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Details
| Genre/Vorm: | Electronic books |
|---|---|
| Aanvullende fysieke materiaalsoort: | Print version: After Saddam. Santa Monica, CA : Rand Arroyo Center, 2008 (DLC) 2008025846 (OCoLC)232002125 |
| Genre: | Document, Internetbron |
| Soort document: | Internetbron, Computerbestand |
| Alle auteurs / medewerkers: |
Nora Bensahel; United States. Army.; et al |
| ISBN: | 9780833046383 0833046381 9780833044587 0833044583 |
| OCLC-nummer: | 341234720 |
| Opmerkingen: | "Prepared for the United States Army." "MG-642-A"--P. [4] of cover. |
| Beschrijving: | 1 online resource (xxxvii, 273 p.) : ill., maps. |
| Inhoud: | Military planning efforts -- Civilian planning efforts -- Task Force IV -- The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance -- Humanitarian planning -- Combat operations during Phase IV -- The Coalition Provisional Authority -- Building new Iraqi security forces -- Governance and political reconstruction -- Economic policy -- Essential services and infrastructure -- Assessing postwar efforts. |
| Verantwoordelijkheid: | Nora Bensahel ... [et al.]. |
Fragment:
This monograph begins by examining prewar planning efforts or postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for reconstruction. The monograph then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003; the analysis covers this period through the end of June 2004. Finally, the monograph examines civilian efforts at reconstruction after major combat ended, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuilding structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that the CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi Government. The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations.
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