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Complementarity among vertical integration decisions : evidence from automobile product development

Autor Sharon Novak; Scott Stern; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Vydavatel: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007.
Edice: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 13232.
Vydání/formát:   e-kniha : Document : EnglishZobrazit všechny vydání a formáty
Databáze:WorldCat
Shrnutí:
This paper examines complementarity among vertical integration decisions in automobile product development. Though most research assumes that contracting choices are independent of each other, contracting complementarity arises when the returns to a single vertical integration decision are increasing in the level of vertical integration associated with other contracting choices. First, effective coordination may  Přečíst více...
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Detaily

Typ materiálu: Document, Internetový zdroj
Typ dokumentu: Internet Resource, Computer File
Všichni autoři/tvůrci: Sharon Novak; Scott Stern; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC číslo: 153303405
Popis: 1 online resource (1 v.)
Název edice: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 13232.
Odpovědnost: Sharon Novak, Scott Stern.

Anotace:

This paper examines complementarity among vertical integration decisions in automobile product development. Though most research assumes that contracting choices are independent of each other, contracting complementarity arises when the returns to a single vertical integration decision are increasing in the level of vertical integration associated with other contracting choices. First, effective coordination may depend on the level of (non-contractible) effort on the part of each agent; contracting complementarity results if coordination efforts are interdependent and vertical integration facilitates a higher level of non-contractible effort. Second, effective coordination may require the disclosure of proprietary trade secrets, and the potential for expropriation by external suppliers may induce complementarity among vertical integration choices. We provide evidence for complementarity in product development contracting by taking advantage of a detailed dataset that includes the level of vertical integration and the contracting environment for individual automobile systems in the luxury automobile segment. Using an instrumental variables framework that distinguishes complementarity from unobserved firm-level factors, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that contracting complementarity is an important driver of vertical integration choices. The findings suggest that contracting complementarity may be particularly important when coordination is important to achieve but difficult to monitor.

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