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Arrovian aggregation models

저자: F T Aleskerov
출판사: Boston : Kluwer Academic, ©1999.
시리즈: Theory and decision library., Series B,, Mathematical and statistical methods ;, v. 39.
판/형식:   도서 : 영어모든 판과 형식 보기
데이터베이스:WorldCat
요약:

Investigates three formulations of the aggregation problem according to the form in which the individual opinions about the alternatives are defined, as well as to the form of desired social  더 읽기…

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상세정보

명시된 사람: Kenneth Joseph Arrow; Kenneth J Arrow; Kenneth Joseph Arrow; Kenneth Joseph Arrow; Kenneth Joseph Arrow
자료 유형: 인터넷 자료
문서 형식: 책, 인터넷 자원
모든 저자 / 참여자: F T Aleskerov
ISBN: 0792384512 9780792384519
OCLC 번호: 40668120
설명: x, 242 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm.
내용: Aggregation: A General Description --
Analysis of examples --
Arrow's General Impossibility Theorem --
Individual opinion: a formalization --
Aggregation: the synthesis problem --
Rationality of Individual Opinions and Social Decisions --
Binary relations --
Criterial model of choice --
Expansion-Contraction Axioms --
Relations between the classes of choice functions --
Social Decision Functions --
Strong locality --
Normative conditions --
Rules from Central Class --
Rationality constraints --
Comparing classes in [Lambda][superscript C] --
Arrow's General Impossibility Theorem --
Rationality constraints: further results --
Aggregation of equivalences --
Non-monotonic strongly local SDFs --
Locality --
Normative conditions --
Rules from Central Class --
Rationality constraints --
Comparing classes in [Lambda][superscript C] --
Functional Aggregation Rules --
Locality --
Normative conditions --
Rules from Central Class --
Rationality constraints: non-emptiness --
Rationality constraints: domains H, C, and O --
Comparing classes in [Lambda][superscript C] --
Rules from Basic Class --
Non-monotonic rules --
Non-monotonic rules: dual domains --
Social Choice Correspondences --
Locality --
Normative conditions --
Boolean representation of Social Choice Correspondences --
Rules from Central Class, I --
Rules from Central Class, II --
Rules from Symmetrically Central Class --
Rationality constraints: single-valuedness --
Coalitional q-federation rules under rationality constraints --
Rationality constraints: domains H, C, O.
일련 제목: Theory and decision library., Series B,, Mathematical and statistical methods ;, v. 39.
책임: Fuad Aleskerov.
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'This monograph is excellent and should belong to every social choice theorist's library. it is also highly recommended to mathematicians working in discrete mathematics since it offers many 더 읽기…

 
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