WorldCat Identities

Gächter, Simon

Works: 129 works in 281 publications in 2 languages and 660 library holdings
Roles: Author, Thesis advisor, Creator, Honoree
Classifications: HD58.6, 330
Publication Timeline
Most widely held works by Simon Gächter
Moral property rights in bargaining by Simon Gächter( Book )

8 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 25 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In many business transactions, in labor-management relations, in international conflicts, and welfare state reforms claims acquired in the past seem to create strong entitlements that shape current negotiations. Despite their importance, the role of entitlements in negotiations has not received much attention. We fill the gap by designing an experiment that allows us to measure the entitlements and to track them through the whole negotiation process. We find strong entitlement effects that shape opening offers, bargaining duration, concessions and reached (dis-)agreements. We argue that entitlements constitute a "moral property right" that is influential independent of negotiators' legal property rights
Living in two neighborhoods : social interactions in the lab : presented at Area Conference on Employment and Social Protection, May 2003 by Armin Falk( Book )

10 editions published between 2003 and 2009 in English and held by 23 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Field evidence suggests that agents belonging to the same group tend to behave similarly, i.e., behavior exhibits social interaction effects. Testing for such effects raises severe identification problems. We conduct an experiment that avoids these problems. The main design feature is that each subject simultaneously is a member of two randomly assigned and economically identical groups where only members ('neighbors') are different. In both groups subjects make contribution decisions to a public good. We speak of social interactions if the same subject at the same time makes group-specific contributions that depend on their respective neighbors' contribution. Our results are unambiguous evidence for social interactions. A majority of subjects is very strongly influenced by the contributions of their respective neighbors. Roughly ten percent exhibit no social interactions
Peer Effects and Social Preferences in Voluntary Cooperation by Christian Thöni( )

9 editions published between 2011 and 2014 in English and German and held by 22 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Substantial evidence suggests the behavioral relevance of social preferences and also the importance of social influence effects ("peer effects"). Yet, little is known about how peer effects and social preferences are related. In a three-person gift-exchange experiment we find causal evidence for peer effects in voluntary cooperation: agents' efforts are positively related despite the absence of material payoff interdependencies. We confront this result with major theories of social preferences which predict that efforts are unrelated, or negatively related. Some theories allow for positively-related efforts but cannot explain most observations. Conformism, norm following and considerations of social esteem are candidate explanations. -- social preferences ; voluntary cooperation ; peer effects ; reflection problem ; gift-exchange ; conformism ; social norms ; social esteem
Reputation or reciprocity? an experimental investigation by Simon Gächter( Book )

7 editions published between 1999 and 2001 in English and held by 22 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Recent evidence highlights the importance of social norms in many economic relations. However, many of these relationships are long-term and provide repeated game incentives for performance. We experimentally investigate interaction effects of reciprocity and repeated game incentives in two treatments (one-shot and repeated) of a gift-exchange game. In both treatments we observe reciprocity, which is strengthened in the repeated game. A detailed analysis shows that in the repeated game some subjects imitate reciprocity. Thus, reciprocity and repeated game incentives reinforce each other. Observed behaviour is robust against experience. We conclude that a long-term interaction is a reciprocity-compatible contract enforcement device
Social comparison and performance: experimental evidence on the fair wage-effort hypothesis by Simon Gächter( )

5 editions published between 2009 and 2010 in English and German and held by 20 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We investigate the impact of wage comparisons for worker productivity. We present three studies which all use three-person gift-exchange experiments. Consistent with Akerlof and Yellen's (1990) fair wage-effort hypothesis we find that disadvantageous wage discrimination leads to lower efforts while advantageous wage discrimination does not increase efforts on average. Two studies allow us to measure wage comparison effects at the individual level. We observe strongly heterogeneous wage comparison effects. We also find that reactions to wage discrimination can be attributed to the underlying intentions of discrimination rather than to payoff consequences -- Fair wage-effort hypothesis ; wage comparison ; gift exchange ; horizontal fairness ; discrimination
Fairness and retaliation : the economics of reciprocity by Ernst Fehr( Book )

7 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 19 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper shows that reciprocity has powerful implications for many economic domains. It is an important determinant in the enforcement of contracts and social norms and enhances the possibilities of collective action greatly. Reciprocity may render the provision of explicit incentive inefficient because the incentives may crowd out voluntary co-operation. It strongly limits the effects to competition in markets with incomplete contracts and gives rise to noncompetitive wage differences. Finally, reciprocity it is also a strong force contributing to the existence of incomplete contracts
Who makes a good leader? social preferences and leading by example( )

