NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC CENTER FOR COUNTERPROLIFERATION RESEARCH

Overview

Works:	62 works in 62 publications in 1 language and 64 library holdings

Publication Timeline

1990 |

|2010

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Publications about NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC CENTER FOR COUNTERPROLIFERATION RESEARCH

Publications by NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC CENTER FOR COUNTERPROLIFERATION RESEARCH

Most widely held works by NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC CENTER FOR COUNTERPROLIFERATION RESEARCH

Recovering and Accounting for Prisoners of War and Missing Personnel ( Book )
1 edition published in 2002 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
The United States expends great effort to account for members of the Armed Forces who were lost while serving the Nation. No other country has done as much. The Department of Defense is responsible for personnel recovery and accounting. Today, the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) develops and oversees national policies that facilitate this overall endeavor. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, various commissions pursued information on the fate of missing service members. In 1991, the Senate established the Select Committee on Prisoner of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) Affairs, which thoroughly investigated the issue, including government attempts to resolve it. One committee recommended a single DoD office to oversee all matters relating to captive and missing Americans. DPMO was initiated by DoD Directive 5110.10 on July 16, 1993, under the authority of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. This achieved centralized management of POW/MIA affairs within DoD. DPMO provides departmental participation in negotiations with foreign governments to achieve maximum accounting of missing service members; assembles and analyzes information and maintains data bases on military and civilian personnel who are, or were, prisoners of war or missing in action; declassifies documents for disclosure and release according to public law and executive orders; and maintains channels of communication among Pentagon officials, members of Congress, POW/MIA families, and veterans organizations. DPMO's operational partners include the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Joint Task Force-Full Accounting activity, U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, Armed Forces Repository of Specimen Samples for the Identification of Remains, and Service casualty offices. These partners help DPMO with four broad activities: investigation, recovery, identification, and notification. (5 photographs).

The Second Revolution ( Book )
1 edition published in 1997 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
A paradox is emerging as the revolution in military affairs (RMA) moves ahead: the larger the magnitude of the revolution, the greater the possible long-term advantage to a potential enemy. Why? The answer lies in the second revolution. The system of systems--a complete architecture of detection, selection, display, targeting, and attack--will revolutionize war. Related; advances information warfare will complement and enhance the progress made in the first revolution. We will adjust and integrate these developments with new organizations, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures, many of which will be integrated into the Armed Forces by early in the next century, and other industrialized nations will gradually follow suit. Indeed, some components are already entering service, and others are being aggressively purchased, programmed and researched. Both doctrine and operational concepts are undergoing study and change. Joint Vision 2010 makes it clear the we are on the leading edge of this first revolution, evolving the military for a "challenging and uncertain future." We are moving into the first revolution.

The Impact of NBC Proliferation on Doctrine and Operations ( Book )
1 edition published in 1996 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
NBC proliferation is recognized as a serious threat across the operational spectrum--from the deployment of forces to post-hostility activities. References to NBC frequently aggregated under the rubric of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) appear often in policy and capstone statements such as the national military strategy and Joint Vision 2010. At present NBC is also mentioned in service doctrine (for example Army Field Manual 100-5 and Air Force Manual 1-1) as well as in more technical manuals on detection decontamination individual protection and biological warfare/chemical warfare (BW/CW) shipboard defense.

Transforming Reserve Forces (Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 36) ( Book )
1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) is the principal policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all matters relating to the Reserve components and provides independent and timely advice and recommendations on the challenges they face. The Secretary has asked the board to support transformation, rebalance and strengthen the Reserve components, and assist the Reserve in reconnecting with America. The board usually meets quarterly and reports annual to Congress. It consists of 24 members including the Chairman, the Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs of each military department, and flag and general officers from active and Reserve forces and the Coast Guard. The regular officers are designated by their respective service Secretaries, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff names the military executive, and the Secretary of Defense designates the Reserve officers. Congress has repeatedly stated its duties that the board act independently in its advisory and reporting roles--a position steadfastly maintained and more important than ever due to increased reliance on Reserve forces and mobilizations in support of the war on terrorism.

Seapower and the Reserve Components (Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 36) ( Book )
1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
New York City metropolitan area to support relief and emergency rescue operations at the site of the World Trade Center. Within days, more than 1,100 bolstered the ranks of active duty personnel engaged in security operations at ports and along waterways around the United States. Each of the seven After the United States was attacked on 9/11, Coast Guard, Navy, and Marine Reservists did not wait for President George Bush's mobilization proclamation of September 14, 2001 to spring into action. Within minutes, Coast Guard Reservists reported to their active duty units in the tri-state New York City metropolitan area to support relief and emergency rescue operations at the site of the World Trade Center. Within days more than 1,100 bolstered the ranks of active duty personnel engaged in security operations at ports and along waterways around the United States.

