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Collected papers in theoretical economics.

Auteur : Kaushik Basu
Éditeur: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2005.
Édition/format:   Livre imprimé : Anglais
Résumé:

The rise of game theory around the middle of the twentieth century has profoundly affected the way economic theory is practiced. The present book is a collection of Kaushik Basu's papers on game  Lire la suite...

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Détails

Type de document: Livre
Tous les auteurs / collaborateurs: Kaushik Basu
ISBN: 0195667611 9780195667615 019566762X 9780195667622
Numéro OCLC: 474733633
Description: 2 bd
Contenu: I. INTRODUCTION; PART I. MEASURING DEVELOPMENT; 2. ON THE GOALS OF DEVELOPMENT; 3. ON MEASURING LITERACY; 4. THE GREYING OF POPULATIONS:SOCIAL STATUS, PRICES, AND MARKETS; 7. CIVIL INSTITUTIONS AND EVOLUTION: CONCEPTS, CRITIQUE AND MODELS; PART III. AGRARIAN ORGANIZATION; 8. TECHNOLOGICAL STAGNATION, TENURIAL LAWS AND ADVERSE SELECTION; 9. THE MARKET FOR LAND: AN ANALYSIS OF INTERIM TRANSACTIONS; 10. DISNEYLAND MONOPOLY, INTERLINKAGE AND USURIOUS INTEREST RATES; 11. FRAGMENTED DUOPOLY: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS TO BACKWARD AGRICULTURE; 12. THE BROTH AND THE COOKS: A THEORY OF SURPLUS LABOUR; 13. LIMITED LIABILITY AND THE EXISTENCE OF SHARE TENANCY; PART IV. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS AND CHILD LABOUR; 14. COMPACTS, CONVENTIONS AND CODES: INITIATIVES FOR HIGHER INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS; 15. THE ECONOMICS OF CHILD LABOUR; 16. A NOTE ON MULTIPLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIA / CONCEPTS AND MEASUREMENT; PART II. INSTITUTIONS, NORMS AND POWER; 5. ONE KIND OF POWER; 6. A THEORY OF ASSOCIATION. 1. INTRODUCTION; PART I. RATIONALITY AND SOCIAL NORMS; 2. THE TRAVELLER S DILEMMA:AN EXPLANATION BASED ON MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; 13. THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL CREDIT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF TRADE; 14. WHY ARE SO MANY GOODS PRICED TO END IN NINE? AND WHY THIS PRACTICE HUR; / PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY IN GAME THEORY; 3. ON WHY WE DO NOT TRY TO WALK OFF WITHOUT PAYING AFTER A TAXI RIDE; PART II. GAMES AND EQUILIBRIUM BEHAVIOUR; 4. ON THE EXISTENCE OF A RATIONALITY DEFINITION FOR EXTENSIVE GAMES; 5. STRATEGY SUBSETS CLOSED UNDER RATIONAL BEHAVIOUR; 6. GROUP RATIONALITY, UTILITARIANISM, AND ESCHER S WATERFALL; 7. INFORMATION AND STRATEGY IN THE ITERATED PRISONER S DILEMMA; PART III. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR; 8. MONOPOLY, QUALITY UNCERTAINTY, AND STATUS GOODS; 9. WHY MONOPOLISTS PREFER TO MAKE THEIR GOODS LESS DURABLE; 10. ENTRY-DETERRENCE IN STACKELBERG PERFECT EQUILIBRIA; 11. COLLUSION IN FINITELY REPEATED OLIGOPOLIES; 12. STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM IN OLIGOPOLY. Vol. 1. Development, markets, and institutions --
Vol. 2. Rationality, games, and strategic behaviour.
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Synopsis de l’éditeur

Kaushik Basu displays a rare combination of concern for social justice and a deep understanding of the fundamental issues in economic modeling. The spirit of this collection will provide inspiration Lire la suite...

 
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