3 editions published in 2008 in English and Undetermined and held by 18 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We examine the effects of social preferences and beliefs about the social preferences of others in a simple leader-follower voluntary contributions game. We find that groups perform best when led by those who are reciprocally oriented. Part of the effect can be explained by a false consensus effect: selfish players tend to think it more likely that they are matched with another selfish player and reciprocators tend to think it more likely that they are matched with another reciprocator. Thus, reciprocators contribute more as leaders partly because they are more optimistic than selfish players about the reciprocal responses of followers. However, even after controlling for beliefs we find that reciprocally-oriented leaders contribute more than selfish leaders. Thus, we conclude that differing leader contributions by differing types of leader must in large part reflect social motivations. -- Reciprocity ; Contribution preferences ; Leadership ; Leading-by-Example ; False consensus effect
Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments by Ernst Fehr( Book )

9 editions published between 1999 and 2000 in English and held by 17 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper provides evidence that free riders are heavily punished even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher. The more free riders negatively deviate from the group standard the more they are punished. As a consequence, the existence of an opportunity for costly punishment causes a large increase in cooperation levels because potential free riders face a credible threat. We show, in particular, that in the presence of a costly punishment opportunity almost complete cooperation can be achieved and maintained although, under the standard assumptions of rationality and selfishness, there should be no cooperation at all. We also show that free riding causes strong negative emotions among cooperators. The intensity of these emotions is the stronger the more the free riders deviate from the group standard. Our results provide, therefore, support for the hypothesis that emotions are guarantors of credible threats
Individual level loss aversion in riskless and risky choices by Simon Gächter( )

3 editions published between 2007 and 2010 in English and held by 17 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Loss aversion can occur in riskless and risky choices. Yet, there is no evidence whether people who are loss averse in riskless choices are also loss averse in risky choices. We measure individual-level loss aversion in riskless choices in an endowment effect experiment by eliciting both WTA and WTP from each of our 360 subjects (randomly selected customers of a car manufacturer). All subjects also participate in a simple lottery choice task which arguably measures loss aversion in risky choices. We find substantial heterogeneity in both measures of loss aversion. Loss aversion in the riskless choice task and loss aversion in the risky choice task are highly significantly and strongly positively correlated. We find that in both choice tasks loss aversion increases in age, income, and wealth, and decreases in education. -- Loss aversion ; endowment effect ; field experiments
The impact of social comparisons on reciprocity by Simon Gächter( )

3 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 17 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We investigate the effects of pay comparison information (i.e. information about what co-workers earn) and effort comparison information (information about how co-workers perform) in experimental firms composed of one employer and two employees. Exposure to pay comparison information in isolation from effort comparison information does not appear to affect reciprocity toward employers: in this case own wage is a powerful determinant of own effort, but co-worker wages have no effect. By contrast, we find that exposure to both pieces of social information systematically influences employees' reciprocity. A generous wage offer is virtually ineffective if an employee is matched with a lazy co-worker who is also paid generously: in such circumstances the employee tends to expend low effort irrespective of her own wage. Reciprocity is more pronounced when the co-worker is hard-working, as effort is strongly and positively related to own wage in this case. Reciprocity is also pronounced when the employer pays unequal wages to the employees: in this case the co-worker's effort decision is disregarded and effort decisions are again strongly and positively related to own wage. On average exposure to social information weakens reciprocity, though we find substantial heterogeneity in responses across individuals, and find that sometimes social information has beneficial effects. We suggest that group composition may be an important tool for harnessing the positive effects of social comparison processes. -- Reciprocity ; gift-exchange ; social information ; social comparisons ; pay comparisons ; peer effects
Culture and cooperation by Simon Gächter( Book )

7 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 15 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Does the cultural background influence the success with which genetically unrelated individuals cooperate in social dilemma situations? In this paper we provide an answer by analyzing the data of Herrmann et al. (Science 2008, pp. 1362-1367), who study cooperation and punishment in sixteen subject pools from six different world cultures (as classified by Inglehart & Baker (American Sociological Review 2000, pp. 19-51)). We use analysis of variance to disentangle the importance of cultural background relative to individual heterogeneity and group-level differences in cooperation. We find that culture has a substantial influence on the extent of cooperation, in addition to individual heterogeneity and group-level differences identified by previous research. The significance of this result is that cultural background has a substantial influence on cooperation in otherwise identical environments. This is particularly true in the presence of punishment opportunities. -- human cooperation ; punishment ; culture ; experimental public good games
Social preferences, beliefs and the dynamics of free riding in public good experiments by Urs Fischbacher( Book )

6 editions published between 2008 and 2009 in English and held by 15 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

One lingering puzzle is why voluntary contributions to public goods decline over time in experimental and real-world settings. We show that the decline of cooperation is driven by individual preferences for imperfect conditional cooperation. Many people's desire to contribute less than others, rather than changing beliefs of what others will contribute over time or people's heterogeneity in preferences makes voluntary cooperation fragile. Universal free riding thus eventually emerges, despite the fact that most people are not selfish. -- Public goods experiments ; social preferences ; conditional cooperation ; free riding
Behavioural economics : from homo economicus to homo sapiens by Simon Gächter( Book )

