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Competition in persuasion

Author: Matthew Gentzkow; Emir Kamenica; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, ©2011.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 17436.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
Does competition among persuaders increase the extent of information revealed? We study ex ante symmetric information games where a number of senders choose what information to gather and communicate to a receiver, who takes a non-contractible action that affects the welfare of all players. We characterize the information revealed in pure-strategy equilibria. We consider three ways of increasing competition among  Read more...
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Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Matthew Gentzkow; Emir Kamenica; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 753559422
Notes: Title from http://www.nber.org/papers/17436 viewed Sept. 19, 2011.
"September 2011."
Description: 1 online resource (36 pages) : illustrations.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 17436.
Responsibility: Matthew Gentzkow, Emir Kamenica.

Abstract:

Does competition among persuaders increase the extent of information revealed? We study ex ante symmetric information games where a number of senders choose what information to gather and communicate to a receiver, who takes a non-contractible action that affects the welfare of all players. We characterize the information revealed in pure-strategy equilibria. We consider three ways of increasing competition among senders: (i) moving from collusive to non-cooperative play, (ii) introducing additional senders, and (iii) decreasing the alignment of senders' preferences. For each of these notions, we establish that increasing competition cannot decrease the amount of information revealed, and will in a certain sense tend to increase it.

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