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Collected papers in theoretical economics.

著者: Kaushik Basu
出版: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2005.
エディション/フォーマット:   書籍 : Englishすべてのエディションとフォーマットを見る
データベース:WorldCat
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ドキュメントの種類: 図書
すべての著者/寄与者: Kaushik Basu
ISBN: 0195667611 9780195667615 019566762X 9780195667622
OCLC No.: 474733633
物理形態: 2 bd.
コンテンツ: I. INTRODUCTION; PART I. MEASURING DEVELOPMENT; 2. ON THE GOALS OF DEVELOPMENT; 3. ON MEASURING LITERACY; 4. THE GREYING OF POPULATIONS:SOCIAL STATUS, PRICES, AND MARKETS; 7. CIVIL INSTITUTIONS AND EVOLUTION: CONCEPTS, CRITIQUE AND MODELS; PART III. AGRARIAN ORGANIZATION; 8. TECHNOLOGICAL STAGNATION, TENURIAL LAWS AND ADVERSE SELECTION; 9. THE MARKET FOR LAND: AN ANALYSIS OF INTERIM TRANSACTIONS; 10. DISNEYLAND MONOPOLY, INTERLINKAGE AND USURIOUS INTEREST RATES; 11. FRAGMENTED DUOPOLY: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS TO BACKWARD AGRICULTURE; 12. THE BROTH AND THE COOKS: A THEORY OF SURPLUS LABOUR; 13. LIMITED LIABILITY AND THE EXISTENCE OF SHARE TENANCY; PART IV. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS AND CHILD LABOUR; 14. COMPACTS, CONVENTIONS AND CODES: INITIATIVES FOR HIGHER INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS; 15. THE ECONOMICS OF CHILD LABOUR; 16. A NOTE ON MULTIPLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIA / CONCEPTS AND MEASUREMENT; PART II. INSTITUTIONS, NORMS AND POWER; 5. ONE KIND OF POWER; 6. A THEORY OF ASSOCIATION. 1. INTRODUCTION; PART I. RATIONALITY AND SOCIAL NORMS; 2. THE TRAVELLER S DILEMMA:AN EXPLANATION BASED ON MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; 13. THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL CREDIT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF TRADE; 14. WHY ARE SO MANY GOODS PRICED TO END IN NINE? AND WHY THIS PRACTICE HUR; / PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY IN GAME THEORY; 3. ON WHY WE DO NOT TRY TO WALK OFF WITHOUT PAYING AFTER A TAXI RIDE; PART II. GAMES AND EQUILIBRIUM BEHAVIOUR; 4. ON THE EXISTENCE OF A RATIONALITY DEFINITION FOR EXTENSIVE GAMES; 5. STRATEGY SUBSETS CLOSED UNDER RATIONAL BEHAVIOUR; 6. GROUP RATIONALITY, UTILITARIANISM, AND ESCHER S WATERFALL; 7. INFORMATION AND STRATEGY IN THE ITERATED PRISONER S DILEMMA; PART III. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR; 8. MONOPOLY, QUALITY UNCERTAINTY, AND STATUS GOODS; 9. WHY MONOPOLISTS PREFER TO MAKE THEIR GOODS LESS DURABLE; 10. ENTRY-DETERRENCE IN STACKELBERG PERFECT EQUILIBRIA; 11. COLLUSION IN FINITELY REPEATED OLIGOPOLIES; 12. STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM IN OLIGOPOLY. Vol. 1. Development, markets, and institutions --
Vol. 2. Rationality, games, and strategic behaviour
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"It is wonderful to see Kaushik Basu's papers being put together in these volumes. His works have greatly enriched economics and the social sciences, and it is extremely useful to have these essays 続きを読む

 
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