skip to content
Bank capital regulation in general equilibrium Preview this item
ClosePreview this item

Bank capital regulation in general equilibrium

Author: Gary Gorton; Andrew Winton; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, ©1995.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), working paper no. 5244.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
Abstract: We study whether the socially optimal level of stability of the banking system can be implemented with regulatory capital requirements in a multi-period general equilibrium model of banking. We show that: (i) bank capital is costly because of the unique liquidity services provided by demand deposits, so a bank regulator may optimally choose to have a risky banking system; (ii) even if the regulator prefers  Read more...
Getting this item's online copy... Getting this item's online copy...

Find a copy in the library

Getting this item's location and availability... Getting this item's location and availability...

WorldCat

Find it in libraries globally
Worldwide libraries own this item

Details

Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Gary Gorton; Andrew Winton; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 51530134
Notes: "August 1995."
Description: 1 online resource (43, [2] pages).
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), working paper no. 5244.
Responsibility: Gary Gorton, Andrew Winton.

Abstract:

Abstract: We study whether the socially optimal level of stability of the banking system can be implemented with regulatory capital requirements in a multi-period general equilibrium model of banking. We show that: (i) bank capital is costly because of the unique liquidity services provided by demand deposits, so a bank regulator may optimally choose to have a risky banking system; (ii) even if the regulator prefers more capital in the system, the regulator is constrained by the private cost of bank capital, which determines whether bank shareholders will agree to meet capital requirements rather than exit the industry.
Retrieving notes about this item Retrieving notes about this item

Reviews

User-contributed reviews

Tags

Be the first.
Confirm this request

You may have already requested this item. Please select Ok if you would like to proceed with this request anyway.

Close Window

Please sign in to WorldCat 

Don't have an account? You can easily create a free account.