| Contents: |
Burge, Descartes, and us / Calvin Normore -- Anti-individualism and scepticism / Barry Stroud -- When swampmen get arthritis: "externalism" in Burge and Davidson / Martin Hahn -- Burge thought experiments / Keith Donnellan -- Anti-individualism, indexicality, and character / Joseph Owens -- Competence with demonstratives / James Higginbotham -- Implicit conceptions, understanding, and rationality / Christopher Peacocke -- Burge on mentalistic explanations, or why I am still epiphobic / Fred Dretske -- Mental paint / Ned Block -- Mental content and hot self-knowledge / Bernard W. Kobes -- Phenomenal intentionality as the basis of mental content / Brian Loar -- Internalist explorations / Noam Chomsky -- TYLER BURGE REPLIES -- Descartes, bare concepts, and anti-individualism: reply to Normore -- Some reflections on scepticism: reply to Stroud -- Davidson and forms of anti-individualism: reply to Hahn -- The thought experiments: reply to Donnellan -- The indexical strategy: reply to Owens -- Tracking perspectives: reply to Higginbotham -- Concepts, conceptions, reflective understanding: reply to Peacocke -- Epiphenomenalism: reply to Dretske -- Qualia and intentional content: reply to Block -- Mental agency in authoritative self-knowledge: reply to Kobes -- Phenomenality and reference: reply to Loar -- Psychology and the environment: reply to Chomsky. |
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