NATIONAL WAR COLL WASHINGTON DC
Most widely held works by NATIONAL WAR COLL WASHINGTON DC
Covert Action: A Very American Dilemma ( Book )
1 edition published in 1999 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Perhaps no other issue so starkly lays out the fault lines between the idealistic and realistic strains in American foreign policy as does the subject of covert action. The title of this essay consciously reflects that of Gunnar Myrdal's classic study of race in America, "An American Dilemma." Myrdal posited, accurately, that the conflict between stated American ideals of freedom, democracy, and equal justice and the realities of race discrimination created a tension that America would inevitably have to address. Beginning with World War II and Franklin Roosevelt's fascination with General "Wild Bill" Donovan and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), U.S. leaders have seen covert action as an attractive tool for a dangerous world. Many proponents of covert action justify its use in "realist" terms. While the author does not detail them in this paper, there are strong arguments for using covert action, especially when carried out as part of an agreed-upon public policy and with adequate oversight and review. Generally, these arguments focus on two elements: necessity (i.e., extreme threats call for extreme responses) and effectiveness (i.e., some things can only be done covertly). However, neither of these arguments addresses the heart of the issue: that covert action is basically antithetical to the values that the United States espouses and to the policies that it would like other countries to adopt. In a society that fundamentally adheres to democratic ideals, covert action, by its very nature, creates a basic conflict. After first detailing why this is so, particularly for the United States, this paper will examine the continuing consequences of the use of covert action on the United States, on the image of its citizens as Americans, and on its role in the world.
Values as a Strategic Constraint: How Cultural Values Undermine U.S. Foreign Policy in Colombia. What We Can learn From the Alliance for Progress to Reduce Risk of Failure With Plan Colombia ( Book )
1 edition published in 2001 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
The experience of the Alliance for Progress program in the 1960s is analyzed and compared to the present Plan Colombia. Cultural values are identified as strategically significant factors influencing current U.S. strategy in Colombia. Traditional "progress-resistant" values may explain the persistent weakness of Colombian state institutions to address internal conflict. The opening of the Colombian economy seems to have further constrained government policy while benefiting conflictive non-state actors. The risk of policy failure is high. Mitigating this risk requires that political "end-state" objectives be given higher priority than counter-drug targets.
The President, Factions, and 'The Invitation to Struggle': Lifting the Gay Ban in the United States Military ( Book )
1 edition published in 1997 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Candidate Bill Clinton promised that, as President, he would promulgate an Executive order to remove the prohibition on homosexuals serving in the United States military. A year after President Clinton's inauguration, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued its new guidance on homosexuals serving in the military, which, in essence, simply substituted the words "homosexual conduct" for "homosexual". The guidance fell far short of candidate Clinton's campaign promise. This paper will analyze how a supposedly firm campaign promise failed to materialize and why Commander-in-Chief Clinton did not issue an Executive order "forcing" the military to accept gays openly. To do this, it will follow the issue from the 1992 campaign to the December 1993 issuance of DOD directives implementing the new policy on homosexuals.
Geo-Strategic Context: South Asia, A National Security Strategy ( Book )
1 edition published in 1998 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
The US South Asia policy needs to be redirected and refocused. It is time for us to recognize that this long overlooked region requires greater US attention, and that it presents promising opportunities in the coming century not only for the United States, but also for the world community. We need to explore the region beyond the presumed constraints, and extend our strategic vision to the plausibility of a conflict-free, economically sound South Asia with reduced threats of nuclear weapons and lessened perils of transnational problems. We begin this process with greater US involvement in the region by 1) actively promoting economic reform and market liberalization, 2) prevailing upon India and Pakistan to reduce regional conflict, 3) providing them with concrete incentives for capping nuclear capability, and, 4) impressing upon regional actors to address such other urgent issues as population growth, illicit drug production and trafficking, spread of communicable disease and environmental degradation that threaten the region's socio-economic equilibrium.
