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Stanford University Department of Philosophy

Works: 68 works in 70 publications in 1 language and 76 library holdings
Genres: Periodicals 
Classifications: BC136, 160
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Most widely held works by Stanford University
The dualist : undergraduate journal of philosophy( )

in English and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Mencian philosophic psychology by Bryan W Van Norden( )

2 editions published in 1991 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Inferentialism with an attitude : an expressivist theory of objectivity by Laura Elizabeth Maguire( )

1 edition published in 2006 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

A critical study of Herbert Wildon Carr's theory of monads by Elmo Arnold Robinson( )

1 edition published in 1930 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Pyrrhonian paideia by Matthew R Darmalingum( )

1 edition published in 2012 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism purports to offer philosophical therapy: Philosophical dogmatism is a disease which perpetuates disturbance. Pyrrhonism is a cure which brings tranquility. Through--or in--suspension of judgment, the Pyrrhonist claims to come to overcome the problems of the dogmatists, and live well just in accordance with appearances. But perhaps Pyrrhonism is bunk: Its professed end of freedom from disturbance--ataraxia--appears insubstantial. The professed means of the attainment of this Pyrrhonian tranquility--suspension of belief--appears degenerate, if not impossible. For example, it seems we could not live rational human lives without believing. To explore these complaints, this work attempts, first, to construct Pyrrhonism as a pedagogy towards a radical skepticism in which the thinker may experience appearance unadulterated by dogma. And second, it attempts to bring us to undergo the pedagogy we construct. We attempt the latter, because if the Pyrrhonist is a radical skeptic, she has no theory whose factual correctness could overcome the complaints against it. Then, to appreciate the viability of Pyrrhonism, we would not look for its superior capacity to produce facts, but for its therapeutic power to produce unadulterated appearance. In this effort at constructing an ancient skeptical pedagogy for the sake of undergoing it, we come to produce a Cartesian meditation. For example, we try, along with the Pyrrhonist, to subtract belief in the propositions of material perception and mathematical intuition for the sake of revealing appearance. Since it seems that the Pyrrhonist could not put forward a pedagogy dogmatically, we try to be charitable, and see if we can construct, first, the Pyrrhonian pedagogy through ad hominem analysis of dogmatism, and, second, ad hominem analysis as unavoidable in rational interaction. In the present work, the particular Pyrrhonian ad hominem analysis for a skeptical pedagogy is of Platonism: We attempt to construct Pyrrhonian suspension as a final movement in Platonic ascent towards vision. We analyze the Republic for a conception of the completion of Platonic ascent in contemplative and practical ataraxia. We go on to take seriously Socrates' suggestion in the Republic's Line and Cave that the philosopher, towards the end of her science, is given to apophasis. In going on to examine such apophasis, we take as our exemplar the Neoplatonic remarks about the One in Plotinus' Ennead 5.3. In accordance with the pedagogy of the Republic, we pursue ascent through material and mathematical subtraction towards the principle. And in the end, we pursue analogy between Plotinian vision of the One in subtraction, and Pyrrhonian vision of appearances in suspension of belief. The Pyrrhonists suffer an appearance of the shortcoming of language: Propositional thought appears temporally extended, but the thing we would affirm in believing it would, it seems, have to be entirely present. Likewise, for Plotinus, in the end, vision of the unified principle comes by way of a subtraction in the face of the problem of capturing simplicity in extended thought. The Pyrrhonist claims that we may bring against our present certainty the consideration that we have come to change our minds about things we once thought obvious. Then, we should be open to the possibility that we come to disagree with ourselves in the future. Consideration of this should be enough to bring us to suspension. We pursue such skeptical consideration, and by this, understanding of how the Pyrrhonist, in subtractive vision, may act calmly and, though in suspension, still from rational activity. We try to limn the Pyrrhonist as engaged in such activity through the Aenesidemean expression of both her lack of belief, and her lack of belief that she lacks belief, as she formulates, for the sake of subtraction towards appearance, what appear to be propositions, both in favor of the necessity and against the possibility of the proposition. In this effort at subtraction through equipollence and suspension, we pursue appearance as it might reveal itself to the Pyrrhonist as ground in a reconstruction she might give of her practical activity of expressing herself in dialectic in this way. In turn, by pursuit of this appearance, we try to see how the Pyrrhonist's pedagogical--and so practical--activity of thinking, and speaking, and laying in the balance one thing against the other under norms against hypothesis, regress, and circularity, as well as her analysis of this activity, may be rational, in ease afforded by honesty, and yet without belief
Statistics and probability in criminal trials : the good, the bad, and the ugly by Marcello Di Bello( )