At the Crossroads: Counterproliferation and National Security Strategy ( Book )
1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
The continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) represents the most serious threat to U.S. national security and an enormous challenge for the entire international community. In the hands of rogue states, failing states, or substate terrorist groups, these weapons threaten not only U.S. forces, friends, and allies abroad, but also the U.S. homeland. Rogue states armed with WMD threaten the security of regions that are vital to the United States and raise the costs and risks of U.S. military operations intended to protect those interests. Forming international coalitions to defend shared interests is also more difficult in the shadow of the rogue state WMD threat. WMD in the hands of regional rivals exacerbate long-standing conflicts and increase the potential for escalation and conflict. Finally, terrorist interest in WMD and the threat of terrorist use of such weapons appear to be growing.

Jointness Begins at Home - Responding to Domestic Incidents ( Book )
1 edition published in 1999 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Floods in the Midwest, hurricanes in Florida, and oil spills along the coast of Rhode Island are recent catastrophic natural phenomena that have made headline news. Each one has involved responses by the Armed Forces, who are increasingly being asked to operate in domestic contingencies. This involves working alongside governmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and other private groups. With the Cold War over, there is a growing realization that national security is underpinned by more than military strength and is influenced by factors other than warfare. It can suffer when the economy is disrupted, social fabric is strained, or the international environment is threatened. Absent a superpower threat, the Armed Forces have turned to other roles, and with mixed results have participated in peace operations, drug interdiction, and disaster relief. This has sometimes led to activities within our own borders. Yet little attention has been given to the unique roles the military can play in domestic security threats or the demands confronting joint forces in this arena. This article reviews standard joint staff organization and proposes the use of another standard model for managing domestic events: the Incident Command System (ICS). Developed during the 1970s to coordinate firefighting in California, ICS has been adapted to a wide range of contingencies. ICS is built in modular fashion so that responders can create large or small organizations, and can flex and reorganize during a crisis. A comparison of domestic incidents illustrates the challenges that confront joint forces and the value of ICS in organizing the response. Both events involved oil spills resulting from vessel groundings off the coast of Rhode Island: the tank vessel World Prodigy in June 1989 and the tank barge North Cape in January 1996. A Coast Guard officer led each response, but ICS was only used in response to the second oil spill. These case studies are described and compared.

Interagency Cooperation: PDD 56 and Complex Contingency Operations ( Book )
1 edition published in 2000 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, "Managing Complex Contingency Operations," mandates reform in the joint/interagency coordination process. It recognizes that the United States will continue to conduct complex contingency operations (CCOs). Greater coordination is required to appropriately bring all instruments of national power to bear on all such operations. Those who have served in these operations can attest to the friction and failure caused by poor planning and the lack of interagency coordination. Although PDD 56 takes a significant step toward incorporating planning mechanisms to achieve unity of effort, the program is in its infancy and in some aspects falls short of the President's intent. Following the Cold War the internal collapse of weak nations often unleashed destabilizing forces with the potential to spread to neighboring states. Refugee movements, ethnic and political unrest, organized crime, and other crises (i.e., disease, famine, and human rights abuses) occurred with such an intensity and frequency that the United States was unprepared to handle them. As a result, the country developed a different approach. President Clinton directed an interagency review of peacekeeping policies, programs, and procedures to establish a comprehensive policy framework to address post-Cold War realities. Completed in 1994, the review led to the issuance of PDD 25 on the reform of multilateral peace operations. PDD 25 established instructions for peace operations and focused attention on the need for improved dialog and decision making among governmental agencies. It laid the basis for PDD 56, which institutionalized policies and procedures on managing complex crises. This article argues that the crises in Serbia, Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo provide compelling arguments for expanding PDD 56 to include combat operations. PDD 56 should be expanded to govern interagency coordination for combat as well as peace operations. (5 photographs).