The Gordian Knot of Strategy: A Mismatch of Unlimited Aims and Limited Means in the Iran-Iraq War ( Book )
1 edition published in 2001 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
It is September 1980 and Iraqi forces are invading Iran - escalating what had been a conflict of words and mutual political interference into open war. Saddam Hussein stands before the Iraqi National Assembly and declares that the 1975 Algiers Agreement with Iran had been violated and is now void. Were the Iraqi actions part of a rational political strategy that balanced ends, ways, means, and risks? Or was the Iraqi invasion a shortsighted action that failed to support strategic political objectives? Our conclusion: Iraq made a rational, last resort, choice in going to war, but Saddam miscalculated the nature of his conflict with Iran. His mistaken belief that limited means could achieve unlimited aims led to political stalemate, dismal results on the battlefield, and near destruction of Iraq's economy. Failure to achieve his grand political objectives did not, however, prevent Saddam from achieving the goal he valued most. At the end, he remained in power with a greatly reduced internal and external threat. Yet Saddam did not clearly link his national security and military strategies, and his Pyrrhic victory highlighted his failure to understand the more complex components of the national security decision-making process.
Boris Yeltsin and the First Chechen War ( Book )
1 edition published in 2001 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
In the fall of 1994 Russia moved inexorably toward armed intervention in Chechnya, a member of the newly formed Russian North Caucasus Federated States. In reviewing Russian national interests for its subsequent insertion of an armed force into Chechnya, it is evident that President Boris Yeltsin failed to take into account numerous environmental factors. Consideration of these factors and careful analysis of them should have resulted in the Russians pursuing alternative means in the pursuit of their vital interests. Boris Yeltsin's subordination of Russian national interests to consolidating his sagging political support at home set the stage for an unnecessary military intervention in Chechnya that, combined with a flawed military strategy, was doomed to failure from the onset.
Developing a New National Strategy for U.S.-Russian Relations ( Book )
1 edition published in 1993 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Developing a national security strategy addressing U.S. Russian relations should be the number one priority of the National Security Council. Collapse of the Soviet Union did more than remove U.S. public and governmental consensus regarding the existence of a threat to our vital interests. It has reopened the debate as to what our national interests should be on a global basis. in the absence of a grand security strategy, we will be forced to deal with international events on a regional or state case-by-case basis. Although this may prove satisfactory on a short term basis, it will prove inefficient in marshaling full U.S. power (military, economic, and political) to achieve our objectives. it also increases the probability of the U.S. pursuing policies counterproductive to other objectives in the area. Finally, piecemeal pursuit of U.S. interests increases the likelihood of sending mixed signals to the global community. Why should our relations with Russia be the National Security Council's number one priority? Perhaps the most persuasive reason is that it affords us a unique opportunity to totally restructure our thinking regarding U.S. international interests, objectives, and policy. Additionally, some analysts argue Russia remains the only country capable of threatening the vital interests of the U.S. Missing in this argument, however, is an analysis of the combat effectiveness of the remaining Russian forces. Recent retreat of the Ex-Soviet surface fleet to local waters, the number of ships tied up at pier, reductions in the procurement of weapons systems, and dismal economic conditions indicate declining combat effectiveness both now and in the future.
Restoration of US Aid to Fiji: The Advantages of Obscurity ( Book )
1 edition published in 1991 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
On May 14, 1987, Colonel Sitveni Rabuka overthrew the democratically elected government in Fiji. The bloodless coup precipitated sharp responses from the U.S. Most importantly, the U.S. suspended all economic and military assistance to Fiji. This paper focuses on how the U.S. subsequently restored economic assistance. The process involved bureaucratic politics and interplay between the executive branch and the Congress. The Reagan administration set a precedent in its use of a section of law permitting the President to restore aid flows if deemed in the national security interest of the U.S. Had Fiji been a major player in the world arena, this would never have happened. It has not been repeated thus far. In that sense, Fiji's relative obscurity and unimportance were advantageous.
Vietnam: The End of a Chapter. A Plan for Normalization of Relations ( Book )
1 edition published in 1990 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
More than 17 years have passed since the signing of the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement formally ending the Vietnam War. Yet many Americans cannot get the war out of their systems. The national trauma associated with the United States' failure in that conflict has scarred the American psyche, precluding many Americans from dealing with Vietnam in any logical manner. Unlike their vanquished foes from World War II, many Americans seemingly seek to punish Vietnam and extract in peace what they were unable to gain on the battlefield. Today, Vietnam is not the same country Americans knew when they first arrived in the 1960s. Although Hanoi achieved forcible reunification with the South, it has been unable to satisfactorily address the problems associated with governing a country. Thus far, Hanoi has been unsuccessful in translating its battlefield successes into politically and economically viable programs that meet the needs of the people. For more than a decade, the United States has followed a policy of keeping Vietnam politically and economically isolated from the world community. Economically, the degree of suffering inflicted on the Vietnamese by the United States' embargo has been successful beyond anyone's imagination. With a budget deficit of $1.1 billion, an external debt of $8.6 Billion (owed mostly to the Soviets), an inflation rate of 301%, and an unemployment rate of at least 10% and climbing, the problems are not hard to understand. Couple the basic economic problems with the world's fifth largest standing Army, which utilizes 40-50% of the central government's yearly budget, and the size of the problem begins to come into focus. This paper examines the current relationship between the United States and Vietnam, focusing on the two issues that most influence the bilateral relationship: POW/MIA and Cambodia. The authors contend that it is in U.S. interests to improve relations and begin the normalization process. A road map to normalization is included.