1 edition published in 2013 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Is a high probability of guilt, in and of itself, enough to convict? I answer in the negative. The prosecutor's burden of proof does not only consist in establishing the high probability of the defendant's guilt; it also consists in offering a reasonably specific narrative of the crime. This can explain, among other things, the nuances of using statistical evidence in criminal trials. Taking DNA evidence as a case study, I argue that statistical evidence can be particularly problematic whenever it fails to support a reasonably specific narrative of the crime
Underdetermination and indirect measurement by Teru Miyake( )

1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

We have been astonishingly successful in gathering knowledge about certain objects or systems to which we seemingly have extremely limited access. Perhaps the most difficult problem in the investigation of such systems is that they are extremely underdetermined. What are the methods through which these cases of underdetermination are resolved? I argue in chapter 1 that these methods are best understood by thinking of what scientists are doing as gaining access to the previously inaccessible parts of these systems through a series of indirect measurements. I then discuss two central problems with such indirect measurements, theory mediation and the combining of effects, and ways in which these difficulties can be dealt with. In chapter 2, I examine the indirect measurement of planetary distances in the solar system in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by Copernicus and Kepler. In this case, there was an underdetermination between three different theories about the motions of the planets, which can be partly resolved by the measurement of distances between the planets. The measurement of these distances was enabled by making certain assumptions about the motions of the planets. I argue that part of the justification for making these assumptions comes from decompositional success in playing off measurements of the earth's orbit and the Mars orbit against each other. In chapter 3, I examine the indirect measurement of mechanical properties such as mass and forces in the solar system by Newton. In this case, there were two underdeterminations, the first an underdetermination between two theories about the true motion of the sun and the earth, and the second an underdetermination between various theories for calculating planetary orbits. Newton resolves these two problems of underdetermination through a research program where the various sources of force are identified and accounted for. This program crucially requires the third law of motion to apply between celestial objects, an issue about which Newton was criticized by his contemporaries. I examine the justification for the application of the third law of motion through its successful use for decomposition of forces in the solar system in a long-term research program. I further discuss comments by Kant on the role of the third law of motion for Newton, in which Kant recognizes its indispensability for a long-term program for determining the center of mass of the solar system and thus defining a reference point relative to which forces can be identified. Chapter 4 covers the indirect measurement of density in the earth's interior using observations of seismic waves. One of the difficult problems in this case is that we can think of the interior density of the earth as a continuous function of radius--in order to determine this radius function, you are in effect making a measurement of an infinite number of points. The natural question to ask here is how much resolution the observations give you. I focus on the work of geophysicists who were concerned with this problem, out of which a standard model for the earth's density was developed
Endowments, inequality, and aggregation : an inquiry on the foundations and methods of distributive justice by Daniel Kearney Halliday( )

1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

This dissertation is organised around the development and defence of a novel distributive principle and its philosophical foundations. This principle serves as a refinement of the view that distributive justice requires the mitigation of endowment differences, which otherwise stand to make some people worse off than others. The principle of distribution itself is extensionally intermediate between Utilitarian principles of distribution, and principles that have (typically) been offered as expressing the idea of giving priority to the worse-off
Zhuangzi and skepticism by Paul Kjellberg( )

1 edition published in 1993 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Justification of induction by inference to lesser coincidence by Daniel Jonathan Elstein( )

