WorldCat Identities

Roncolato, G.

Overview
Works: 4 works in 4 publications in 1 language and 4 library holdings
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by G Roncolato
The U.S. Navy and the 21st Century: Uncharted Waters?( )

1 edition published in 1994 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The U.S. Navy today is faced with the challenge of defining its role in American society. Its principal opponent, the Soviet Navy, now lies largely in port, rusting, inadequately manned, and serviced by no coherent doctrine. At the same time, the recent changes in U.S. defense organization wrought by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act are placing new demands on the Navy to cooperate and operate with the other services. Long a go-it-alone service focusing on global naval warfare -- on winning command of the sea -- the Navy now faces a period in which command of the sea is largely assumed. In the emerging regional context, the Navy must now focus its energies on operations within the littoral and on the projection of American national power across the surf line. This fundamental change is having a profound impact on American naval strategy. The purpose of this paper is to explore some of the strategic implications of the changes that are transforming the world. Much of the debate in the literature today is concerned with the operational-level impacts of change, and very little attention is being paid to the long-term strategic landscape. For those operational and force structure discussions to hold validity, an assessment of the strategic changes must be made. Therefore, this essay will delve only briefly into some operational issues, and then only to illustrate some of the implications of the changing environment for the Navy. To begin the journey, a brief look at a historical example will illuminate some of the challenges the U.S. Navy faces today
Charles De Gaulle: France's Bridge to the Future( )

1 edition published in 1993 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In 1945, the end of World War II found France laid low once again, much as she had been in 1815 after Waterloo, in 1871 after Sedan, and in 1918 after the Western Front. She had had enough -- her industry was in shambles, her agriculture destroyed, her infrastructure nearly nonexistent, her military weak and divided, and, perhaps most importantly, her spirit broken. Into this scene entered a man who refused to accept the inevitability of France's demise, who had a vision of a France that was new in texture, yet married to the ideals of nationalism and greatness tied to the France of old. That man, Charles de Gaulle, succeeded like few other statesmen have; he bridged the gap between the French concept of an imperial France that died in 1940 and the strong, confident France we know today. De Gaulle accomplished this reversal of national decline by a combination of iron will and diplomatic talent. It was the lessons of his life, especially of World War II combined with his love of France that gave direction to his extremism. The French were treated like second class allies throughout the war. To Charles de Gaulle, nothing was more important in 1945, and again in 1958, than the restoration of national self confidence. The statecraft of Charles de Gaulle has many lessons for strategists. Perhaps the most significant lesson is the importance of personal leadership and interpersonal relations in foreign affairs. A second lesson involves timing. Finally, and most importantly, de Gaulle's techniques teach us how to obtain our goals with a minimum of resources. He always started from a clear understanding of his objectives and an astute assessment of the inter-relationships of world affairs. He then advanced along a broad front, using every forum available. He kept his opponents effectively controlled by confusion and deception. They seldom knew exactly where he was headed, mainly because they could, or would, never understand why he was doing what he was doing
Goldwater-Nichols: The Need for Debate( )

1 edition published in 1994 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

On 1 October, 1986, President Ronald Reagan signed into law the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, otherwise known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act It was the culmination of a four-year debate, from the disclosure of significant problems with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) system by then-chairman General David Jones, USAF, to the final conference bill that became law. Throughout the process, the Navy Department (Navy and Marines), under the leadership of Secretary John Lehman, led the effort to defeat the bill. Though the Navy has come onboard with Goldwater-Nichols faster and to a greater extent than any of the other services, many of the arguments articulated by Lehman and his cohorts remain of concern. They have not been satisfactorily answered, and bear detailed analysis and debate. Based on numerous interviews with key officials, this essay reviews the inside politics of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, then summarizes the Navy's arguments against it. A brief assessment is then provided to look at Navy's arguments in light of the effort of the defense organization to implement the main provisions of the act Finally, some concluding remarks outline serious questions about the course we are on in defense organization, and the implications of that course for the country. Constrained in both space and time, the purpose of this paper is limited to an outline of the events, and to the encouragement of a frank, open and rigorous debate on the direction we are headed Complacency is to be avoided; intelligent discourse, sometimes critical, sometimes not, is to be welcomed as a strengthening and constructive element. If that discourse is ever strangled because of dogmatism, rigidity, or centralization, then great concern will be fitting, but, perhaps, also too late
Military Theory and Peace Enforcement Operations( )

1 edition published in 1994 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

As suggested above by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, there is a very real uncertainty surrounding the ongoing debate over methods to resolve a growing number of internal conflicts that plague our world. It permeates all levels of America's policy-making elite. Statements made with a similar flavor have been delivered by several key administration spokesmen, including President Clinton himself. The situation is too new and the conditions are changing too rapidly. Right now there simply are no answers. What we have seen so far during the Clinton administration is an effort at damage control as crises crash in upon decision makers. Little time has been available to step back from the problem and attempt to develop some sort of theoretical mechanism that could put order into the world community's efforts to stem the tide of violence and war
 
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