Landpower and Future Strategy: Insights from the Army after Next ( Book )
1 edition published in 1999 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
In an era of tight budgets, long-range investment decisions call for careful determination of future strategic requirements. This process, in turn, requires identifying the kinds of tasks the Armed Forces will conduct tomorrow. The Army after Next (AAN) project was launched in 1996 to examine the nature of such tasks, particularly with respect to landpower. AAN is focused on the years 2020 to 2025. Research and wargaming for this project have produced valuable insights into the nature of future strategic requirements, which indicates that landpower will be vital in both peacetime and war. AAN foresees a rapidly changing environment in which the United States remains engaged internationally and retains its leadership in multinational defense arrangements and in promoting democratic values, free markets, and human rights. Although the multipolar security system will endure, the future will be characterized by shifting power relationships and ad hoc security structures, as opposed to stable alliances. Current sources of conflict -- ethnic rivalry, nationalism, religious antagonism, and competition for resources -- may intensify as world population increases. Threats such as transnational crime, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking also may grow. AAN also posits the ascendancy of one or more major military competitors -- modernized states that threaten the interests of the United States and its allies in a specific region. Such a dynamic geopolitical context is likely to mean that the Armed Forces will have to execute a range of missions almost everywhere in the world. Future strategic requirements are as follows: maintain and shape the peace through stability and support operations; build coalitions and alliances to respond to regional crises and contain conflict; and wage decisive campaigns to limit collateral damage and achieve durable peace. (8 photographs).

The Evolution of Peace Operations Doctrine ( Book )
1 edition published in 2002 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Transforming Kosovo is a multifaceted challenge requiring a comprehensive and incremental response. Political, security, legal, and economic issues must be addressed as a coordinated whole to ensure a durable peace. Thus, the military contribution must be integrated within the overall framework. Lessons can be drawn from both existing doctrine and previous operations, particularly from successful counterinsurgency efforts. Capable warfighting forces must operate among the people, using the guidelines provided by maneuverist doctrine and adapted to local conditions to enable the military, in cooperation with the police, to find (locate), fix (control or shape), and then strike at the sources of the security problem. The following analysis centers on approaches adopted after the 1999 Kosovo intervention and includes relevant experiences. Its intent is to combine historical and contemporary approaches, offer lessons, and demonstrate that the military community has already gone beyond current doctrinal guidelines in some areas. It concludes by calling for new doctrine to prepare forces for operations similar to the Kosovo conflict in a complex multinational environment. The aim is to ensure that tactical activity by deployed forces leads to a meaningful strategic result. (6 photographs).

Storm over the Desert: A New Assessment ( Book )
1 edition published in 2001 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Even before the first bomb fell, some observers believed the air campaign held the promise of winning the Persian Gulf War. But overall there was rampant uncertainty over whether air power could assure the outcome without a major ground offensive that might entail a notable loss of life. Computer models using traditional assumptions about attrition warfare predicted allied casualties in the thousands. The final authorizing order from the President to the Commander in Chief, Central Command, acknowledged that losses could reach 10 percent of fielded coalition ground forces. Despite such concerns, the consequences of initial air operations on shaping the war could not be denied. Opening attacks against command and control facilities and integrated air defenses proved uniformly successful, with some 800 combat sorties launched at night under radio silence against important targets. Only one coalition aircraft was lost, a Navy F/A-18, presumably to an infrared missile from a MiG-25. Over the next three days, the air campaign systematically struck targets on the strategic and operational levels, gaining unchallenged control of the air and freedom to operate with near impunity against enemy airfields, ground forces, and other assets. When a cease-fire was declared five weeks later, most observers acknowledged the roles of all elements of the coalition, albeit with interpretations largely drawn along service lines. However, the prevailing view was that Desert Storm was the apotheosis of air power. The only question that remained was whether the conflict pointed to the predominance of air power in future wars and thus to a need for a new way of viewing military operations. This article provides a new assessment of the use of air power in the Persian Gulf War. (6 photographs).

JLASS: Educating Future Leaders in Strategic and Operational Art ( Book )
1 edition published in 1996 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
The joint land, aerospace, and sea simulation (JLASS) is the preeminent joint educational exercise structured to support wargaming at the senior colleges. It generally concludes advanced studies electives on strategic and operational art. The exercise is unique in that both red and blue teams win. This can only be accomplished through cooperation among faculty and staff members. JLASS is also the only exercise that explores service capabilities in a learning environment, which not only allows but actually encourages risk-taking. Students thus think in a nonthreatening situation, learn to ask the right questions, explore military options in support of political objectives, and experiment by employing innovative teaching tools at a pivotal time in their careers. Warriors who fought in the Persian Gulf, regardless of component, attributed much of their success to training at Red Flag, Blue Flag, Twentynine Palms, and the National Training Center. But such training is costly because it requires deployment of a large number of personnel as well as considerable material over great distances. It also consumes sustainment and maintenance stocks. Congress is heeding the popular call to focus on domestic issues and balance the budget. Cuts have been made across the board, leaving much of the government to provide the same output with reduced resources. This has required the services to make hard decisions on weapon systems and readiness that are felt by unified commands: CINCs must train with fewer resources each day. It therefore becomes more vital for senior colleges to find ways to educate officers in strategic and operational art and science. Part of this need can be met through wargaming. (3 figures).