1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

I begin by identifying David Hume's problem of induction. Hume argues that induction cannot be justified by a priori reasoning, because the failure of induction does not imply contradiction, or by a posteriori reasoning, because reasoning that the unobserved will resemble the observed based on observation would be circular. Hume concludes that induction cannot be justified by any reasoning. The principle that nature is uniform cannot be established without assuming that nature is uniform. But many paradigmatic instances of induction can be justified in terms of something weaker than the principle that nature is uniform, namely a form of reasoning I call "inference to lesser coincidence". This form of reasoning is meant to incorporate traditional formulations of the justification of induction expressed in terms of inference to the best explanation, statistical sampling, and Bayesian reasoning. My version of the argument is as follows: The conditional, time-invariant proposition that vast regularities in progress are likely to continue somewhat further is either true or false. If false, then the regularities we have observed are colossally coincidental. If true, they are far less coincidental. Therefore the proposition is probably true. If, in fact, vast regularities in progress are likely to continue, this has application to specific cases, such as the possibility that the Sun will rise again. I respond to three objections, which claim that time-restricted laws lessen the coincidence of observed regularities without making it likely that the Sun will rise again, that the "sample" of observed events might be biased, and that a zero prior probability assignment for dependence might be justified. I conclude by discussing the meaning of 'cause'
Axiomatization and representation of difference structures by Stanford University( Book )

in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Seeking explanations : abduction in logic, philosophy of science and artificial intelligence by Atocha Aliseda-Llera( )

1 edition published in 1997 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

The practical demand of means-end rationality by Luis Cheng-Guajardo( )

1 edition published in 2013 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

In this dissertation I provide a vindication of the normative requirement on persons to intend and take means to their ends. One basic intuition that we have is the thought that if a person is not intending or taking the means to an intended end of hers, then she is "irrational". Another basic intuition is that a requirement of rationality cannot be true if it simply entails that a person ought to take means to her ends. The tension between these two thoughts leads to the philosophical problem at the heart of this dissertation. That problem is to account for what we take to be a genuine requirement of "means-end rationality" that makes a normative demand on persons. In Part I, I clarify these intuitions and situate the problem within some appropriate constraints. I take as a backdrop very recent work of philosophers whom I call the "Myth Theorists". I show that the Myth Theorists are best understood as presenting those who accept the prevailing contemporary view of the requirement of means-end rationality with a challenge. I present this challenge in what I call the Argument of Superfluity. I show that the advocate of the prevailing view of the normative requirement of means-end rationality supports a "requirement" that appears to have no explanatory work to do in our attributions of "rationality" and "irrationality". I therefore go on to propose an account that allows us to salvage both of our basic intuitions while also incorporating lessons that we learn from the Myth Theorists. On the account that I offer, our decisions and intentions are significant in altering what it is that we have reason to do. Sometimes, but not always, they can determine what it is that we ought to do. The activity of persons therefore has a special significance on my view. The special significance of a person's intentional action is that it is the expression of a person taking something or other to be at least minimally worth bringing about. On my view, a person thereby has at least a pro tanto reason to intend and take the means that she believes are required to realize her end. I argue that satisfaction of the normative requirement of means-end rationality by a person just is the practical expression of her autonomy. In Part II of the dissertation, I distinguish between different conceptions that we have of "autonomy". I also show how two leading contemporary accounts take the normative requirement of means-end rationality to be grounded in the value of what turn out to be different conceptions of a person's autonomy. I argue that one of these conceptions of a person's "autonomy" does not allow us to resolve our philosophical problem while incorporating the lessons that we learn from the Myth Theorists. My account therefore emphasizes the importance of the form of autonomy that is anchored in our understanding of persons as accountable and responsible for their activity
No power alike : legal realism and legal reality by Matthew Xavier Etchemendy( )

1 edition published in 2016 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

