WorldCat Identities

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI

Overview
Works: 1,180 works in 1,224 publications in 1 language and 1,244 library holdings
Genres: Rules 
Classifications: V420,
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
Unit of Effort During Noncombatant Evaluation Operations( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Unity of effort between the Departments of State and Defense is essential to the successful execution of a noncombatant evacuation. The military is usually the last resort in a series of evacuation options. when possible the Department of State evacuates as many American citizens as possible by private and commercial methods. When military assistance is requested, the Department of State's objective is to evacuate U.S. citizens while maintaining overall national security interests. The military objective is the quick and safe removal of U.S. civilians. To achieve unity of effort, both the ambassador and the regional military commander (CINC) must coordinate from the earliest stages of deliberate planning, through crisis action planning, and continue until either the evacuation is executed or the country stabilizes and an evacuation is no longer required. This paper discusses the evacuation options available to an ambassador, the political considerations involved in making an evacuation decision, the planning process, and makes a case for improving the coordination between the embassy and the regional CINC so that the desired end state is achieved
Prisoners of War and the Code of Conduct by William P Lyons( Book )

1 edition published in 1967 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"This paper investigates the Code of Conduct for the U.S. Armed Forces and its relation to prisoners of war. It addresses the questions, 'Does a need exist for a code?' and if so, 'Does the present Code fulfill that need?'"
Command and Control of Multinational Naval Forces( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The USN is pushing towards implementation of JV-2010 in the wake of a smaller fleet and in the midst of greater emphasis upon the use of multinational forces. Implementation of the IT-2 1 system may bring the realization of the "system of systems" envisioned by Admiral Owens. Yet there is no guarantee that the 2010 multinational naval force Commander will enjoy this envisioned level of interoperability with any units other than U.S. ships. Many U.S. allies are concerned that they are being left behind and feel they are being pushed into a peripheral role. A methodology is presented that addresses allied concerns that relies on mainly non-technical actions. A modified naval combat control process is presented that can be used to more clearly understand the decision process for a unit commander in a large naval force. The need to establish solid doctrine for multinational naval operations, training upon the doctrine, and conducting combined deployments and exercises to make the doctrine commonplace is stressed. Based upon identification of the sub-networks that make up the USN's approach to network-centric warfare and the likelihood of coalition operations between the U.S. and other navies several suggestions & be made to improve the ability to form effective multinational naval forces
OP Art to the Rescue: Fundamentals for a Hostage Crisis( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The objective of this paper is to underscore the importance of operational art in the planning and execution of a hostage rescue operation. With this form of asymmetrical threat, strategic and operational leaders are faced with a difficult challenge where political objectives are wholly dependent on a focused tactical action. The critical influence of the action and interaction of operational factors, in a highly charged political context, is vividly illustrated by comparing the 1980 U.S. operation in Iran with the 1976 Israeli operation in Entebbe. This comparison contrasts and highlights four areas: first, the political context and ensuing strategic guidance, second, factor space including hostage location, distance and weather; third, factor time and the impact on planning, intelligence, and training; and finally factor forces, where the effects and interdependence of readiness, operational security, command and control and force protection were decisive in the varied outcomes of the two operations
Conflict Termination in the Persian Gulf: How Did We Fall Short?( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Much has been written recently regarding the subject of conflict termination and how it relates to the operational commander in planning and executing military objectives to be victorious at war. Prior to the Persian Gulf War conflict termination was focused primarily at the strategic level with political objectives in mind and little thought of how the national desired end state is transformed by the operational commander to satisfy the military objectives. The Joint Chief of Staff more recently have come to realize that conflict termination is a very important and integral part of campaign planning and have included it in their planning for joint operations. Conflict termination provides an essential link between national security strategy, national military strategy, and post-hostility aims. The issue of conflict (or war) termination centers on the national will and freedom of action. Further, it must be considered from the outset of planning and should be refined as the conflict moves toward advantageous termination. As the link between a war's end state and the post-hostility phase, conflict termination poses one set of difficult issues for the grand strategists and different but equally challenging questions for the operational commander. Herein lies the complicated task for the operational commander. That is, transforming the desired national end state into definable and achievable military conditions which meet the military objectives. Therefore, the operational commander must develop a mission statement based on the national objectives, coordinate that mission statement with the political authority, and develop an acceptable end state--satisfying economically, militarily, and politically
Future Coalitions - Learning from the Past, Looking to the Future and Listening to our Allies by Ronald L Furlong( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Nothing in life is as simple as it seems. Coalition operations most certainly fall into that category. Perhaps the biggest mistake that operational commanders make is that they only concentrate on one third of the "process" of preparing for future coalitions. It is human nature to look back in history to the last war and gather lessons learned to apply to the next conflict. However, if this is the only preparation that the operational commander does, he may find himself ill prepared for the next ad hoc coalition. Desert Storm, while a major military success, left many Americans with a false mindset about the United States' ability to fight future wars and continue to maintain minimal casualties. Likewise, the ease of coalition warfare left a similar false impression on the minds of many senior military operational commanders who may be involved in future coalition operations. This mindset is based primarily on very limited observations of coalition support during a relatively short Gulf War. The wise commander, in future military or non-military coalition operations, will be the one who takes the time now to sort through the valuable lessons learned, looks at U.S. technological advances and their potential impact on coalition partners, and at the same time, listens to the concerns of coalition partners. If he fails to do this, even though the United States may form a "coalition" in the next conflict - he may find himself fighting virtually alone
Targeting Command and Control Warfare as Operational Fires( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how to apply conventional targeting techniques in sequencing and synchronizing the Operational Fires of Operational C2W. It proposes a methodology for applying the Decide portion of the Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess process used for targeting in the U.S. Army. It describes how the lethal and non-lethal fires of C2W can be applied at the operational level of war as Operational Fires. Further, it recommends giving the responsibility for planning and execution of C2W to the Joint Special Operations Task Force Commander on a permanent basis. These recommendations are designed to make the Joint Task Force Commander more comfortable with the employment of C2W and to increase the importance of C2W role in mission accomplishment
Focused Logistics and the Sustainment of Deployed Forces by Paul L Ladd( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

