing for the availability of an additional instrument in the form of patent length policy
An empirical study of international patent protection by Edwin L. C Lai ( Book )
1 edition published in 2003 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
Would global patent protection be too weak without international coordination? by Edwin L.-C Lai ( Book )
1 edition published in 2008 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
Trade and intellectual property rights protection by whom and for what? by Larry D Qiu ( Book )
1 edition published in 1999 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
The most-favored nation rule in club enlargement negotiation ( )
1 edition published in 2008 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
Globalization of production and the technology transfer paradox ( )
1 edition published in 2008 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
 
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Languages
English (64)