This dissertation explores a new approach to analytic jurisprudence called "legal expressivism." Where much of contemporary analytic jurisprudence focuses on discovering the nature of law (i.e., law's necessary features or some important subset thereof), legal expressivism focuses on developing a naturalistic account of the function of legal discourse and thought. The approach is inspired by metaethical expressivism, which seeks to tell a similar story about moral/ethical discourse and thought, or about normative discourse and thought more generally. And it has a similar motivation: namely that legal claims, like moral claims, do not seem amenable to translation or analysis into naturalistic terms. Although legal expressivism bears a resemblance to important aspects of the jurisprudential theories of H.L.A. Hart and the Scandinavian legal realists, it has only recently been given any sustained attention in contemporary philosophy of law. I thus start by analyzing and critiquing the small existing literature on legal expressivism. I then turn to the task of developing my own legal-expressivist theory (or rather theories). First, I develop a form of legal expressivism based on Allan Gibbard's norm-expressivism. According to this form of legal expressivism, Hartian internal legal statements (or, as I call them, normative legal statements) express acceptance of norms concerning the use of institutional coercive force. Next, I consider the possibility that an even better form of legal expressivism could be had if we moved beyond the confines of Gibbardian norm-expressivism and developed an account of legal discourse's social function and genealogy in the spirit of Huw Price's "global expressivist" project. I argue that this more radical Pricean kind of legal expressivism would still locate the function of legal discourse in its ability to coordinate attitudes (and ultimately behavioral dispositions) concerning the operation of certain institutional structures, notably institutions of social control backed by coercive force. I also consider the bearing legal expressivism might have on certain timeless jurisprudential debates, such as whether and to what extent judges make law, and whether and when there are right answers to "hard" legal cases or questions. I argue that legal expressivism should not (and, in its most plausible forms, will not) resolve such first-order jurisprudential disputes. Just as Gibbard's metaethical expressivism is neutral between, say, utilitarianism and ethical egoism, so too is legal expressivism neutral between the classical position that judges do not make law and the more modern, legal-realist position that judges often make law. That being said, legal expressivism can show us why traditional or classical positions on questions about judicial lawmaking and the existence of right answers to hard cases are consistent with the most plausible form of scientific naturalism. In this respect, its potential effect on first-order jurisprudential questions is analogous to that of contemporary metaethical expressivism on first-order moral questions: it shows us why scientific-naturalist scruples need not influence the side we take on these issues
Jealousy and confidence: an essay on the limits of authority. Volume1 by Patrick Michael Byrne( )

1 edition published in 1996 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Representation and realism in Descartes's meditations by Shawn Burns( )

1 edition published in 2014 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Recent scholarship regarding Descartes's theory of ideas as presented in his Meditations makes a case for regarding Descartes as a direct realist: someone who believes in the existence of extra-mental objects, and who believes our cognitive activity involves the direct apprehension of those objects. On this view, we have direct cognitive access to those objects through ideas, but such ideas are conceived simply as acts, or operations, of the mind, not as mental objects before the mind. This contrasts with a long-standing view of Descartes as a representational realist: someone who believes in the existence of extra-mental objects, and who believes our cognitive activity involves a mediated relationship with those objects. On this view, we have direct cognitive access only to mediating mental objects, called ideas. In this dissertation, I generally defend a representational realist interpretation of Descartes against several direct realist interpretations. I reject John Yolton's sign-signifier, direct realist interpretation, Deborah Brown's Thomistic direct realist view, and John Carriero's quasi-Aristotelian direct realist view. I also reject the view that we ought to interpret Descartes as a direct realist because the concepts involved in his theory of ideas are owed to direct realist, Scholastic predecessors
The making of the kilogram, 1789-1799 by Sally Riordan( )

1 edition published in 2013 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

