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Absolute voting rules

Author: Adrian Vermeule; University of Chicago. Law School.
Publisher: [Chicago, Ill.] : Law School, the University of Chicago, [2005]
Series: Public law and legal theory working paper, no. 103.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : English
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
"A fully specified voting rule must state both a multiplier (for example, a majority or a supermajority) and a multiplicand (for example, a majority of the votes cast or a majority of all members eligible to vote in the institution). The theory of voting rules developed in law, political science, and economics typically compares simple majority rule with alternatives such as supermajority rule. This sort of  Read more...
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Details

Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Adrian Vermeule; University of Chicago. Law School.
OCLC Number: 129485180
Notes: Cover title.
"August 2005."
Title from homepage, University of Chicago Law School (viewed May 16, 2007).
Reproduction Notes: Electronic reproduction. Chicago, Ill. : Law School, University of Chicago, 2006. Available via the World Wide Web.
Description: 39 p.
Details: Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Series Title: Public law and legal theory working paper, no. 103.
Responsibility: Adrian Vermeule.

Abstract:

"A fully specified voting rule must state both a multiplier (for example, a majority or a supermajority) and a multiplicand (for example, a majority of the votes cast or a majority of all members eligible to vote in the institution). The theory of voting rules developed in law, political science, and economics typically compares simple majority rule with alternatives such as supermajority rule. This sort of comparison picks up variation in the multiplier alone. In this paper, by contrast, I consider variation in the multiplicand. The focus is on absolute voting rules, whose multiplicand is all members eligible to vote in the institution. I compare absolute voting rules to voting rules that use a standard multiplicand, under which only those present and voting are counted. The thesis is that under a range of circumstances, absolute voting rules prove normatively superior. Absolute voting rules can insure majorities against strategic behavior by minorities, combine supermajoritarian effects with majoritarian symbolism, and liberate voters from accountability when it is socially desirable to do so."

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