WorldCat Identities

Greif, Avner 1955-

Overview
Works: 56 works in 127 publications in 4 languages and 1,029 library holdings
Genres: History 
Roles: Author, Editor, Thesis advisor
Classifications: HF395, 381.0902
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works about Avner Greif
 
Most widely held works by Avner Greif
Institutions and the path to the modern economy : lessons from medieval trade by Avner Greif( Book )

30 editions published between 2005 and 2010 in English and Undetermined and held by 594 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

It is widely believed that current disparities in economic, political and social outcomes reflect distinct institutions. Avner Greif presents a multi-disciplinary perspective to study endogenous institutions and their dynamics and to understand why they are influenced by the past
Institutions, innovation, and industrialization : essays in economic history and development( Book )

9 editions published between 2014 and 2015 in English and held by 189 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Risk, Institutions and Growth: Why England and Not China? by Avner Greif( )

3 editions published between 2010 and 2011 in English and German and held by 16 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We analyze the role of risk-sharing institutions in transitions to modern economies. Transitions requires individual-level risk-taking in pursuing productivity-enhancing activities including using and developing new knowledge. Individual-level, idiosyncratic risk implies that distinct risk-sharing institutions - even those providing the same level of insurance - can lead to different growth trajectories if they differently motivate risk-taking. Historically, risk sharing institutions were selected based on their cultural and institutional compatibility and not their unforeseen growth implications. We simulate our growth model incorporating Englands and Chinas distinct pre-modern risk-sharing institutions. The model predicts a transition in England and not China even with equal levels of risk sharing. Under the clan-based Chinese institution, the relatively risk-averse elders had more control over technological choices implying lower risk-taking. Focusing on non-market institutions expands on previous growth-theoretic models to highlight that transitions can transpire even in the absence of exogenous productivity shocks or time-dependent state variables. Recognizing the role of non-market institutions in the growth process bridges the view that transitions are due to luck and the view that transitions are inevitable. Transitions transpire when luck creates the conditions under which economic agents find it beneficial to make the choices leading to positive rates of technological change. Luck came in the form of historical processes leading to risk-sharing institutions whose unintended consequences encouraged productivity-enhancing risk-taking
Cultural and institutional bifurcation : China and Europe compared by Avner Greif( Book )

4 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 13 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

How to sustain cooperation is a key challenge for any society. Different social organizations have evolved in the course of history to cope with this challenge by relying on different combinations of external (formal and informal) enforcement institutions and intrinsic motivation. Some societies rely more on informal enforcement and moral obligations within their constituting groups. Others rely more on formal enforcement and general moral obligations towards society at large. How do culture and institutions interact in generating different evolutionary trajectories of societal organizations? Do contemporary attitudes, institutions and behavior reflect distinct pre-modern trajectories?
Contract enforcement and institutions among the maghribi traders refuting edwards and ogilvie by Avner Greif( Book )

4 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 12 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Edwards and Ogilvie (2008) dispute the empirical basis for the view (Greif, e.g., 1989, 1994, 2006) that multilateral reputation mechanism mitigated agency problems among the eleventh-century Maghribi traders. They assert that the relations among merchants and agents were law-based. This paper refutes this assertion using quantitative and documentary evidence thereby vindicating the position that the legal system had a marginal role in mitigating agency problems in long-distance trade in this historical era.** Edwards and Ogilvie constantly present legal actions in non-trade related legal cases as evidence for a reliance on the legal system for matters pertaining to long-distance trade. Their criticism of Greif's documentary analysis also fails scrutiny. The claim that merchants' relations with their overseas agents were law-based is wrong. This paper is based on quantitative analyses of the corpuses containing the hundreds of documents on which the literature relies and a careful review of the documents and the literature Edwards and Ogilvie cite. Their assertion is shown to be based on unrepresentative and irrelevant examples, an inaccurate description of the literature, and a consistent misreading of the few sources they consulted. In particular, their examples for the use of the court are mainly taken from mandatory legal procedures associated with sorting out the assets and liabilities of deceased traders' estates. Such examples do not support the claim that agency relations were law-based. The quantitative analysis reveals that empirical basis for the multilateral reputation view is stronger than originally perceived. This paper also sheds light on the roles of the legal system and reputation mechanism during this period
The clan and the city : sustaining cooperation in China and Europe by Avner Greif( Book )

6 editions published in 2012 in English and held by 11 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Over the last millennium, the clan and the city have been the locus of cooperation in China and Europe respectively. This paper examines - analytically, historically, and empirically - the cultural, social, and institutional co-evolution that led to this bifurcation. We highlight that groups with which individuals identify are basic units of cooperation. Such groups impact institutional development because intra-group moral commitment reduces enforcement cost implying a comparative advantage in pursuing collective actions. Moral groups perpetuate due to positive feedbacks between morality, institutions, and the implied pattern of cooperation
Da lie bian : zhong shi ji mao yi zhi du bi jiao he xi fang de xing qi by Avner Greif( Book )