Fighting Terrorism, Avoiding War: The Indo-Pakistan Situation ( Book )
1 edition published in 2002 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
After languishing for five decades as a region of only marginal importance to the United States, South Asia became a major area of interest for U.S. defense planners after 9/11. The cause of this turnabout was a need for cooperation with India and Pakistan during Operation Enduring Freedom. But several subsequent developments, some quite disturbing, ensure that South Asia will remain critical for years to come. They include the presence of the Taliban and al Qaeda militants in Pakistan and possibly Kashmir, anti-American and anti-national terrorism in both nations, turmoil in the disputed state of Kashmir, and a potential for nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. On a more positive note, Washington has improved its political and military relationships with New Delhi and Islamabad, which has raised expectations. Because of rivalry between India and Pakistan, which began with their independence from Britain in 1947, the United States has never been able to maintain close relations with both nations simultaneously. India drifted between nonalignment and an outright alliance with the Soviet Union, while Pakistan was a staunch American ally in the fight against communist expansion. When the United moved closer to India after the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962, and again during the 1990s following the breakup of the Soviet empire, its relations with Pakistan waned. Today the challenge is translating increased influence in both New Delhi and Islamabad into tangible results in the war on terrorism, stabilizing Indo-Pakistani competition, and promoting other American interests throughout the region. This article discusses Operation Enduring Freedom and its effect on Pakistani-American relations, Indo-American cooperation after 9/11, terrorism in South Asia, military tension between India and Pakistan, and the danger of nuclear war between the two countries. (2 tables, 1 map, 6 photographs).

Which Way to the Future ( Book )
1 edition published in 1999 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
The Armed Forces are at a crossroads. There has been vigorous debate since the Cold War over the nature of future war. This article identifies four major positions in that debate and argues that each represents not only a possible future, but a likely one. The sign at the crossroads points in four directions and the future lies each way. No wonder the controversy seems inconclusive. Debates on future wars and other military operations are usually set against the inherited (or legacy) image of war. Proponents of various persuasions argue that a particular scenario portends the future. They usually contend with conservatives who they cast as unwilling to change rapidly enough to prepare for their view of the future. The argument is about which future to prepare for. The argument that there is only one likely future leads to premature closure and narrowing of options as force planners and doctrinal scribes sense the pressure to translate hazy guesses into concrete designs. Accordingly, this article argues that one should recognize that multiple futures are possible and likely to occur simultaneously. Moreover, the future will not be one-dimensional, but rather multidimensional. How should we prepare for these multiple futures? The four positions on the future currently being debated in defense circles can be identified as systemic war, cyber war, peace war, and dirty war. To them must be added the legacy position, or mechanical war. Mechanical war characterizes the recent past of the Armed Forces. It conceives of war as a clash of massed and tactical air, with deep strikes to weaken enemy will, along the lines of Operation Desert Storm. The four images of war are described and then plotted along two dimensions: high/low technology and hard/soft power. The goal should not be to create a military after next, but rather four militaries after next, corresponding to four visible futures. (2 figures, 8 photographs).

Missile Defense Attack Operations (Joint Force Quartery, Winter 2000-2001) ( Book )
1 edition published in 2001 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Joint doctrine maintains that theater missile defense (TMD) is a joint mission, but in fact it is just another common mission pursued separately by the services. Joint Pub 3- 01.5, Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense, often invokes the term integrate. Although the services are making progress in vertical integration on all levels, little has been done to harmonize efforts horizontally. Service agencies responsible for TMD illustrate this divergence. Some numbered air forces have cells dedicated to attack, passive defense, and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence operations, while the Navy contributes to attack operations with its air assets and could conduct active defense with Aegis systems. The Army operational lead for TMD is 32d Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC), which executes elements: attack operations, active defense, passive defense, and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence. In sum the services have formidable capabilities, but they usually work in spite of each other rather than with each other. There is a better alternative. Recent efforts to improve attack operations in Korea reveal the problems and potential for enhancing theater missile defense operations.

Supplying War: Interservice and Interallied Cooperation in China-Burma-India (Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1996) ( Book )
1 edition published in 1996 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
The China-Burma-India (CBI) theater, perhaps the most political front in World War II, has been largely ignored by students of military history. One reason for this inattention is the bitter interservice as well as interallied friction that nearly led to a collapse of cooperation between Great Britain and the United States in the southeast Asian theater of operations. The squabbles were over the best strategy for defeating Japan, the command and control of forces and resources in theater, postwar decolonization, and U.S. policy toward China. Finally, CBI was a backwater, receiving little in the way of men and equipment despite the extent of the front and the number of Japanese on the Asian mainland. Only through the dogged determination of those who fought there, and the belated importance attached to CBI after the Trident conference of May 1943, was the theater given resources for a three-pronged offensive aimed at removing the Japanese threat to British-controlled India as well as driving them from Burma, China, and Indochina.

