WorldCat Identities

Fleck, Janice

Overview
Works: 4 works in 4 publications in 1 language and 4 library holdings
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by Janice Fleck
The 1990-91 U.S.-Philippine Base Negotiations: Killing the American Goose( )

1 edition published in 1994 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Subic Bay Naval Base at the end of 1992 marked the end of the "special relationship" between the U.S. and the Philippines, centered, since the 1947 Military Bases Agreement (MBA) around a substantial American military presence. For much of that quarter century, the relationship weathered Philippine nationalist resentment of the U.S. role in the islands, disputes over compensation for U.S. use of military facilities, differences about jurisdiction over military personnel and specifics of base operations, and evolving visions of the strategic value of the bases. Yet, until 1990-91, both sides were able to agree on conditions which allowed the U.S. presence to continue and huge amounts of U.S. assistance to flow. Why did protracted negotiations fail to bring about agreement under Aquino? It appears that: 1) the U.S. estimate of the value of the U.S.-Philippine relationship and of the bases declined over the course of the negotiations; and 2) the Philippines failed to perceive the change and continued to act as though the U.S. commitment to their country and the bases was immutable. How was the U.S. able to overcome the inertia of a policy in place for a quarter century? Why did the Philippines miscalculate? The lens of the bureaucratic model of national decision-making provides a framework for suggesting answers. Ironically, both the U.S. and the Philippines took the positions they did in the negotiations because of factors that 3 sharply circumscribed the power of their respective Executive Branch bureaucracies. On the U.S. side, a bureaucratic innovation the off ice of Special Negotiator provided the vehicle for a strong personality to marginalize the bureaucracy and its attachment to the status quo. In the Philippines, a weak presidency allowed base opponents to seize control of the negotiations from the Foreign Ministry
Limited War Theory in Vietnam: A Critique According to Clausewitz( )

1 edition published in 1994 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

America's limited war theory, which provided the intellectual justification and guide for the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, suffered from all the flaws which Clausewitz had seen in such abstract approaches to war 130 years earlier. Misled by the apparent rationalist perfection of its theory, U.S. leaders failed to understand that a war of limited objectives and means is only possible when both sides are willing to restrict means. They could not understand this because their theory did not admit the role of passion and will in driving a people's effort in war. This paper will discuss the series of errors in strategic thinking that flowed from this fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of war, and which led to the United States' loss of the Vietnam War. First, the U.S. did not recognize that the true Clausewitzian "center of gravity" in Vietnam was essentially political: the will of the people to resist the Communist insurgency, a will the United States could not create or substitute for by military action. The United States thus chose a military objective - defeat of the North Vietnamese Army - when it became clear that Saigon was losing its grip on the country in 1965. Second, having engaged the North Vietnamese, U.S. leadership did not understand the role of moral factors in determining the amount of forces which North Vietnam and the Viet Cong would field and which the United States would have to match. Totally committed to victory in the South, the North Vietnamese continued to up the ante. Third, the United States, seeking a military solution to a political problem, used the military as a political tool rather than directing it to a clear military objective, thereby increasing the cost of the war. Having lost control of the cost of the war, the United States leadership lost the war because it lost the support of the American people
The Shaky Pillar: The U.S. and the European Union( )

1 edition published in 1994 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. security guarantee to Europe assured it dominance of the U.S. European Union relationship. The U.S.-EU Declaration of November 1990, signed at a time of when the EU appeared headed toward world power status, commits the U.S. and the EU to a "global partnership" implying a greater sharing of world leadership. With U.S. support for the "separable but not separate" option for European forces within NATO at the January 1994 NATO Summit, the United States appears fully prepared to accept the independent European defense identity that could make burden sharing within a global partnership a reality. Yet three years after the Declaration was signed, the extended wrangle over the GATT agreement and the bloody quagmire of former Yugoslavia are witness to the limits of cooperation, joint action, and to the EU's ability to act alone. Some part of the U.S. - EU tensions over these issues reflects enduring flash points in the U.S.-EU relationship. However, U.S.-EU tensions and frustrations over issues like the GATT and former Yugoslavia are also due in large measure to the EU's limited ability to pursue cohesive, swift, decisive action on issues which go beyond the strictly technical. The need for de facto consensus on foreign policy issues has hampered EU foreign policy making since its earliest days. The EU's external paralysis is compounded now by its own pervasive internal malaise, of which the travails of the Maastricht Treaty, the wreckage of the European Monetary System, and anti-immigrant tensions are only the symptoms
The U.S. and ASEAN( )

1 edition published in 1994 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The ASEAN economic growth. states are experiencing sustained, substantial Demands for popular political participation are increasing and have led to greater pluralism throughout the region. With the negotiated settlement in Cambodia, the region faces no immediate threat to its security. The U.S. can claim a great deal of responsibility for these developments. U.S. forward military presence and our system of alliances helped contain both tensions and military budgets over the last half century. U.S. support for an open world trading system made the region's export-led growth a possibility. Ironically, our influence in the region has lessened somewhat in post-Cold War years. Our reduced military posture and the ambiguity of our position with respect to potential conflict areas like the Spratlys temper our political clout. Our large trade deficits have made us something of a supplicant on economic issues. The Clinton Administration is attempting to move the region toward acceptance of more liberal economic policies by pressing for the development of the Asia Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) as a multilateral vehicle for liberalization. It has reaffirmed our commitment to maintain forward presence and respect our alliances, and has accepted participation in ASEAN's new Regional Forum. At the same time, it is pursuing aggressive bilateral approaches on trade issues and to force progress on human rights and democratization. The basic thrust of these policies is consistent with the general approach which has brought such success around the world in the "American Century": U.S. security guarantees, multilateralism, and support for open economics and democratic values. Yet we must be careful to apply this approach in a way which reflects the growing relative power of the ASEAN states, and their own limited willingness and ability to pursue cooperative solutions
 
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