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Classics in game theory

Author: Harold W Kuhn
Publisher: Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, ©1997.
Series: Frontiers of economic research.
Edition/Format:   Book : EnglishView all editions and formats
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
In the last fifteen years, game theory has become the dominant model in economic theory and has made significant contributions to political science, biology, and international security studies. The central role of game theory in economic theory was recognized by the awarding of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science in 1994 to the pioneering game theorists John C. Harsanyi, John Nash, and Reinhard Selten. The  Read more...
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Material Type: Internet resource
Document Type: Book, Internet Resource
All Authors / Contributors: Harold W Kuhn
ISBN: 0691011931 9780691011936 0691011923 9780691011929
OCLC Number: 34772151
Description: xv, 362 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
Contents: Equilibrium points in n-person games ; The bargaining problem / John F. Nash, Jr. --
Non-cooperative games / John Nash --
An iterative method of solving a game / Julia Robinson --
Equivalence of games in extensive form / F.B. Thompson --
Extensive games and the problem of information / H.W. Kuhn --
A value for n-person games ; Stochastic games / L.S. Shapley --
Recursive games / H. Everett --
Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments / R.J. Aumann and B. Peleg --
A limit theorem on the core of an economy / Gerard Debreu and Herbert Scarf --
The bargaining set for cooperative games / Robert J. Aumann and Michael Maschler --
Existence of competitive equilibria in markets with a continuum of traders / Robert J. Aumann --
The core of an n-person game / Herbert E. Scarf --
Games with incomplete information played by "Bayesian" players. pt. 1. The basic model ; pt. 2. Bayesian equilibrium points ; pt. 3. The basic probability distribution of the game / John C. Harsanyi --
The big match / David Blackwell and T.S. Ferguson --
On market games / Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik --
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games / R. Selten.
Series Title: Frontiers of economic research.
Responsibility: edited by Harold W. Kuhn.
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Abstract:

The theory of games, first given a rigorous formulation by von Neumann in 1928, is a subfield of mathematics and economics that models situations in which individuals compete and cooperate with each  Read more...

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"This volume assembles in one sourcebook the basic contributions to the field [of game theory]..."--L'Enseignement Mathematique

 
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