The operationally based template of Focused Logistics seeks to exploit emerging information processing technologies in order to improve the basic business practices of the military. Within each respective Service, supporting initiatives are currently under development. The Army concept is called Velocity Management while the Marine Corps concept is known as Precision Logistics. The Navy concept is called Expeditionary Logistics and the Air Force concept is known as Lean Logistics. Throughout the period envisioned in 2010 and Beyond, pressure will continue to mount for reductions in inventory, infrastructure, and footprint. The programs implemented by each Service show great promise for such reductions in post, station, and base operations. However, when operating in immature theaters, Focused Logistics cannot be fully implemented until traditional methodologies and rivalries of Service oriented chain of command Stovepipes are modified. Traditional requisitioning procedures, Command and Control, and development of theater infrastructure are all outdated. A rational sequence for theater development built on the core competencies of each Service is required
Weapons of Mass Destruction a Network-Centered Threat( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Battlespace dominance is more than the physical control of air, land, and sea. Under the network centric concept of operations, U.S. forces must be ready to control the infosphere in order to assure military objectives can be achieved. Perhaps the most effective information warfare (IW) weapon is a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD), specifically a biological or nuclear weapon. Important questions should be answered about the ability to protect American information networks from the significant information disruption characteristics of WMD
Targeting for Peace Operations( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

In virtually any forum where future missions for American military forces are discussed, one of the more distinctly possible Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) discussed is peace operations. The apparent contradiction between peace operations and targeting is a "gray area" for Joint Task Force Commanders. They will find little written in US Joint Doctrine to assist them in properly preparing for their potential targeting responsibilities in the peace operations arena. While restraint and political considerations are important aspects of peace operations, the Joint Force Commander cannot overlook the importance of having a plan for all contingencies, and a targeting plan should be one of them. Due to the complexity of peace operations, the proper balance of diplomacy and force is difficult to determine. It is time to recognize that targeting and peace operations are not mutually exclusive. A Joint Pub that clearly addresses all aspects of peace operations must be developed and targeting considerations should be included as a key planning factor
Post-Apartheid South Africa and United States National Security( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the importance of continued engagement with post-apartheid South Africa to United States national security. It is based on the realist premise that the U.S. has limited national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa which would be best served by a regional security strategy explicitly predicated on engagement with South Africa. The paper is presented in six chapters. Chapter One places South Africa in regional perspective as Sub-Saharan Africa's pivotal state through an analysis of its political, economic, and military dimensions of national power. Chapter Two describes U.S. national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. These interests -- South Africa's transition to democracy, continued U.S. access to strategic minerals, the security of U.S. economic interests, and the security of sea lines of communication -- focus on South Africa and the Southern African sub-region. Chapter Three provides an analysis of the Sub-Saharan African strategic environment. South Africa offers the United States the greatest opportunity for meaningful engagement in a strategic environment which is generally characterized by dysfunctional political and economic regimes and their attendant social conditions. Chapter Four describes the emergence of a U.S. policy for Sub-Saharan Africa which implicitly recognizes South Africa as the region's pivotal state. Chapter Five is a critical analysis of U.S. regional strategy for Sub- Saharan Africa. This chapter demonstrates that there are significant discontinuities in U.S. policy and strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa. In effect, the U.S. lacks a comprehensive strategy for Sub- Saharan Africa; there are only a group of loosely coordinated political, economic, security, and informational policy initiatives which provide the semblance, but not the substance of a regional strategy
A CINC's Worry: The Defense Reform Initiative( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