Organizing British Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 2000) ( Book )
1 edition published in 2000 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Britain sent the spearhead battalion of its joint rapid reaction force (JRRF) to Sierra Leone in May 2000. The unit took control of the airport at Lungi and began restoring order to the capital of Freetown, a preliminary to evacuating Britons and foreign nationals. Some 36 hours earlier, the unit had been in barracks at Aldershot. Operation Palliser was a classic example of a rapid reaction mission, something often sought yet rarely achieved. It validated the concept of integrating operational planning, preparation, and execution under a permanent joint headquarters (PJHQ). Both the previous Conservative and current Labor governments have viewed the capability to mount rapid reaction operations as in the national interest, in keeping with global responsibilities as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, to play a part in resolving selected crises. Britain had an inefficient response system in 1994 and a constant though apparently contradictory political intention to improve imilitary efficiency while achieving cost savings.

JFACC: Who's in Charge? (Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1994) ( Book )
1 edition published in 1994 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
There is unanimity that the Armed Forces will fight as a joint team in the future. Each of the services has come a long way to make joint force a reality, but real difficulties remain in the area of command and control. It is time to take off the doctrinal blinders and look harder for the solutions. One concern is command and control of joint air operations. The capabilities, flexibility, and multi-service character of aviation make a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) important to most joint operations. Some say that a JFACC's actual responsibilities make the role more that of a coordinator. Regardless, there is likely to be a JFACC in most large joint operations. What then is the problem? Why do many dissent in reviewing joint doctrine on this subject? Why are CINCs unable to agree on a concept? The answer lies in understanding the needs of joint commanders at all levels and building the proper dynamics into joint decisionmaking and tasking processes. To gain some insight into possible solutions, one must first understand that we simply do not fight in a functionally centralized fashion. This is evidenced by the Army- Air Force Air Land Battle concept and the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) concept. Neither concept is about organization; rather they involve teamwork and combined arms philosophies. The Navy's surface, subsurface, and aerospace systems are tightly woven into a combined arms warfighting capability. Service commanders must master a range of joint and component fires to decide a battle and shape the next one. It follows that commanders must have adequate authority to direct actions necessary to accomplish their missions. We do not wage functional fights, but we demand functional excellence. That search for excellence requires striking a balance between centralized, sub-optimized, functional efficiency and decentralized authority that subordinate commanders need in order to succeed.

Do We Need An Information Corps? (Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 1993) ( Book )
1 edition published in 1993 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Warfare is about to enter a new phase that will upset the traditional balance between information and force. As firepower becomes an appendage to information, organizational transformations will begin to underpin a new architecture. A separate Information Corps could guide this revolution, create common doctrine for the diverse requirements of information warriors, and facilitate liaison among civilian information agencies. Such a corps could also obviate the need for the services to integrate their data systems because standardization would exist from the outset. Moreover, the corps could foster innovations more consonant with the logic of the information revolution than would be the case if the services were left to their own devices. But even though the proposal for such a corps has merit, a number of issues concerning its likely impact on operational autonomy, the critical functions of operational units, and certain joint imperatives must first be addressed.

A War that Was Not Left to the Generals ( Book )
1 edition published in 1995 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
During World War II Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill really ran the war and not the generals. According to Admiral Leahy, the credit for war leadership goes to Franklin D, Roosevelt and to an even greater extent to his great colleague, Winston Churchill. Churchill exercised a directive, forceful control of a kind that most members of the defense establishment today would find unusual or perhaps improper. They prodded subordinates, questioned their orders, and on occasion drove them into paroxysms of either anger or despair. Yet the end result was better strategy, not merely better democracy. The current models of civi1-military relations are very different. We think of either civilian micro-management, a la Vietnam, or a supposedly hands-off and out-of-the-way handing over of strategic responsibilities to the military in the Persian Gulf. Both views are historically inaccurate, but what counts here is the legend more than the reality A Roosevelt or Churchill would not have given a Westmoreland a free hand to pursue a wasteful, destructive, and politically unsustainable strategy of search and destroy, nor would he have allowed a Schwarzkopf to negotiate an armistice without guidance on the peace terms to be exacted at the end. In part, the situation of World War II leaders was simply very different: the margin between success and failure was much narrower. American strategists of that war, unlike those of late, had to allocate military resources that were scarce and difficult to replace.

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