A New Air Sea Battle Concept: Integrated Strike Forces ( Book )
1 edition published in 1992 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
The dissolution of the former Soviet Union with attendant stability in Eastern Europe and south-central Asia; Proliferation of advanced weapons (including nuclear, biological, chemical and high technology conventional systems); Unrest in many parts of the developing world (stemming from increased demands for democratization, expanding populations, deteriorating resource and ecological bases); Increased U.S. and allied presence in the Third World or markets and sources of raw materials, e.g. oil, minerals); Continuing intransigence on the part of a variety of particularly unstable Third World regimes -- e.g. Iraq, Iran, rth Korea, Libya, and Cuba -- fostering regional crisis.
Chou En-Lai and the Opening to the West ( Book )
4 editions published between 1989 and 1995 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the grand strategy and statecraft of Chou En-lai during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The paper will identify the national interests of China, the goals and objectives of Chou En-lai, and the instruments of statecraft that led to a reversal in United States policy and its formal recognition of the communist dominated People's Republic of China. China viewed herself as a nation who possessed a tremendous level of self-sufficiency. Additionally, China consistently held to a belief of Chinese cultural superiority comparative to any western society. Then what could lead China towards a rapprochement in her relations with the United States and other nations of the Western World? As will be discussed in this paper, the author believes the principal motivation for Chou En-lai's grand strategy and the ultimate opening to the west became the fundamental issues of survival and national security. It is essential to acknowledge three of the significant forces which were at work in Chou's mind, those of nationalism, emergence from the cultural revolution, and Marxist-Communist ideologies. Internally, the Cultural Revolution had dramatically reduced the power of China's party and government apparatuses and in its trail left considerable disarray. This fact combined with the deteriorating status of relations with the Soviet Union proved to be the overriding determinate for Chou En-lai's national strategy formulations.
Regional Assessment of South America ( Book )
3 editions published between 1997 and 1998 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
The vast South American continent poses some conceptual challenges for most North Americans. Simply using the term "Americans" (referring to US citizens) can be a source of some sensitivity as South Americans also fiercely consider themselves Americans. Their self-identity, however, is not the same as that of North Americans for considerable historical and cultural reasons. The historical and cultural context of South American identity helps to explain what US policies may or may not succeed--and how they might be perceived in the region. While significant US interest in the region began as early as the 1880s, South Americans perceived US policies and attention as inconsistent due to higher US security concerns in other parts of the world. With the end of the Cold War, the US has turned its focus to South American economic potential and those issues of transnational concern. Complicating this renewed interest is the South American perception and suspicion of external intervention and threats to sovereignty.
Willy Brandt and Ostpolitik ( Book )
3 editions published between 1976 and 1991 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
The government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), led by Chancellor Willy Brandt, embarked in 1969 upon a policy of Ostpolitik: improved relations with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Soviet Union. Brandt held two ministerial-level consultations with representatives of the GDR in the spring of 1970. Following subsequent negotiations at lower levels, several bilateral agreements -- signed in 1971 and 1972 -- increased the volume of cultural and economic traffic across the Inter-German Border and formalized mutual recognition of each state's political legitimacy. Ostpolitik also contributed to the conclusion of the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement, which clarified the political and economic links between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. By Brandt's own account, his policy was only partially successful, as much as he underestimated the resistance his initiatives would face. Yet, others often recall Ostpolitik as the successful catalyst that ushered in the decade of superpower detente. Following in the footsteps of Brandt's policy, the United States and the Soviet Union reached numerous agreements during the 1970s that stabilized, if not reduced, the intensity of the deadlocked ideological and military confrontation between East and West. Today, with that confrontation ail but moot, one might question whether Ostpolitik was a landmark foreign policy with broad general implications, or instead, simply an historical artifact of the Cold War. After reviewing the ends Brandt sought and the means he chose to accomplish them, this paper argues that Brandt's Ostpolitik contains relevant "lessons" for contemporary American policy makers, and that his policy is one of long-standing significance.