When France's leading academicians--Lavoisier, Coulomb, Laplace, Condorcet and Lagrange amongst them--set about defining and then implementing a new system of weights and measures in the 1790s, they did so with gusto and pride. Their purpose was not merely to unify the country's weights and measures, but to present to the world a system of measurement that was "perfect", "taken from nature" and "in no way arbitrary". It was deemed necessary to perform fresh scientific experiments, witnessed by international observers, to determine the value of the metre and its off-shoot, the kilogram. The creators of the metric system were anticipating the day when every public measurement, whether for commercial or scientific use, would be made with the new metric measures. The expectation was wild, generated in the fervour of the French Revolution, but it did come true. At the turning of the twenty-first century, the kilogram and the metre are the scientific community's measures of mass and length respectively, and used (even if indirectly) in almost all societal circles. The history of the kilogram has played second fiddle to that of the metre. I chart here how, ten years after the French people called upon its government to deliver a single weight for the entire nation, the first kilogram prototype came to be delivered to its vault. Along the way, I examine experiments that were performed to calibrate the new weight against the old, the metrological ideals that drove the project forward and the craftsmanship with which the first kilogram prototype was fabricated from platinum. My historical research has been guided by philosophical questions. What does it take for a scientific measure to be objective? What is the difference between a calibration and an experiment? Once we know all there it to know about how to measure mass, do we know all there is to know about mass? Without fully addressing questions like these, this thesis provides a commentary relevant to topics in the foundations of measurement: the nature of experimental calibration, the naturalness of scientific measures and the significance of a measure's definition are considered here, but from the perspective of the experimental and technological history of metrology
The philosophical status of diagrams by Mark Greaves( )

1 edition published in 1997 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Objective probability and the art of judgment by Kevin Nelson( )

1 edition published in 2014 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

This dissertation argues that for many purposes, it is often useful to regard probability as objective; and, furthermore, that we can do so without any metaphysically heavyweight commitments. Those claims will be defended within three broad domains: quantum mechanics, classical statistical mechanics, and macroscopic chance events such as coin tosses. It will be explored how taking objective probability as a function of two arguments (i.e., taking it as primitively conditional) contributes to its overall usefulness. Finally, it will be discussed how objective probability can guide our actual degrees of belief. A pluralist picture will be presented in which many variants of Lewis's Principal Principle are all of some use, each with their merits and demerits
The importance of dedication by William Michael Beals( )

1 edition published in 2012 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

In this dissertation I develop a philosophical conception of an extraordinary kind of commitment, what I call "dedication, " that is exhibited in people like religious martyrs, those devoted to secular ideals, and others whose lives revolve around grand personal passions. The motivation for this project is two-fold: one, this kind of commitment is interesting because it is significantly valuable; two, analysis of dedication reveals insights into fundamental areas of ethical thought. I argue that dedication itself is intrinsically, invariably, and significantly valuable in virtue of its intimate relationship to a special and valuable mode of integrity that is disposed to persist in the face of adverse circumstances, what I call "robust" integrity. I argue that integrity is significantly valuable because it is tantamount to a disposition to what I call "self-endorsement, " or happiness with oneself and the way one leads one's life. And, robustness contributes further value to this by providing its bearer with the ground for what I call "self-assurance." This self-assurance brings peace of mind regarding one's future self-endorsement, and satisfaction with the quality of one's current self-endorsement. The general ethical upshots of this investigation are the following. The relation between dedication and robust integrity, a species of metaphysical sufficiency plausibly understood as realization, allows for intrinsic value to be inherited across its lines. Also, all instances of dedication appear to be organic unities, wholes whose value is not necessarily equal to the value of the sum of the parts, which helps to explain possible misevaluation of dedication. And, in the course of investigating whether the value of robust integrity and dedication translates into reasons for action, I uncover a puzzle the most plausible solution of which leads to far reaching consequences for practical reasons generally: particularly, value does not entail a reason for action, reasons for ends are holistic, and the concept of reasons "transmission" from ends to means is inapt, reasons "coordination" is more fitting
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controlled identityStanford University

Departamento de Filosofía de la Universidad Stanford

Faculté de philosophie de Standford

Stanford University. Dept. of Philosophy

философский факультет Стэнфордского университета

English (33)