WorldCat Identities

Terrill, W. A.

Works: 6 works in 7 publications in 1 language and 9 library holdings
Genres: Conference papers and proceedings 
Classifications: DS247.K88, 355.03305367
Publication Timeline
Most widely held works by W. A Terrill
The Military Consequences of Military Rule in Sub-Saharan Africa( Book )

1 edition published in 1983 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This study has sought to shed some light on several of the most significant after-effects of military coups in Sub-Saharan Africa. In doing this, the authors have examined both the governing military's relations with its own subordinate elements and the governing military's relationship with the society itself as a whole. The first priority here has been to examine the military consequences of military rule in terms of such things as resource allocation, fostering of professionalism and morale, as well as the provision of adequate military training. Another important aspect of military rule addressed by this study is a determination regarding the effects of military rule on the propensity for a nation to use both external and internal force. The foreign and domestic policies of military juntas are, therefore, addressed. Finally, this study is concluded with an analysis of those instances where the military has returned to power to civilian authorities with some speculation regarding the conditions which are most favorable to such a transition. Section I presents a broad overview of African militaries in general. The basic conclusion of this overview is that, to varying degrees, African militaries are afflicted with a variety of internal divisions and cleavages. These cleavages can be ethnic, tribal, linguistic generational, political and/or ideological. Nigeria, Congo-Brazzaville, Uganda, Liberia and Zaire are studied
Prospects for peace in South Asia by W. Andrew Terrill( )

1 edition published in 2003 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Serious prospects of nuclear war continue to exist in South Asia due to ongoing strategies of brinkmanship. U.S. effort and energy are vital to helping manage ongoing South Asian tensions. Appointing a special envoy to the region, along the lines of those appointed to the Middle East peace negotiations, may be useful. The Pakistani military considers the Kashmiri insurgent organizations to be a key asset, which they will not want to surrender. A major problem is that Pakistan may lose control over Kashmiri militant groups it supports. The United States has a number of key interests in South Asia, including the avoidance of a radicalized Pakistan. The United States may consider working more extensively with India as it emerges as a regional superpower
The United States and Iraq's Shi'ite clergy : partners or adversaries? by W. Andrew Terrill( )

2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Clerics are one of the most important forces guiding and directing Iraqi Shi'ite public opinion. Many of Iraq's secular leaders were sullied by their collaboration with the Sad dam Hussein regime or were tainted by their prolonged absence from Iraq, and thus do not have the potential power of the religious establishment to mobilize popular opinion. Moreover, many Shi'ite clerics are emerging as important spokesmen for their communities. Iraqi Shi'ites have been denied power proportionate with the size of their community since Iraq was established in 1920 and are determined not to be disenfranchised again. Their actions toward the United States are often calibrated with this goal in mind. All of Iraq's major Shi'ite clerics are critical of the U.S. military presence. Some are deeply critical and may choose to support anti-coalition violence should the U.S. forces remain in Iraq for an extended period of time. Those who do cooperate with the U.S. presence usually are careful to explain to their followers that they do so reluctantly and only in recognition of overwhelming U.S. power. The leading Shi'ite clerics in Iraq at this time are Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and his four colleagues who control the Najaf Hawza, a Shi'ite religious seminary and center of religious scholarship. The Hawza clerics have had a tradition of staying distant from politics, but this tradition now seems to be eroding. Sistani publicly treats the U.S. presence as illegitimate, but also engages in tacit cooperation with U.S. authorities. His continued cooperation with the United States will be vital for U.S. forces now in Iraq, but his patience is not assured
Preventing Iraq from Slipping Back into Sectarian Chaos( )

1 edition published in 2009 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