Public Diplomacy ( Book )
2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Ambrose Bierce's well-known definition of a diplomat as a man "sent to lie abroad for his country" illustrates the widely-accepted perception of diplomats as secretive, deceptive manipulators who operate exclusively behind the scenes. In fact, most diplomatic work involves matters which are neither classified nor sensitive. Trade promotion, interventions on behalf of American businesses operating abroad, adjudicating visas, writing position papers and talking points, and organizing the schedule of a visiting delegation of Members of Congress are examples of non-classified work which is carried out at virtually every diplomatic post. "Public diplomacy" is the term used to describe a government's conscious efforts to promote understanding of its own culture and interests among foreign publics, and to solicit their support for a policy objective. Routine diplomatic tasks such as those mentioned above significantly shape America's image in each country and in that respect are an important element of our public diplomacy. Like so many other aspects of our national governance, public diplomacy has been affected by globalization. There is now a diverse collection of actors engaging in activities which used to be the unique preserve of the government, and through which we could frame and focus public diplomacy in support of broad policy objectives. Private and professional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, sister city programs, humanitarian relief projects, and private business initiatives are examples of new players who compete with the U.S. Government for the attention and participation of foreign elites in their programs. Successful public diplomacy in a "globalized" world requires the ability to coordinate initiatives that the government does not directly control. The author relates how the end of the Cold War has changed the way in which public diplomacy is conducted with Russia and other members of the former Soviet bloc.
National Security Strategy of Charles De Gaulle ( Book )
2 editions published between 1994 and 1995 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Charles de Gaulle was recalled to leadership during a series of political crises in France in 1958. There had been 24 governments in the 12 years since he had resigned as President in 1946. The costly war in Indochina and now the rebellion in Algeria were disintegrating the French Empire abroad and riots threatened civil war at home. Out of the morass of competing political factions, only two had any cohesion: the communists and the Army. It was the French Army that summoned de Gaulle from retirement. De Gaulle's terms for accepting the burden of leadership were nonnegotiable: he was granted constitutional authority for a powerful executive branch that stood above any legislative authority. Having at last been imbued with the power he believed necessary to govern France, he set about an ambitious agenda to restore France to "greatness." His visions of France as an equal partner in a triumvirate with Great Britain and the United States and as the uncontested leader of a unified European Community were never realized. He did succeed, however, in restoring France's self-confidence and dignity, both as a people and a nation, and in placing her on more equal terms in the competitive international system.
Charles De Gaulle and the Break with Atlanticism ( Book )
2 editions published in 1995 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
France was a nation struggling in the late 1950s. The economy was stagnant and the military weakened by its missions in Vietnam and Algeria. The fragmentation of political parties precluded any hope for consensus in domestic or international affairs. In 1958, Charles de Gaulle was elected president. The Fifth Republic was formed, along with a new constitution that replaced a parliamentary form of government with one that granted greater powers to the executive branch. De Gaulle wasted little time before announcing his focus on international affairs. He was disturbed by the decline of French stature in the world. He believed that France had the universal mission to use its power for the benefit of others. France's mission (grand design) was to be one of peace and to lead Europe as a "balancing third force" in a world suffering under the hegemony of the two superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. If de Gaulle was to restore France as the leader in Europe and a major power in the world, he could not cede power to anyone. One of his core principles was to "sustain the will and ability to make independent judgements" in all spheres of activity: military, political, economic, and social. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effectiveness of Charles de Gaulle's statecraft in his attempt to break the Atlantic Alliance and create a powerful, French-led Europe. President de Gaulle left the Presidency without achieving his strategic objective of a French-led Europe, primarily for three reasons: (1) while possession of nuclear weapons allowed him to stray from NATO, it was not enough for the world to bestow upon France the recognition as a world leader; (2) de Gaulle's style of leadership and diplomacy alienated most leaders; and (3) the primary reason for de Gaulle's failure to achieve world power status for France was his neglect of domestic economic and social issues.