6 editions published between 2009 and 2012 in English and held by 12 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Do incentive contracts crowd out voluntary cooperation? by Ernst Fehr( Book )

4 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 11 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Human pro-social motivation and the maintenance of social order by Simon Gächter( Book )

6 editions published in 2014 in English and held by 10 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This chapter presents some insights from basic behavioural research on the role of human pro-social motivation to maintain social order. I argue that social order can be conceptualized as a public good game. Past attempts to explain social order typically relied on the assumption of selfish and rational agents ("homo economicus"). The last twenty years of research in behavioural and experimental economics have challenged this view. After presenting the most important findings of recent research on human pro-sociality I discuss the evidence on three pillars of the maintenance of social order. The first pillar is internalized norms of cooperation, sustained by emotions such as guilt and shame. The second pillar is the behaviour of other people who typically are "conditional cooperators" willing to cooperate if others do so as well. This motivation can sustain cooperation if enough people cooperate but can jeopardise social order if many others follow selfish inclinations. The third pillar are sanctions meted out to anyone who does not cooperate; ideally punishment can work as a mere threat without being executed much. The chapter also presents some evidence on the cross-cultural variability of some findings, in particular with regard to punishment behaviour. The chapter concludes with remarks on future research
Sequential versus simultaneous contributions to public goods experimental evidence by Simon Gächter( Book )

4 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 10 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting (Varian, Journal of Public Economics, 1994). Our findings support the theoretical argument that sequential contributions result in lower overall provision than simultaneous contributions. However, the distribution of contributions is not as predicted: late contributors are sometimes willing to punish early low contributors by contributing less than their best response. This induces early contributors to contribute more than they otherwise would. A consequence of this is that we fail to observe a predicted first mover advantage
Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment by Vital Anderhub( Book )

8 editions published between 1999 and 2001 in English and German and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Modern 'principal-agent theory' has made a lot of progress in proposing theoretical Solutions to agency problems. This paper contributes to a better understanding of behavior in agency situations. In particular, we provide experimental evidence on offered contracts and effort choices in a simple agency game. In line with principal-agent theory we find that in our experiments many contracts proposed by principals are 'incentive compatible' and most agents behave optimally given the terms of the contract. However, in contrast with economic predictions, we find that agents (i) reject 'unfair contracts' and that (ii) given acceptance, their effort choices are to some extent driven by reciprocity. It seems that contract design has to regard an equity constraint that has so far been neglected by contract theory. In fact, most contract offers observed in the experiment aim at fair surplus sharing. -- principal-agent theory ; contract theory ; fair sharing ; incentive contracts ; reciprocity ; experiments
Reputation and reciprocity : consequences for labour relations by Armin Falk( Book )

4 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Leaders as role models for the voluntary provision of public goods by Simon Gächter( Book )

6 editions published in 2014 in English and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We investigate the link between leadership, beliefs and pro-social behavior. This link is interesting because field evidence suggests that people's behavior in domains like charitable giving, tax evasion, corporate culture and corruption is influenced by leaders (CEOs, politicians) and beliefs about others' behavior. Our framework is an experimental public goods game with a leader. We find that leaders strongly shape their followers' initial beliefs and contributions. In later rounds, followers put more weight on other followers' past behavior than on the leader's current action. This creates a path dependency the leader can hardly correct. We discuss the implications for understanding belief effects in naturally occurring situations
The roles of incentives and voluntary cooperation for contractual compliance by Simon Gächter( )

4 editions published in 2011 in English and German and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Efficiency under contractual incompleteness often requires voluntary cooperation in situations where self-regarding incentives for contractual compliance are present as well. Here we provide a comprehensive experimental analysis based on the gift-exchange game of how explicit and implicit incentives affect cooperation. We first show that there is substantial cooperation under non-incentive compatible contracts. Incentive-compatible contracts induce best-reply effort and crowd out any voluntary cooperation. Further experiments show that this result is robust to two important variables: experiencing Trust contracts without any incentives and implicit incentives coming from repeated interaction. Implicit incentives have a strong positive effect on effort only under non-incentive compatible contracts. -- principal-agent games ; gift-exchange experiments ; incomplete contracts ; explicit incentives ; implicit incentives ; repeated games ; separability ; experiments
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Alternative Names
Gächter, S. 1965-

Gaechter, Simon 1965-

Gähter, Simon 1965-

Simon Gächter austerriksk økonom

Simon Gächter Austrian economist

Simon Gächter econoom uit Oostenrijk

Simon Gächter österrikisk ekonom

Simon Gächter østerriksk økonom

Simon Gächter østrigsk økonom

Гэхтер, Симон

English (114)

German (4)