skip to content
Aum Shinrikyo, al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa reactor : implications of three case studies for combating nuclear terrorism Preview this item
ClosePreview this item
Checking...

Aum Shinrikyo, al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa reactor : implications of three case studies for combating nuclear terrorism

Author: Sara A Daly; John Parachini; William Rosenau; United States. Air Force.; Project Air Force (U.S.)
Publisher: Santa Monica, CA : RAND Corp., 2005.
Series: Documented briefing (Rand Corporation), DB-458-AF.
Edition/Format:   Book : EnglishView all editions and formats
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
Revelations about A.Q. Khan's global nuclear marketing efforts and Osama bin Laden's contact with Pakistani nuclear scientists have raised concerns about terrorist acquisition of a nuclear or radiological weapons capability. Such a capability would pose a grave danger to U.S. national security and also to the security of the international system of nation-states. Looking across three case studies, this documented  Read more...
Rating:

(not yet rated) 0 with reviews - Be the first.

Subjects
More like this

 

Find a copy in the library

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Finding libraries that hold this item...

Details

Additional Physical Format: Online version:
Daly, Sara A.
Aum Shinrikyo, al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa reactor.
Santa Monica, CA : RAND Corp., 2005
(OCoLC)607604940
Document Type: Book
All Authors / Contributors: Sara A Daly; John Parachini; William Rosenau; United States. Air Force.; Project Air Force (U.S.)
ISBN: 0833037617 9780833037619
OCLC Number: 60127433
Notes: "Prepared for the United States Air Force."
"RAND Project Air Force."
Description: xi, 75 p. : ill., 1 map ; 28 cm.
Contents: Introduction --
Case study 1: Aum Shinrikyo's attempt to acquire a nuclear capability --
Case study 2: Al Qaeda's attempts to acquire a nuclear capability --
Case study 3: Smuggled nuclear material from the Kinshasa research reactor --
Observations.
Series Title: Documented briefing (Rand Corporation), DB-458-AF.
Other Titles: Combating nuclear terrorism
Responsibility: Sara Daly, John Parachini, William Rosenau.

Abstract:

Explores attempts by terrorists to acquire nuclear materials and fabricate nuclear systems and suggests that strict controls on nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise will reduce opportunities for  Read more...

Reviews

User-contributed reviews
Retrieving GoodReads reviews...
Retrieving DOGObooks reviews...

Tags

Be the first.
Confirm this request

You may have already requested this item. Please select Ok if you would like to proceed with this request anyway.

Linked Data


<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/60127433>
library:oclcnum"60127433"
library:placeOfPublication
library:placeOfPublication
owl:sameAs<info:oclcnum/60127433>
rdf:typeschema:Book
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1040914>
rdf:typeschema:Intangible
schema:name"Nuclear terrorism--Prevention"@en
schema:name"Nuclear terrorism--Prevention."@en
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1148123>
rdf:typeschema:Intangible
schema:name"Terrorism--Prevention"@en
schema:name"Terrorism--Prevention."@en
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1110895>
rdf:typeschema:Intangible
schema:name"Security, International"@en
schema:name"Security, International."@en
schema:about
schema:contributor
schema:contributor
schema:contributor
schema:contributor
schema:creator
schema:datePublished"2005"
schema:description"Revelations about A.Q. Khan's global nuclear marketing efforts and Osama bin Laden's contact with Pakistani nuclear scientists have raised concerns about terrorist acquisition of a nuclear or radiological weapons capability. Such a capability would pose a grave danger to U.S. national security and also to the security of the international system of nation-states. Looking across three case studies, this documented briefing concludes with a set of observations. First, access to significant resources, including the sanctuary of a state, will not guarantee the success of a nonstate actor's nuclear acquisition effort. Second, even sophisticated terrorists, searching for nuclear material, have been victims of scams. Third, Russian officials appear to have been less corrupt, and Russian nuclear materials and expertise more secure than many analysts in the West have alleged. Fourth, despite inspections and safeguards, the IAEA failed to prevent the loss of reactor fuel. Finally, the study suggests that strict control s on nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise will reduce opportunities for terrorists to acquire these resources."@en
schema:description"Introduction -- Case study 1: Aum Shinrikyo's attempt to acquire a nuclear capability -- Case study 2: Al Qaeda's attempts to acquire a nuclear capability -- Case study 3: Smuggled nuclear material from the Kinshasa research reactor -- Observations."@en
schema:exampleOfWork<http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/889726628>
schema:inLanguage"en"
schema:name"Aum Shinrikyo, al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa reactor : implications of three case studies for combating nuclear terrorism"@en
schema:name"Combating nuclear terrorism"@en
schema:numberOfPages"75"
schema:publisher
schema:url
schema:workExample

Content-negotiable representations

Close Window

Please sign in to WorldCat 

Don't have an account? You can easily create a free account.