The Defense reform initiative report was published in November 1997 and is the Secretary of Defense road map to the Department of Defense management structure of the future. It is designed to complement JV 2010 by providing the DoD organization for JV 2010 concept implementation. It misses the mark and actually imperils the combat commanders-in-chief (CINCs). The CINCs are placed in jeopardy due to the lack of synergy between the DRI and JV 2010. The DRI is a piecemeal approach to management restructuring and it fails to provide a complete corporate strategy with specific performance objectives for transforming all of DoD. The DRI's limited scope combined with significant staff reductions without strategic corporate vision places the CINCs at great risk; they may not be able to complete assigned missions due to lack of forces and resources. Additionally, the concepts of JV 2010 that support future joint (CINc) warfighting are not served well by the DRI. If the CINCs do not follow the DRI process closely and influence it to ensure current and future mission accomplishment capability is not compromised, they will move from being in jeopardy to being in double jeopardy
The CJTF and NGOs - One Team, One Mission? A Description of the Military-NGO Relationship and its Effects on Operational Planning and Mission Execution by Mark G Dearfield( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Until National Security Strategy changes, the U.S. military will continue to be a key participant in small scale contingencies and humanitarian operations. As such, military leaders have recognized the requirement to interact at all levels with an increasingly large number of other governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also providing support in crisis areas. The realization that the military will not be the sole actor in these complex situations has prompted it to develop or revise joint doctrine specifically dealing with interagency coordinating guidance and planning procedures. Within this environment, NGOs should be viewed by the military as force multipliers because their knowledge and expertise can help the CJTF develop a more complete military operations plan and execute the mission more effectively. To maximize NGO contributions, the CJTF must first adopt a different operational leadership style; one that is based on a greater understanding of NGOs and that will cultivate a more productive working relationship. Further, the CJTF must solicit and encourage NGO participation in the areas of mission assessment, operations and transition planning, and in country coordination. Each of these subjects will be analyzed to show how a strong military-NGO relationship can contribute to both the development of the operations plan and to mission effectiveness. Supporting the analysis are summaries of pertinent joint doctrines', insights from NGO representatives and military personnel, and recommendations for specific improvements
Civil Reserve Air Fleet Stage III: Viability and Implications by Mark W Graper( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is a vital component of the nation's strategic airlift capability. Stage III is the most aggressive CRAF activation level, contributing heavily to wartime lift needs but also withdrawing the greatest amount of capacity from commercial service. This paper explores the thesis that Stage III is not a viable policy option, and examines the impact such a conclusion would have on our two major theater war (MTW) strategy. Section One analyzes the viability of activating Stage III with respect to feasibility ("Could it be done?") and acceptability ("Would it be done?"). To assess the economic and political costs of activation, this section focuses on how much residual air carrier capacity would be left in the private sector after Stage III activation and mobilization of aircrews with reserve component obligations. Section Two examines the affect the absence of Stage III would have on our two MTW strategy. Finally, Section Three puts forth conclusions and makes recommendations to improve the realism of the assumptions that underlie US contingency and airlift modernization plans. The paper concludes that the economic and political costs of implementing Stage III make the assumption of activation an unsound basis for contingency planning. Also, the absence of Stage III lift capacity would seriously degrade our two MTW strategy, elevating risk in the halting phase of the second MTW and ceding operational initiative to the enemy for a longer period. Recommendations include a call for airline industry executives and senior government officials to reduce Stage III to a level that could be reliably activated in time of crisis. On the basis of this new, smaller Stage III, contingency and airlift modernization plans merit revision
Lodgment: A Thing of the Past( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