Naval Nuclear Arms Reduction - Fixing the US Navy's Achilles' Heel ( Book )
2 editions published in 1990 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
The dramatic political changes in Eastern Europe in 1989 and Mikhail Gorbachev's continued commitment to perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet Union have raised the hopes of people everywhere that world peace may be at hand. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the poor performance of the Red Army in Afghanistan. the perilous state of the Soviet economy and serious internal ethnic conflicts have drastically reduced the perceived threat which the USSR poses to NATO. As a result, many NATO members are contemplating reductions in defense budgets and military forces. West Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Belgium have all recently announced plans for smaller forces in the near future. In the U.S. Congress and the media are today nearly unanimous in demanding reductions in defense expenditures while suggesting a variety of ways to spend the anticipated "peace dividend." President Bush appears to be vying with Gorbachev to announce bigger troop cuts in Europe and several separate arms reduction talks are in progress. At the same time, there exists the reality of the formidable strategic and conventional forces of the Soviet Union.
NATO Offensive Air Power in the Central Region: TWOATAF and FOURATAF Contrasted ( Book )
2 editions published in 1986 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
The balance of forces in the Central Region of NATO Europe has undergone a dramatic shift in recent years as the Warsaw Pact's force structure has begun to reflect long and continuing programs that have improved the quantity and quality of their air power. Of particular concern is the significant advancement in the offensive capabilities of "third generation" tactical aircraft. This paper examines NATO's response to the increased threat, with a particular emphasis on the similarities and differences between the two Central Region Allied Tactical Air Forces as evidenced in their respective approaches to close air support and battlefield air interdiction. Since the mid-1970s, a simmering controversy over Allied air tactics has found its way into military journals and operational plans. This controversy centers around the British-dominated concept of relatively autonomous air operations used in the northern half of Germany as contrasted with the American-dominated concept of technologically dependent, close control of air operations used in the southern half of Germany. Both sides of this argument can be presented logically and persuasively, even while avoiding the obvious nationality bias. It should be carefully noted that significant efforts have been made in recent years to harmonize the different concepts. Many of these efforts have been successful, yet differences between the two countries' tactics remain. This paper examines the organizational structure of the Central Region as it affects perceptions, the environment of the theater as it drives tactical thinking, and the differing philosophies and tactics themselves as they affect the application of Allied and American air power. The paper concludes that these differences are quite likely to continue to be reflected in discussions of future NATO strategies.
A Theater Strategy for Northeast Asia, One of the World's Most Critical Regions ( Book )
1 edition published in 1995 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Northeast Asia has long been and will remain one of the world's most important geopolitical regions, and events here directly impact US economic, political, and world order interests1. Thus region is unique because three of the world's four major powers (China, Japan, Russia) share common borders or close proximity Geography, always important, is critical in the case of the Korean peninsula. Uniquely situated among the three major Asian powers, Korea's pivotal geopolitical position has caused three major wars in a short span of 56 years that involved the armed forces of all four major powers2. Korea's geographical position remains crucial in the region. A hostile and divided Korean peninsula or a reunified Korean nation does not alter significantly the geostrategic equation among the four major powers. In fact, a unified and stronger Korea over the long-term could still aggravate relations among the regional powers, particularly with Japan.
The Effectiveness of War in Attaining National Policy Objectives ( Book )
1 edition published in 1990 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
This essay recommends criteria for determining the effectiveness of war in attaining the objectives of national policy. While I draw on the writings of Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, and B.H. Liddell Hart, my conclusions are not necessarily theirs, although I do not believe they are inconsistent. A few words at the outset about what this paper does not do. Sun Tzu's statement that "to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill" (The Art of War, p. 77) is perhaps the earliest theoretical underpinning for deterrence strategies. I subscribe to this view of the ultimate purpose of armed forces. However, both because, realistically, wars must be fought in order to give a nation's warfighting capabilities the credibility needed for deterrence, and because the topic of this essay explicitly deals with the act of war rather than its avoidance, I do not deal with the effectiveness of deterrence beyond this brief comment. Neither do I concern myself with what national policy objectives are or should be. While this has presented some intellectual problems -- I firmly believe that the correctness or morality of specific national objectives cannot be separated from the appropriateness of military action -- I have tried to frame my arguments at a general level. Thus, I am not prescribing criteria for determining the effectiveness of war in achieving what I think should be United States national security objectives in the 199Os (although that is a tempting subject), but rather trying, in Clausewitzian fashion, to draw up some general principles which can be used to judge the usefulness of war within the context of any country's national security objectives.