1 edition published in 2008 in Chinese and held by 11 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The merchant gild as a nexus of contracts by Avner Greif( Book )

2 editions published in 1990 in English and held by 11 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Analytic narratives by Robert H Bates( Book )

3 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 10 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

How can social scientists draw broad, applicable principles of political order from specific historical examples? In this volume, five senior scholars offer a methodological response to this question. The result is both a methodological manifesto and an applied handbook
The organization of long-distance trade : reputation and coalitions in the Geniza documents and Genoa during the eleventh and the twelfth centuries by Avner Greif( )

4 editions published between 1989 and 1996 in English and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Organizing violence by Bob Bates( Book )

3 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Contract enforcement institutions : historical perspective and current status in Russia by Avner Greif( Book )

3 editions published in 1993 in English and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Informal contract enforcement : lessons from medieval trade by Avner Greif( Book )

2 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Economic history and game theory by Avner Greif( )

2 editions published in 2002 in Undetermined and English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The clan and the corporation sustaining cooperation in China and Europe by Avner Greif( )

1 edition published in 2015 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Over the last millennium, the clan and the corporation have been the loci of cooperation in China and Europe respectively. This paper examines - analytically and historically - the cultural and institutional co-evolution that led to this bifurcation. We highlight that groups with which individuals identify are basic units of cooperation. Such loyalty groups influence institutional development because intra-group moral commitment reduces enforcement cost implying a comparative advantage in pursuing collective actions. Loyalty groups perpetuate due to positive feedbacks between morality, institutions, and the implied pattern of cooperation
Hikaku rekishi seido bunseki by Avner Greif( Book )

2 editions published in 2009 in Japanese and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The rents from trade and coercive institutions removing the sugar coating by Christian Dippel( Book )

5 editions published in 2015 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The 19th century collapse of world sugar prices should have depressed wages in the British West Indies sugar colonies. It did not. We explain this by showing how lower prices weakened the power of the white planter elite and thus led to an easing of the coercive institutions that depressed wages e.g., institutions that kept land out of the hands of peasants. Using unique data for 14 British West Indies sugar colonies from 1838 to 1913, we examine the impact of the collapse of sugar prices on wages and incarceration rates. We find that in colonies that were poorly suited for sugar cane cultivation (an exogenous colony characteristic), the planter elite declined in power and the institutions they created and supported became less coercive. As a result, wages rose by 20% and incarceration rates per capita were cut in half. In contrast, in colonies that were highly suited for sugar cane there was little change in the power of the planter elite -- as a result, institutions did not change, the market-based mechanisms of standard trade theory were salient, and wages fell by 24%. In short, movements in the terms of trade induced changes in coercive institutions, changes that are central for understanding how the terms of trade affects wages
Contract enforcement and institutions among the Maghribi traders : refuting Edwards and Ogilvie( )

1 edition published in 2008 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Edwards and Ogilvie (2008) dispute the empirical basis for the view (Greif, e.g., 1989, 1994, 2006) that multilateral reputation mechanism mitigated agency problems among the eleventh-century Maghribi traders. They assert that the relations among merchants and agents were law-based. This paper refutes this assertion using quantitative and documentary evidence thereby vindicating the position that the legal system had a marginal role in mitigating agency problems in long-distance trade in this historical era.** Edwards and Ogilvie constantly present legal actions in non-trade related legal cases as evidence for a reliance on the legal system for matters pertaining to long-distance trade. Their criticism of Greif's documentary analysis also fails scrutiny. The claim that merchants' relations with their overseas agents were law-based is wrong. This paper is based on quantitative analyses of the corpuses containing the hundreds of documents on which the literature relies and a careful review of the documents and the literature Edwards and Ogilvie cite. Their assertion is shown to be based on unrepresentative and irrelevant examples, an inaccurate description of the literature, and a consistent misreading of the few sources they consulted. In particular, their examples for the use of the court are mainly taken from mandatory legal procedures associated with sorting out the assets and liabilities of deceased traders' estates. Such examples do not support the claim that agency relations were law-based. The quantitative analysis reveals that empirical basis for the multilateral reputation view is stronger than originally perceived. This paper also sheds light on the roles of the legal system and reputation mechanism during this period
The lender's curse : a new look at the origin and persistence of interest bans in Islam and Christianity by Jared Rubin( Book )

1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

 
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Institutions and the path to the modern economy : lessons from medieval trade
Alternative Names
Avner Greif Amerikaans econoom

Greif, A. 1955-

Грейф, Авнер

アブナー・グライフ

グライフ, アブナー

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Analytic narratives