A Joint Force Commander requires a plan that ensures that every component of the Joint and/or Combined Task Force can make it to the fight and be sustained while engaged with the enemy. The Naval Service operational concepts, beginning with Operational Maneuver From the Sea, rely far too heavily on maritime maneuver and in so doing, overlook a traditional requirement of forcible entry operations, that is, to provide secure lodgment for throughput of follow on forces and materiel. While small MAGTFs tasked with limited missions may well benefit from seabasing, Joint Task Forces and larger MAGTFs that rely on the introduction of a Fly in Echelon and prepositioned equipment and supplies must have access to shore based lodgment areas. The limitations of seabasing become immediately apparent to the commander concerned with force projection of CONUS based forces and sustainment of the JTF at the operational level of war. Mobile Offshore Bases, envisioned by some as a tactical platform used to extend the reach of naval aviation and by others as a floating steel island providing all of the functions of a lodgment area, are insufficient to the United States' political or military needs in lengthy or large scale engagements involving US forces, coalition forces, US government agencies and NGO/PVOs. Lodgment areas with expeditionary airfields, port facilities and beaches capable of supporting JLOTS operations will continue to meet best the needs of a JFC in the littoral region for missions ranging from Operations Other Than War to Sustained Operations Ashore
Protecting the Force - Occupational Medicine's Expanded Role in Future Theaters of Operation( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Operational commanders have been and will be confronted with broad, complex theaters of war. Coordinating medical treatment, patient evacuation, and blood program processes are some of the familiar tasks of the operational commander's surgeon and health service support planning staff. Other aspects of health service support that are not so closely tied to the hospital like medical intelligence and preventive medicine must also be considered and included for in the operational planning process. An additional complexity imposed on military commanders and their medical planners in future conflicts is to monitor and protect military personnel from the effects of chemical, physical and biological hazards encountered in their deployed workplaces. Occupational medicine (including medical surveillance) and industrial hygiene are professions that deal with these issues and will be part of future military operations
Impact of Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) on Intelligence Support to DoD Joint Operations by Joseph Scanlin( )

2 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The paper analyzes the impact of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) on Department of Defense (DoD) operational intelligence functions. The analysis briefly covers the development and reform process, which led to the creation of the modern US Intelligence Community. The paper then views the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission as the basis for the creation of Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in order to establish how policy makers viewed the DNI role in supporting military operations. Finally, the paper highlights that although the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 provided the tools to the DNI to support operational military commanders it is far less directive than Goldwater-Nichols was for the DoD. Therefore the paper argues that the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 will not improve DoD operational intelligence activities in support of Joint Operations without a significant DNI effort. The paper recommends how DoD can engage with the DNI in order to ensure better intelligence support to operational commanders
An Operational Primer for Multilateral Peace Operations( )

1 edition published in 1999 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The end of the cold war has seen an increase in the number of peace operations undertaken by the United Nations, by regional organizations, and by multilateral coalitions. Post-cold war peace operations have differed from the "traditional" UN Chapter VI military observation and peacekeeping force models. Humanitarian interventions and the rise in "failed states" have seen peacekeeping forces introduced into missions without the consent of one or more of the belligerents involved. The United Nations in particular has found these operations difficult, as the United Nations is hampered by structural command and control deficiencies as well as a reliance on member states to fund the missions and provide the contingents needed to carry them out. Despite some mission failures, peace operations are here to stay, as they fill a void between the public's demand for action and those situations which, while difficult, do not directly affect a major power's vital interests. Operational commanders must be prepared to carry out peace operations, and must be knowledgeable of how operational factors are affected by peace operations, as well as the difficulties and limitations inherent in them
Commanders and Command Decisions: The Impact on Naval Combat in the Solomon Islands, November 1942( )

1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The number of United States sailors killed approached the figures lost to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor nearly a year before and represented nearly forty percent of the US force. Nearly a third of the 7OO survivors from the sunken ships that managed to make their way to the island of Guadalcanal that morning were wounded. These numbers reflected the "barroom bawl" nature of the fight that the United States commander allowed to take place at such close ranges as to make the danger of collisions and the point-blank gunfire between ships from the two enemy forces make a shambles of any tactical formations or controls. As a result, the United States Navy was without a coherent surface strike force of cruisers and destroyers at a vital turning point in the Guadalcanal Campaign
An Analysis of the Operational Leadership of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel in the Afrika Korps( )

1 edition published in 1997 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

There is no doubt that Field Marshal Rommel was an exceptional leader, but why was he such a poor operational leader? Examining Rommel's first year of command of the Afrika Korps it is evident that he possessed qualities necessary to be an exceptional operational leader, but he failed to understand operational logistics, and the primacy of policy and strategy. Additionally, his insistence to lead from the front caused unnecessary confusion among his forces, and his lack of unity of effort with his Italian allies decreased his combat efficiency and effectiveness. Rommel's inability to be concerned with other than tactical matters caused unnecessary losses for Germany in North Africa and assisted in Germany's failure to achieve her strategic objective in Russia
 
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