WorldCat Identities

Gunzinger, Mark A.

Overview
Works: 7 works in 8 publications in 1 language and 8 library holdings
Roles: Author
Classifications: UG633, 358.4030973
Publication Timeline
.
Most widely held works by Mark A Gunzinger
Power projection : making the tough choices by Mark Alan Gunzinger( Book )

2 editions published between 1993 and 2012 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

This study concludes airpower will play an increasingly dominant role in future US contingency responses. Power projection is defined as the finite application of military power by national command authority to achieve discrete political ends outside the borders of the United States, its territories, and possessions. Power projection contingencies are characterized as wars and operations short of war, but not conflicts that are global or total in nature. Future contingencies that demand a US response may occur without warning, be time sensitive, and require short duration deployments. US forces may not have immediate access to or a previously established presence in potential theaters of operation. Due to the changing nature of the international environment and domestic priorities, the President defined a new National Secunty Strategy that emphasizes projecting military forces in response to regional conflicts. The military services are currently modifying their doctrine and force structures to reflect the shift towards power projection. The services agree power projection forces must be lethal, flexible, deployable, mobile, and capable of surviving an increasingly hostile threat environment. Comparing force characteristics reveals airpower has greater flexibility, deployability, mobility, and is better able to survive future threat environments than surface forces. New domestic imperatives have also forced the services to engage in a healthy competition to preserve their share of a shrinking defense budget. In terms of efficiency, apportioning resources according to an arcane formula that does not reflect force capabilities or the future utility of primary service functions is illogical. Building a strong power projection capability requires a thorough evaluation of the relative efficacy of air, land, and sea power to perform the power projection mission
Toward a balanced combat Air Force by Mark A Gunziger( Book )

1 edition published in 2014 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

This report suggests that it is time for DoD and the Congress to take a hard look at the mix of combat air forces that will be needed to sustain America's asymmetric airpower advantage. In particular, it argues that they should give precedence in the current age of austerity to fielding new long-range ISR and strike aircraft that will bolster the U.S. military's Asia-Pacific posture and enable it to project power rapidly when and where needed
Bureaucratic Politics and the Silver Bullet( )

1 edition published in 1996 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The FY96 National Defense Appropriations Act recently passed by Congress contains 5493 million in long-lead funding for additional B-2s that the Department of Defense did not request. This essay investigates the multiple strands underlying the B-2 funding decision, including conflicting messages sent by various Air Force sources, fiscal concerns that drove the position of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the impact of selected influences on Congress. It concludes the decision to provide additional funds was a compromise driven by bureaucratic politics that failed to determine how national security is enhanced by continuing the B-2 program past its previous mandate of 20 aircraft
Beyond The Bottom-Up Review Individual Research Project( )

1 edition published in 1996 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

On 1 September 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin publicly announced the results of the DoD Bottom-Up Review (BUR), declaring it was "a product of a comprehensive, broadly collaborative review based on the real dangers that face America in this new time."' Secretary Aspin's announcement capped the nation's second effort to determine a defense structure sized and shaped for a post-Cold War world. This essay examines the 1993 BUR, its intent, key assumptions, and the ability of the resulting force structure to support the objectives of the Administration's National Security Strategy>' of Enlargement and Engagement Joint Publication 1-02 defines "national security strategy" as "the art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security"2. The art and science of defense planning is an imperfect, iterative process, especially in a time of transition and uncertainty. This essay concludes the BUR was based on a number of assumptions that may need to be revisited in order to resolve the emerging shortfalls in U.S. defense capabilities. Doing so will require another defense review, one that builds on the lessons learned from the Bottom-Up Review to ensure the Armed Forces remain prepared to meet the dangers and challenges of the future, in peace and in war
A National Security Strategy of Cooperative Engagement for Sub-Saharan Africa( )

1 edition published in 1996 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Extending from the urban centers of South Africa to the lesser-developed regions of the arid Sahel, Sub-Saharan Africa spans the post-Cold War spectrum of political, economic, and military challenges for the United States Generally viewed as lagging in the effort to develop stable governments and self-sustaining economies, Sub-Saharan Africa is, with the exception of a few bright spots, caught in a vicious cycle of conflict, deteriorating infrastructures and humanitarian disasters Despite this apparent gloomy prognosis, Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the richest regions in the world in human and natural resources States that have evolved democratic institutions and established policies that encourage foreign investment are making considerable progress, as shown by their increasing life expectancies, greater per-capita incomes and decreasing infant mortality rates Consistent with its role as a global leader and advocate of stability, economic growth and democratic institutions, the United States will remain engaged to support Sub-Saharan Africa as it adjusts to the post-colonial, post-Cold War era
Airpower as a Second Front( )

1 edition published in 1995 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Throughout this century, nations have taken advantage of the speed, range, and flexibility of airpower to engage enemy forces on multiple fronts. Opening a second "air front" creates a synergistic effects with other operations, improving overall economy of force and increasing the probability of an outcome favorable to the United States and its allies. Of course, the concept of a second front is not new. Classic objectives in land warfare include dividing enemy forces, diverting enemy resources, spoiling advances on other fronts, and reestablishing the initiative. Airpower gives theater commanders a greater ability to realize these objectives. Unconstrained by geography, airpower can strike all of an enemy's warfighting capabilities, almost simultaneously. An enemy determined to defend against attacks from the vertical dimension must spread his resources across many points of attack, not just two or three
Towards a Flexible Theater Air Warfare Doctrine( )

1 edition published in 1996 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Billy Mitchell was right." These words hung in the foyer of the Air Force Air Command and Staff College during Desert Storm, reflecting the belief that air power had finally come of age in the skies over Iraq. As the nation learned of one successful air strike after another, it became obvious that something was significantly different about America's latest war. Expectations rose that Coalition Air Forces could win a decisive victory without the need for a costly ground assault. That the air campaign did not obviate the need for a ground offensive has not stopped post-war speculation that a few more days or weeks of strategic air attacks might have led to Saddam's capitulation. This essay traces the theoretical underpinnings of the Desert Storm strategic air campaign, examines its key assumptions, and reviews barriers to developing a more flexible doctrine for future limited conflicts. Air Force strategic air warfare doctrine is rooted in the theories of the earliest air power advocates, including Giulio Douhet, Brigadier General William "Billy" Mitchell, and the men of the Air Corps Tactical School. Although theory has continued to evolve in response to technological advances, these advocates' core belief that air power could win a decisive victory without the need to first destroy an enemy's army was also a key assumption of the Desert Storm strategic air campaign plan. In fact, the initial Air Force campaign proposal did not target Saddam's Republican Guard divisions, a critical center of gravity. As the Air Force develops joint air warfare doctrine for the 21st Century, it must ensure it remains relevant for executing options against a wide range of potential conditions and centers of gravity. This will require Air Force airmen to challenge their deeply rooted beliefs on how air power can best support the joint campaign, as well as strategic air warfare's linkage to the Air Force as an independent service
 
Audience Level
0
Audience Level
1
  Kids General Special  
Audience level: 0.41 (from 0.28 for Toward a b ... to 1.00 for Airpower a ...)

Languages