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Commercial policy in a predatory world

Author: James E Anderson; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 12576.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
"Predation -- extortion or theft -- imposes significant, sometimes prohibitive, costs on trade. Mutual causation of predation and trade can explain trade volume responses to liberalization that are otherwise puzzlingly 'too big' or 'too small'. Efficient commercial policy in this setting should subsidize (tax) trade when enforcement is weak (strong). The Mercantilist predilection for trade monopoly and for subsidy  Read more...
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Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: James E Anderson; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 73482050
Description: 1 online resource (1 volume).
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 12576.
Responsibility: James E. Anderson.

Abstract:

"Predation -- extortion or theft -- imposes significant, sometimes prohibitive, costs on trade. Mutual causation of predation and trade can explain trade volume responses to liberalization that are otherwise puzzlingly 'too big' or 'too small'. Efficient commercial policy in this setting should subsidize (tax) trade when enforcement is weak (strong). The Mercantilist predilection for trade monopoly and for subsidy has a rationale. Tolerance (intolerance) of smuggling is rational when enforcement is weak (strong). The switch from weak to strong enforcement explains the switch from tolerance to intolerance by British policy toward its North American colonies after 1763"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

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