컨텐츠로 이동
Competition, commitment, and welfare 해당 항목을 미리보기
닫기해당 항목을 미리보기
확인중입니다…

Competition, commitment, and welfare

저자: Kōtarō Suzumura
출판사: Oxford ; New York : Clarendon Press, 1995.
판/형식:   도서 : 영어모든 판과 형식 보기
데이터베이스:WorldCat
요약:
This book examines one of the classical issues in theoretical welfare economics in general, and in theoretical industrial organization in particular - namely, the welfare effects of increasing competition among firms.
평가:

(아무런 평가가 없습니다.) 0 리뷰와 함께 - 첫번째로 올려주세요.

주제
다음과 같습니다:

 

도서관에서 사본 찾기

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; 해당항목을 보유하고 있는 도서관을 찾는 중

상세정보

문서 형식:
모든 저자 / 참여자: Kōtarō Suzumura
ISBN: 0198289146 9780198289142
OCLC 번호: 31607364
설명: xii, 281 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
내용: 1. Entry Barriers and Economic Welfare: Partial Equilibrium Approach --
2. Entry Barriers and Economic Welfare: General Equilibrium Approach --
3. Welfare-Improving Tax Subsidy Schemes with or without Entry Barriers --
4. Strategic R & D and Economic Welfare --
5. Taxation and Welfare with Strategic Commitment --
6. Co-operative and Non-cooperative R & D with Spillovers --
7. Entry, Commitment, and Welfare: A Synthesis --
8. Alternative Firm Objectives and Strategies --
9. Non-Symmetric Equilibria --
App. A. Exemption Systems from Anti-Monopoly Law and Other Anti-Competitive Measures in Japan: Overview and Evaluation --
App. B. Collaborative Research and Development: Economic Analysis in the Light of Japanese Experience.
책임: Kotaro Suzumura.
더 많은 정보:

초록:

This book focuses on one of the classical issues in theoretical welfare economics, namely the effects on social welfare of increasing competition between firms.  더 읽기…

리뷰

편집자의 리뷰

출판사 줄거리

"Mr. Suzumura is to be commended for a mixture of modeling, case study, and synthesis that is all too rare in industrial organization, and his work should be an inspiration for the rest of 더 읽기…

 
사용자-기여 리뷰
GoodReads 리뷰 가져오는 중…
DOGObooks 리뷰를 가지고 오는 중…

태그

첫번째 되기
요청하신 것을 확인하기

이 항목을 이미 요청하셨을 수도 있습니다. 만약 이 요청을 계속해서 진행하시려면 Ok을 선택하세요.

링크된 데이터


<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/31607364>
library:oclcnum"31607364"
library:placeOfPublication
library:placeOfPublication
library:placeOfPublication
rdf:typeschema:Book
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:creator
schema:datePublished"1995"
schema:description"Two questions are posed in looking at these issues: Can competition ever be excessive in the welfare-theoretic sense? Can policy intervention in the name of keeping excessive competition under control be justified? Starting from an elementary model of oligopoly and introducing several complexities step by step, the author shows that, for a wide class of situations where economies of scale prevail, competition can certainly be excessive in the welfare-theoretic sense, but that regulation of competition may cause serious distortions of its own. The latter distortions, he argues, should be weighed against market distortions arising from excessive competition before prescribing a policy mix of competition and regulation. Those who are interested in the proper role of industrial and competition policies in the market economics will find these theoretical results both illuminating and suggestive."@en
schema:description"1. Entry Barriers and Economic Welfare: Partial Equilibrium Approach -- 2. Entry Barriers and Economic Welfare: General Equilibrium Approach -- 3. Welfare-Improving Tax Subsidy Schemes with or without Entry Barriers -- 4. Strategic R & D and Economic Welfare -- 5. Taxation and Welfare with Strategic Commitment -- 6. Co-operative and Non-cooperative R & D with Spillovers -- 7. Entry, Commitment, and Welfare: A Synthesis -- 8. Alternative Firm Objectives and Strategies -- 9. Non-Symmetric Equilibria -- App. A. Exemption Systems from Anti-Monopoly Law and Other Anti-Competitive Measures in Japan: Overview and Evaluation -- App. B. Collaborative Research and Development: Economic Analysis in the Light of Japanese Experience."@en
schema:description"In the orthodox literature on welfare economics and industrial organization, the desirability of competition in terms of social welfare, an idea which can be traced back to Adam Smith, is widely accepted, resulting in the policy-relevant belief that by increasing competition we can always improve social welfare. However, this orthodox view is challenged by another piece of conventional wisdom which is widely held among industrial policy authorities as well as people in business. According to this view, the adage 'doing to excess is as bad as not doing enough' is applicable to the welfare effects of competition as well, and government intervention for the purpose of controlling the damage caused by 'excessive competition' is proper and justified. The author examines whether promoting competition is indeed welfare-improving, or whether there exists any systematic cause for excessive competition which can be identified in the standard framework of welfare economics."@en
schema:description"This book examines one of the classical issues in theoretical welfare economics in general, and in theoretical industrial organization in particular - namely, the welfare effects of increasing competition among firms."@en
schema:exampleOfWork<http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/31652088>
schema:inLanguage"en"
schema:name"Competition, commitment, and welfare"@en
schema:publication
schema:publisher
schema:workExample
umbel:isLike<http://bnb.data.bl.uk/id/resource/GB9535606>
wdrs:describedby

Content-negotiable representations

윈도우 닫기

WorldCat에 로그인 하십시오 

계정이 없으세요? 아주 간단한 절차를 통하여 무료 계정을 만드실 수 있습니다.