It is at least possible, if not likely, that different choices on two key 2003 U.S. decisions would have allowed the United States to withdraw most of its troops from Iraq well before the present date. The two decisions that are now widely understood to have been disastrous mistakes are the dissolution of the Iraqi Army and the decision to pursue harsh punitive actions against vast numbers of former Ba'ath party members beyond the leadership of Saddam's regime. Both decisions alienated Iraq's Sunni Arabs and opened the door for a strong al-Qaeda presence in Iraq. Despite the remonstrations of the former Chief Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), it is well understood that abolishing the Iraqi military rather than issuing a selective, voluntary recall was one of the worst mistakes of the war. Even former President George W. Bush, in a 2006 interview with journalist Robert Draper, refused to defend this decision, asserting instead that dissolving the army was contrary to the policy that he authorized. De-Ba'athification, for its part, disproportionately punished the leadership of Iraq's Sunni community as well as its professional class by removing them from their jobs or nullifying their pensions. CPA authorities and later the Iraqi De-Ba'athification Commission (which was and is dominated by former exiles) treated a large number of ordinary people as Iraq's victimizers while these people saw themselves as victims. The humiliated ex-Ba'athists usually responded to high-minded rhetoric about the price for collaboration with assertions that if you had not lived under Saddam's regime, you could not understand what it was like for those who did. Pressures to submit and conform permeated the Republic of Fear
Strategic Effects of the Conflict with Iraq. The Middle East, North Africa, and Turkey( )

1 edition published in 2003 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

A U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq will place popular pressure on a number of moderate Arab states to reduce high profile military cooperation with the United States. Following a war, Saudi Arabia will probably seek to reduce substantially or eliminate the U.S. military presence in the kingdom due to a more limited regional threat and the domestic difficulties with a U.S. presence. Other Arab nations may continue to cooperate with the U.S. militarily but seek to do so with reduced visibility following an Iraq war. Radical Middle Eastern states are deeply concerned about a U.S. presence in Iraq but will probably be constrained from opposing it through subversion due to fear they may become a future target in the war on terrorism. The politically powerful Turkish military will seek to ensure that U.S.-Turkish ties will remain intact despite disagreements over Iraq. Israel will consider using an invasion of Iraq to expel Palestinian Authority (PA) officials, increasing Arab speculation about U.S.-Israeli coordination against the Arab world. The likelihood of Israel expelling PA leaders will depend upon how the Israelis perceive Washington will respond to such an act
Kuwaiti national security and the U.S.-Kuwaiti strategic relationship after Saddam by W. Andrew Terrill( )

1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The U.S.-Kuwait military relationship has been of considerable value to both countries since at least 1990. This alliance was formed in the aftermath of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's brutal invasion of Kuwait and the U.S. decision to free Kuwait with military force in 1991. Saddam's later defeat and removal from power in 2003 eliminated an important rationale for the alliance, but a close look at current strategic realities in the Gulf suggests that Kuwait remains an important U.S. ally. It is also an ally that faces a number of serious national security concerns in the turbulent post-Saddam era. Since its independence in 1961, Kuwait has struggled to manage a number of difficult challenges related to protecting its citizens and its territory from the predatory designs of large and dangerous neighbors. The most menacing neighbors have been Iraq and Iran. While Iran has proven a threatening and subversive enemy on key occasions, Iraq is even more problematic. Kuwait has maintained a long and often extremely difficult relationship with Iraq, and a series of Iraqi governments have either pressured Kuwait for territorial concessions or suggested that Kuwait is a lost province of Iraq. Kuwait also must cope with a newly empowered Iran which has at least partially filled the Gulf power vacuum created by Iraq's political crisis. Good Kuwaiti relations with Iran are often viewed with favor by significant elements of Kuwait's Shiite community. Nevertheless, the Kuwaiti leadership fears Iranian interest in domination of the Gulf and is especially opposed to Iranian efforts to compel the United States to withdraw its military forces from the region. The United States also has a vested interest in regional political reform and ongoing democratization in Kuwait. Beyond being a valuable strategic ally, Kuwait also has shown a commitment to expanding democracy in an evolutionary way that supports U.S. aspirations for both stability and more inclusive government within the region
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Audience Level
  Kids General Special  
Audience level: 0.61 (from 0.46 for Prospects ... to 1.00 for Preventing ...)